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Executive summary 
Background 
Government commitments to improving health and addressing inequalities 
are reflected in a range of policies, standards and targets, but shifting the 
focus of the NHS towards prevention has proved difficult to achieve. Much 
depends on how commissioners interpret and prioritise health and well 
being and the extent to which a preventive ethos is reflected throughout the 
commissioning cycle. Governance arrangements are intended to promote 
effective decision-making and reflect underlying principles and values. 
However governance arrangements are complex, conflicting incentives are 
layered into the health care system and there are many competing 
priorities. This study explored the extent to which governance structures 
and incentive arrangements acted as enablers or barriers to a preventive 
agenda. 
Aims 
The aim of the study was to identify the impact of governance structures 
and incentive arrangements on commissioning for health improvement and 
on the health improvement activities of practices. This raised specific 
research questions. What is the impact of performance management 
regimes? How are commissioners deploying their contractual flexibilities or 
using incentives to promote health and well being? How is public 
involvement in commissioning being achieved and to what extent is 
prevention prioritised? We also explored the concept of stewardship as an 
underlying principle of governance. 
Methods 
In order to provide a conceptual framework and inform fieldwork we 
mapped elements of performance management regimes, scoped approaches 
to governance, assessed prioritisation tools and reviewed economic theory 
on incentives of relevance to commissioners. Public health governance was 
discussed in three focus groups, one with national stakeholders and two 
with regional stakeholders. Fieldwork involved 99 semi-structured 
interviews in ten purposively selected case study sites across England. 
Interviewees included PCT Chief Executives and Executive Directors, 
practice-based commissioning (PBC) leads, members of the voluntary and 
community sector (VCS), and Chairs of Local Involvement Networks (LINks) 
and of Overview and Scrutiny Committees for Health. An on-line survey of 
PCTs provided a national context for case study findings. 
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Results 
Commissioning organisations differ in the extent to which they reflect a 
preventive ethos. Commissioning for health and well being was often 
viewed as synonymous with commissioning, spanning prevention and 
hospital care. Practice-based commissioners were often poorly integrated 
with the commissioning cycle and few had influenced their local Joint 
Strategic Needs Assessments (JSNAs). 
There are different approaches to governance, including procedures for 
managing risk within organisations, participatory governance and 
governance between organisations. Leadership for health and well being 
involved negotiating these arrangements and encouraging a public health 
perspective. Many commissioner interviewees focused on processes of 
governance within PCTs and performance management regimes were also 
largely geared to single organisational performance. Performance 
management of joint targets by Strategic Health Authorities and 
Government Offices was often poorly integrated. There was a hierarchy of 
targets and health improvement targets were not always prioritised. 
Changes in regulatory arrangements through the Comprehensive Area 
Assessment encouraged a shift towards cross-agency governance which 
better reflected the breadth of a public health system. However, partnership 
governance arrangements for a preventive agenda required development. 
Separate themed partnerships under Local Strategic Partnerships for areas 
such as safety, environment or economic development, tended to fragment 
the health and well being agenda. 
Policy and commissioning guidance emphasises public accountability 
through patient and public involvement throughout the commissioning 
cycle. Initiatives in PCTs ranged from formal involvement to large 
stakeholder events. In practice, engagement often fell short of an influential 
role in decision-making anticipated by members of the VCS and potential 
synergies between VCS activities and partnership strategies were not 
adequately exploited. Public involvement in PBC was limited. While LINks 
could provide a route for engaging with local communities, commissioners 
needed to clarify their role in formal decision-making structures. Scrutiny 
committees were typically focused on health care, often responding to 
public concern. Commissioners considered it difficult to engage the public in 
a longer term health and well being agenda and public interest was skewed 
towards health care services. 
Commissioners can incentivise provider performance through contracts, 
local reward schemes and enhancements to the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF). They can also reward behaviour change through 
individual incentives. Local Enhanced Services, a locally agreed element of 
the GMS contract, were the most widely cited incentive for the provision of 
preventive services. These were viewed as an effective and flexible 
approach to meeting targets and addressing gaps in the QOF. However, 
they were also optional and piecemeal, vulnerable in times of economic 
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downturn and had the potential to increase inequalities. Contract 
specifications and performance management were often weak. 
Other incentives included resources associated with Spearhead status or 
Freed up Resources (FUR) for successful demand management through 
PBC. Additional Spearhead resources formed part of baseline allocations, 
and seemed to have exerted little independent influence. FUR were 
contingent on the financial situation of PCTs and annual funding made it 
difficult for practices to demonstrate success. Some PCTs had introduced 
recurrent funding or pooling of resources in order to address this. There 
were shifts towards more rigorous performance management of primary 
care, deployment of contractual flexibilities, and clustering of LESs, which 
encouraged a more collaborative approach across practices. There were also 
attempts to devise local budgets which incentivised outcomes rather than 
activity. Commissioners considered it important to collaborate and not rely 
on transactional approaches. 
Prioritising investment is a key task for commissioners. Methods for 
prioritising investment within the NHS or across partnerships were under-
developed. Historically, growth money had been used for investing in health 
promotion. Interviewees emphasised the importance of demonstrating the 
business case for prevention, although few were optimistic that preventive 
services would be protected in a period of economic downturn and much 
would depend on how acute sector demand was managed. However, 
economic stringency could also spur radical restructuring and whole system 
investment. Although monitoring preventative health spend could clarify 
changes in the balance of investment, commissioners considered it difficult 
to measure. 
Programme budgeting was commonly used to investigate outliers in terms 
of costs, but there were concerns over the timeliness and quality of data. 
Many were developing their own prioritisation matrices but a comparative 
analysis of tools available demonstrates that tools vary in the extent to 
which they assess inter-sectoral aspects, changes over time, or equity. 
Conclusions 
The extent to which a public health ethos is embedded in the commissioning 
cycle is reflected in the use of incentives and contractual flexibilities for 
preventive services, methods for prioritising investment in health and well 
being and the emphasis accorded to partnership governance. Our study 
shows variation in almost every aspect of commissioning practice, leading 
to the following recommendations. 
1. Commissioning organisations should ensure that the underlying principle 
of stewardship of the health of the population informs governance 
structures and decision-making processes and is integrated into each 
aspect of the commissioning cycle. 
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2. Governance structures influence decision-making and priority-setting. 
Commissioning organisations should assess governance structures for 
their impact on decision-making in relation to health and well being. 
3. Governance processes within organisations predominate and 
commissioners, working in partnership, should also direct attention to 
governance across a local public health system. 
4. PBC is largely focused on demand management with limited involvement 
in the JSNA, health and well being partnerships or assurance for WCC. PBC 
will require further development if it is to address all aspects of the 
commissioning cycle. 
5. Local Enhanced Services are widely used by PCTs as financial incentives 
for GPs to provide preventive services but are optional and fragmented. A 
more strategic approach to the use of incentives by commissioners could 
build on evidence of pitfalls and potential areas of benefit and should also 
take account of the interplay of incentives across a health care system. 
6. Further research is needed on the use of prioritisation tools and their 
applicability for prioritising investment in health and well being over the 
longer term and across all spend. 
7. VCS involvement in commissioning strategies should be developed by local 
commissioners and ways of increasing public involvement in a preventive 
agenda explored. PCTs, PBC and local authorities should clarify the role 
LINks are to play in influencing commissioning decisions. 
8.  Further research is needed on the cost-effectiveness of public health 
interventions over the longer term in order to strengthen the business 
case for public health investment. 
9. In each of the topic areas studied we found examples of innovative 
practice. We also found PCTs working independently on key topics, such as 
prioritisation methods, which would benefit from collaboration. We 
therefore suggest that methods for knowledge exchange in relation to the 
preventive agenda are given more priority by policy makers and 
researchers and that knowledge exchange spans the range of 
organisations involved in the health and well being agenda. 
The report was completed just before a new coalition government signalled 
substantial changes to commissioning in the NHS, including the eventual 
abolition of PCTs. However the study raises generic issues related to 
commissioning for health and well being, exploring the complexity of 
governance for public health which goes beyond the governance 
arrangements of any single organisation. 
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1 Policy context and project aims 
In October 2007 the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Service 
Delivery and Organisation (SDO) programme funded the research proposal 
‘Public health governance and primary care delivery: a triangulated study’ 
as part of the research theme, ‘incentives, performance and governance’, 
under its public health research programme. 
1.1 Policy context 
Effective commissioning is a key priority for the NHS in England, reflected in 
the reinvention of Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) as commissioning 
organisations1, the World Class Commissioning (WCC) assessment 
framework2 and associated guidance3-5 and reinforced through an annual 
WCC assurance process. As part of the commissioning cycle, PCTs choose a 
minimum of ten health outcomes of which two, improving life expectancy 
and addressing health inequalities, are mandatory. This acts as a further 
lever for implementing policy commitments to improve health and address 
inequalities, reflected in a wide range of national policies, standards and 
targets. There has also been a policy emphasis on shifting the focus of the 
NHS towards prevention6, 7 and The NHS 2010-2015: from good to great. 
Preventative, people centred, productive8 emphasised the ‘paradigm shift’ 
required while at the same time improving productivity and integrated care 
centred on the patient. 
However, shifting the balance of investment towards preventing ill health 
has proved difficult to achieve.9-12 Various reasons have been put forward 
including: weaknesses in the public health evidence base and difficulties in 
assessing the cost-effectiveness of public health interventions; inadequate 
modelling of the costs of preventable morbidity and their impact on the NHS 
and the wider economy; failure to identify or track spend on prevention; 
and a lack of joined up strategies for addressing underlying determinants of 
health or the health consequences of policy. There is a widening gap in life 
expectancy between the most and least deprived populations13-15 and life 
expectancy for people in poverty has fallen further below the national 
average.16 Despite progress in meeting the objectives of Tackling Health 
Inequalities: A Programme for Action17 it has been argued 16 that better use 
of ‘tools and levers’ is required, with higher priority accorded to addressing 
health inequalities. In a review of public health performance and spending, 
the Audit Commission15 highlighted variation in performance between 
Spearhead Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs), demonstrating that ‘local 
strategies can work’ in areas of disadvantage, and therefore the potential 
influence of local commissioners. 
Whether prevention is prioritised in practice is influenced by ways in which 
commissioning for health and well being is understood and then 
operationalised at a local level. Commissioning practice is framed by a 
complex system of incentives and governance arrangements which 
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influence priorities and decision-making. These include national guidance, 
policy priorities, Public Service Agreements (PSAs) and other national and 
local targets, the assessment activities of regulatory agencies, local 
governance and performance management arrangements, the nature of 
contractual flexibilities and the layering of incentives throughout the health 
care system. 
1.2 Project aims and objectives 
The aim of the project was to identify the impact of governance structures 
and incentive arrangements on commissioning for health improvement and 
on the health improvement activities of practices. Research objectives were 
as follows. 
• Map incentives and governance arrangements in England for 
commissioning for health improvement and tackling health 
inequalities. 
• Develop a conceptual framework for public health governance. 
• Identify the impact of specific incentives, namely (a) Spearhead 
status (b) practice-based commissioning and (c) contractual 
flexibilities, on health improvement activities. 
• Chart changes in selected measures of preventative health spending 
within PCTs. 
• Assess the relative importance of specific incentives for health 
improvement for PCTs and practice-based commissioners. 
• Identify (a) the current role of the public in decision-making related 
to public health and (b) perceptions of how effective involvement 
could be achieved. 
An advisory group was established for the project and met twice. Ethics 
approval was granted by Newcastle and North Tyneside 1 REC on 20 March 
2008 (REC reference number 08/H0906/11). 
1.3 Policy developments 
The project began in 2007, soon after the publication of the Commissioning 
Framework for Health and Well Being7 which outlined eight steps for 
effective commissioning, including putting people at the heart of 
commissioning, the development of the Joint Strategic Needs Assessment 
(JSNA) and of incentives for commissioning for health and well being, 
through Local Area Agreements (LAAs), contracts, pooling budgets, direct 
payments and practice-based commissioning. However, the period of the 
project, from October 2007 to March 2010, was one of rapid change: policy 
initiatives related to commissioning and changes in regulatory 
arrangements were implemented in quick succession between December 
2007 and April 2009. Key developments were as follows. 
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• WCC2 and the implementation of the WCC assurance system.4 The first 
round of WCC panel assessments took place in 2008, during the period of 
first phase interviews. 
• Clear separation of commissioning and provider functions.1,18 This meant 
that PCTs were increasingly focused on their role as commissioning 
organisations. 
• The introduction, in April 2008, of JSNAs, as outlined in the Local 
Government and Public Involvement in Health Act (2007). 
• High Quality Care for All19 emphasised quality of care, clinical decision-
making and personalised services and influenced the shape of 
commissioning strategies. The review also recommended that ‘every 
primary care trust will commission comprehensive well being and 
prevention services in partnership with local authorities’. (p.9) 
• Major changes in national regulatory arrangements through the launch of 
the Care Quality Commission (CQC) in April 2009, and, following 
implementation of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health 
Act (2007), the introduction, also in April 2009, of the new Comprehensive 
Area Assessment (CAA).20 This aligned processes of seven inspectorates in 
assessing partnerships and outcomes across a local area. It reports 
annually on the new national indicator set (NIS) and provides a scored 
judgment on direction of travel and on use of resources. 
• For 2008/09 the annual operating framework (AOP)21 included a new 
performance framework, ‘Vital Signs’, with three tiers of performance 
measurement: national requirements, national priorities for local action 
and local priorities. Improving health and reducing health inequalities 
formed one of the five national priority areas. This was continued in the 
operating framework for 2010/11.22 
• Finally Patient and Public Involvement Forums (PPIFs) were abolished and 
replaced by Local Involvement Networks (LINks) in every local authority 
area from April 2008. Established through the Local Government and 
Public Involvement in Health Act, they were intended to give citizens a 
stronger voice in how health and social services were delivered. LINks are 
financially supported by local authorities until 2011, but for many of our 
case study sites interim arrangements were still in place. 
These changes are relevant to governance arrangements and are 
interrelated. For example, competencies for WCC include partnership 
working (competency 2) and public involvement (competency 3); the CAA 
assesses local partnerships; JSNAs are intended to inform commissioning 
intentions of partnerships and the strategic direction for PCTs (competency 
5) and Audit Commission assessments of PCTs on their use of resources 
incorporate information from WCC assessments. Inevitably these changes 
were reflected in the project and, in particular, in differences between the 
two phases of fieldwork. Moreover, the impact of the credit crunch on NHS 
finances post 2010/11 became clear with an associated emphasis on 
implementing the DH QIPP (quality, innovation, productivity and 
prevention) programme.23 By the end of 2009, almost all PCTs in our case 
study sites had separated their provider arms from their commissioning 
functions, although the organisational form to be adopted by provider 
services was still to be decided. Because of the rapid pace of change, 
second phase interviews were less of a ‘follow up phase’ than an exploration 
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of new challenges for commissioning in general and for a focus on 
prevention in particular. This led to more focused discussions on prioritising 
investment and strategies for disinvestment, the challenges of performance 
management in primary care and how collaborative commissioning 
arrangements could be developed. While the first round of panel 
assessments of all 152 PCTs, carried out as part of the WCC assurance 
process was completed in 2008, the emphasis on achieving high levels of 
commissioning performance increased during the period of the study and 
was further prompted by the publication of a ‘league table’ of PCTs in March 
2009.24 
Fieldwork therefore mirrors a period over which the WCC initiative shaped 
PCT commissioning activities and the CAA began to influence approaches to 
partnership. There were also organisational changes prompted by PCTs 
reconfiguring their roles and responsibilities better to reflect their role as 
commissioning organisations and to promote matrix working. This was the 
case in eight of our case study sites. If commissioning was the sole purpose 
of the organisation, then the post of ‘Director of Commissioning’, for 
example, appeared redundant. 
Following the results of the election in May 2010 and the formation of a new 
coalition government, the White Paper Equity and Excellence: liberating the 
NHS 25 signalled major changes in the governance of the NHS in England. 
These included the abolition of Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) in 2012, 
of PCTs from 2013, of PSAs, Overview and Scrutiny Committees (OSCs), the 
CAA after one year of operation, and arms length bodies, including the 
Health Protection Agency (HPA). Commissioning is to be carried out through 
new GP commissioning consortia reporting to a national NHS Commissioning 
Board. The timing of the project did not allow us to take account of these 
changes but the relevance of project findings in an emerging commissioning 
landscape is explored in the conclusions. 
1.4 Structure of report 
Following a description of methods (Chapter 2), the report reviews 
perspectives on governance (Chapter 3), and then summarises project 
findings on ways in which underlying values and the stewardship role 
influence the commissioning of health and well being at a local level 
(Chapter 4). Chapters five to seven discuss governance within 
organisations, governance between organisations and public accountability. 
Theories of incentives and their relevance for commissioners provide the 
context for Chapter 8 which analyses commissioners’ use of incentives and 
contractual flexibilities for health and well being. The extent to which 
commissioners invest in health gain can be gauged by their prioritisation 
and decision-making processes and Chapter 9 analyses interview and 
survey data in the context of a review of prioritisation tools currently 
available. 
Although governance and incentives are analysed separately, approaches to 
governance are linked with different kinds of incentives 26 and the final 
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section discusses what can be learned by comparing findings across these 
linked themes, drawing out implications for commissioners. 
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2 Methods 
Mixed methods were used in this study. The exploratory phase comprised a 
mapping study, rapid reviews and focus groups. The fieldwork phase 
involved documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews in ten case 
study sites, with the analysis of interviews supported by NVivo. The national 
survey adopted a quantitative approach. Methods for each research activity 
are discussed in detail below. 
2.1 Exploratory phase 
The exploratory phase informed the development of research instruments 
and provided a framework for interpreting research findings. 
2.1.1 Focus groups 
Three focus groups were carried out in different venues across England 
during 2008. The aim was to explore views of national and regional 
stakeholders on dimensions of governance relevant to public health in order 
to inform a conceptual framework for public health governance and research 
instruments for fieldwork. A total of 50 potential participants with a national 
profile or holding senior regional public health, commissioning or finance 
posts across England were contacted, and 16 were able to participate. Of 
these, four cancelled and were interviewed individually by telephone. Focus 
Group one (national) had four participants (plus five project team 
members), Focus Group two (regional) had six participants (plus six project 
team members) and Focus Group three (regional) had two participants 
(plus four project team members). Project team members acted as 
observers. Focus groups lasted for two hours and were facilitated by a 
member of the project team, guided by a focus group protocol (Appendix 
1). Focus groups and interviews were transcribed and main themes were 
identified inductively by two members of the project team on a separate 
basis and then compared. A detailed analysis (working paper 1 (SC, LM, 
DJH (http://www.dur.ac.uk/public.health/projects/project3/)), was then 
discussed by the project team, most of whom had attended one or more 
focus groups. The findings formed the basis of an article.27 
2.1.2 Scoping studies 
A descriptive mapping exercise (SC) on incentives and governance 
arrangements and their implications for the health and well being agenda 
drew on the experience of the project team and documentary analysis of 
standards, targets and performance management regimes in PCTs and local 
authorities. A scoping study of public health governance (working paper 2 
(LM, SC, DH, JM)) was based on rapid literature reviews of governance and 
public health governance and also drew on the experience of the project 
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team. It incorporated the descriptive study of targets, performance 
management regimes and regulatory arrangements and focus group 
findings. An economics review brought together economic perspectives on 
incentives, their potential relevance for commissioners, issues arising in the 
economic evaluation of public health interventions and an assessment of the 
relevance of prioritisation tools currently available (working paper 3 (JM, 
AM, HW)). Prioritisation tools were identified through existing knowledge of 
the project team, a review of key literature, web-based searches and 
through informal consultation with experts in the field. The potential 
impacts of incentives on public health were examined by applying several 
theoretical approaches found within the economic literature. This drew on 
and extended a previous review of governance, incentives and outcomes by 
Davies and colleagues.26 
2.2 Developing research instruments 
Interview schedules were informed by the exploratory phase. Draft 
interview schedules were piloted with two interviewees (reflecting public 
health expertise and the voluntary sector) and were subsequently modified 
during fieldwork to reflect (a) the role of the interviewee and (b) changes 
that had taken place between the first and second phases of field work. 
Interviews covered commissioning arrangements; the impact of 
performance management systems, regulatory arrangements and standards 
on commissioning for health and well being; incentives for commissioning 
for health and well being; decision-making and investment for health; and 
stewardship. Examples of interview schedules from each phase are included 
in Appendix two. Consent was obtained to record interviews which were 
then transcribed using a professional agency. 
2.3 Fieldwork 
Field work was carried out in ten case study sites across England: selection 
of sites and recruitment of participants are described below. 
2.3.1 Selection of case study sites 
 Sites were selected to reflect: 
• An equal number of Spearhead and non-Spearhead PCTs, to include one 
of each within London 
• Urban and rural areas 
• A spread of SHAs 
• A range of population size 
• Different ratings in relation to quality of services and use of resources as 
assessed through the Healthcare Commission Annual Health Check 
(2006/7) 
• A number of PCTs which rated highly on new national targets, as 
outlined in National Standards Local Action, Health and Social Care 
Standards and Planning Framework 2005/6-2007-8,28 including health 
inequalities and rates of smoking (as measured in the Healthcare 
Commission ratings of 2006/7) 
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• Sites which were not over researched or included in other projects 
funded under the NIHR SDO public health research programme. 
Although selection of sites took place before the WCC assurance process 
and the publication of a league table in 2009,24 a reasonable spread of WCC 
achievement was reflected with four PCTs in the top quartile, three in the 
second quartile, one in the third quartile and two in the fourth quartile. 
Selected PCTs were initially contacted by letter to request agreement in 
principle. We also identified alternative potential sites which met our 
criteria. A total of 12 PCTs declined to participate in the study due to time 
pressures or the co-existence of other research projects. However we 
achieved recruitment of sites according to our criteria. Field work consisted 
of two phases of interviews and documentary analysis, which are discussed 
in turn. 
Table 1. Selection of case study sites 
Site  Spear-
head 
Use 
of 
resources 
Urban  Pop. 
over 
300,000  
Quality 
of 
services  
New 
national 
targets 
1 No Weak Yes No Fair Weak  
2 Yes Weak No Yes Fair Weak 
3 No  Weak Yes No Fair Fair 
4 Yes Fair Yes No Good Good 
5 Yes Good Yes No Good Good 
6 Yes Fair Yes Yes Good Excellent 
7 No Weak Yes Yes Weak Weak 
8 Yes Fair Yes Yes Excellent Excellent 
9 No Fair Yes Yes Fair Weak 
10 No Weak No Yes Weak Good  
2.3.2 Recruitment 
Phase one involved interviews with 78 participants across the ten sites 
spanning PCT Chief Executives and Chairs, Directors of Commissioning, 
Finance and Public Health, Practice-based Commissioning (PBC) leads, 
Professional Executive Committee (PEC) Chairs, Non-Executive Directors 
(NEDs), Chairs of the local Overview and Scrutiny Committees (OSCs) for 
Health, voluntary and community sector (VCS) representatives on Health 
and Well being partnerships of the LSP and Chairs of the recently formed 
LINks. 
Interviews (mainly face to face with some telephone interviews) were 
carried out between October 2008 and April 2009. Table 2 shows that we 
achieved a balance of PCT decision-makers, PBC leads and community 
members across each of the sites. Where there were joint positions we 
interviewed both incumbents and in one site, due to the boundaries of the 
PCT spanning two borough councils, additional participants were recruited. 
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Table 2. Recruitment for phase one interviews 
 Case study site  
Interviewees 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Chief Executive R R R D D D D D D D 3 
Director of 
Commissioning/ 
Strategy 
R R RT R R R R R RT RT 10 
Director of Public 
Health 
R RT - RT Rx2 R R R RT R 10 
Director of Finance D R RT R R R R D R D 7 
Non-Executive 
Director 
R D R R R D R D R RT 7 
PEC Chair R R R N/A R D D R R R 7 
PBC Lead D RT RT D Rx2 R R RT RT D 8 
Health Scrutiny 
Committee Chair 
R D R Rx2 D R D D D R 6 
LINk Chair N/A N/A R N/A R R R R R D 6 
VCS member of 
Health 
Partnership 
R R RT RT 
R 
R R D R R RT 10 
Additional 
interviewees 
1   1 2      4 
Total  8 7 9 9 12 7 6 6 8 6 78 
R: Recruited (face to face interview) RT: Recruited (telephone interview) 
D: Declined; N/A: Not applicable or post not filled 
The follow up phase was intended to update developments and was more 
limited in scope, with two or three interviews carried out in each of the ten 
case study sites. Timing maximised the gap between the first phase (2008- 
2009) and the second phase (2009 - early 2010) (range 8 -11 months). 
First phase interview schedules were amended and updated (see Appendix 
2 for examples) and 21 interviews were carried out between September 
2009 and January 2010. We aimed to interview the DPH in each of the case 
study sites as well as one other. Choice of the latter was influenced by any 
major gaps in the first phase: recruitment is summarised in Table 3. There 
were four new interviewees and 17 follow up interviews. 
Table 3. Recruitment for phase two interviews 
 
Case study site 
Total 
Interviewees 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Chief Executive -  - - - - - - - -  
Director of 
Commissioning/ 
Strategy 
D - - R - - RT D D RT 3 
Director of Public Health R RT RT - Rx2 RT RT RT D D 8 
Director of Finance - - - - - - - - RT - 1 
Non-Executive Director - - - - - - - - - - - 
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PEC Chair - - - - - - RT - - - 1 
PBC Lead R RT - - R - - - - RT 4 
Health Scrutiny 
Committee Chair 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
LINk Chair - - RT R - RT - - - - 3 
VCS member of Health 
Partnership 
- - - - - - - - - -  
Additional interviewees         1  1 
Total  2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 
2.4 Interview analysis 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed with interviewees’ permission. 
A thematic analysis of first phase interviews was carried out by two 
members of the project team. This was complemented by a systematic 
analysis of all interviews supported by NVivo and a detailed analysis 
completed (working paper 4 (SC)). This involved developing five 
frameworks (PCT interviewees, PBC leads, OSC members, VCS Health 
Partnership members and LINk members) which allowed common themes in 
each group to be identified. The analysis was then extended to allow 
themes to be compared across groups of interviewees and across case 
study sites. Analysis was discussed by two members of the team and any 
differences of interpretation were resolved. Second phase interviews were 
fewer in number and were not integrated into the NVivo analysis. A 
thematic analysis was carried out and discussed by two members of the 
project team (working paper 5 (LM)). 
2.5 Documentary analysis 
A documentary analysis was carried out (SC) for each of the case study 
sites in order to compare key documents for 2008/9 and 2009/10, 
including: the five year Commissioning and Strategic Plan (CSP), the Annual 
Operating Plan (AOP), the Director of Public Health (DPH) Report and the 
JSNA. Analysis was informed by the exploratory stage and the interview 
analysis and covered the following topics: the alignment of commissioning 
intentions to local health needs; the involvement of PBC in commissioning 
for health and well being; partnership involvement; investment for health 
and well being; and incentives for health and well being services. 
The first phase of document collection was carried out as part of phase one 
fieldwork. Where documents for 2008/9 could not be easily accessed 
through website or site contacts, Freedom of Information (FOI) requests 
were made. Not all documents for 2009/10 could be accessed in time to be 
included in the analysis. 
2.6 National survey 
Drawing on key findings generated through first phase fieldwork, a national 
survey of PCTs was carried out in two waves between October and 
December 2009 (working paper 6 (AW, SP)). As a research team we 
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discussed various definitions and defined health and well being at the 
beginning of the survey as: ‘health improvement through public health 
measures focusing on health promotion, preventative care and community 
involvement’. The survey explored how PCTs prioritise, incentivise and 
commission health and well being services. After several iterations with 
input from all members of the project team, the survey was piloted on five 
contacts from PCTs, including a DPH, Director of Primary Care 
Commissioning and NEDs. The survey was piloted in September 2009 with 
results and comments fed back into a final iteration of the survey. 
The survey was distributed through the web tool Survey Monkey, an 
accessible, easy to use on-line survey. We stopped collecting responses on 
December 31st when a plateau in collection rates was reached. The survey 
was sent to 508 individuals across 146 out of a total of 152 PCTs (an 
average of 3.5 individuals per PCT), reflecting the fact that a number shared 
Boards and were treated as one PCT. Individuals fell into four categories: 
PCT Board Chair, Director of Public Health, PEC Chair or Medical Director 
and Director of Commissioning. Responses were received from 65 per cent 
(95/146) of PCTs (Table 4). The survey enabled us to locate case study 
findings in a national context. 
Table 4. Survey sample 
  Invitations sent Responses Percentage 
completed 
Board Chair 135 (full 
coverage = 146)  
34 25  
DPH 133 (full 
coverage = 139)  
52 38  
PEC Chair 
 
118 (full 
coverage = 139) 
28 24  
Director of 
Commissioning 
or equivalent 
122 (full 
coverage = 130) 
24 18  
Total 508 (full 
coverage = 555)  
138 27  
In 38 per cent (55) of PCTs there was one respondent; in 23 per cent (34) 
of PCTs there were two respondents; and in four per cent (6) of PCTs there 
were three or four respondents. Where this has implications for the analysis 
this has been accounted for and the results have been adjusted. 
2.7 Data synthesis and limitations of the study 
The study drew together findings from different research activities: scoping 
studies; qualitative data gained through interviews; quantitative data 
gained through the national survey and documentary analysis. An iterative 
approach was taken so that the focus groups and scoping studies carried 
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out in the exploratory phase informed the conceptual framework and the 
development of first phase interview schedules; first phase interviews 
influenced the development of the national survey as well as the 
documentary analysis. Analysis of first phase interviews influenced second 
phase interview schedules. For example, the importance of LESs and of 
prioritisation processes in commissioning for health and well being became 
more evident as the study progressed. 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the study had to take account of numerous policy 
changes. For example, WCC was not included in the study proposal as it had 
not yet been developed. This was a key influence on PCT strategy and 
attempts to align health needs, commissioning intentions and financial 
planning. 
There are limitations attached to each research activity. Focus group 
participants were few in number and there were last minute cancellations. 
Four of those who cancelled were interviewed separately. Documents were 
not readily available and often sourced through FOI requests and the 
analysis was limited to two years rather than the three years originally 
anticipated in the proposal. The selection of case study sites and 
recruitment of interviewees was largely as anticipated although there were 
delays in setting up LINks nationally which were reflected in our sites. Most 
interviews were carried out face to face in the first phase. 
The response rate for the national survey was 65 per cent of PCTs and this 
limits the generalisability of findings. Moreover, the national survey was 
limited to PCTs and therefore limited within-study comparisons. We 
analysed themes within and between case study sites and also compared 
findings with the national survey. Inconsistencies are highlighted in the 
report. The report integrated theoretical perspectives with both qualitative 
and quantitative data in relation to key themes. 
2.8 Developing a conceptual framework 
The exploratory studies enabled us to develop a conceptual framework 
which informed the development of research instruments and the analysis 
of case study data and is reflected in the structure of the report. This 
framework draws together separate influences on the governance of public 
health including the impact of current performance management regimes on 
the health and well being agenda (Chapter 5); the complex governance 
landscape to be negotiated for governance of public health including 
governance between organisations (Chapter 6); public involvement in 
commissioning (Chapter 7); prioritisation processes (Chapter 9) and the 
influence on commissioning of underlying values of stewardship of the 
health of the population (Chapter 4). The latter influences the 
implementation of performance management regimes, the emphasis placed 
on partnerships and public accountability, the nature of commissioning 
intentions and the extent to which they are prioritised in practice. It can 
also influence the use of incentives for preventive services. Chapter 8 
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discusses this aspect in the context of theoretical approaches to incentives 
and the impact of incentives layered into the health care system. 
Through detailed analysis of interviews and selected documents in the ten 
case study sites we were able to construct portraits of each of the ten case 
study sites (Appendix 3) and compare key themes including the impact on 
commissioning for health and well being of performance management 
arrangements, the use of incentives and decision-making processes. 
Analysis of key themes in Chapters 4–9 draws on case study and national 
survey data. 
The report draws together findings from the different phases of research, 
allowing us to locate fieldwork in a national context and interpret our data 
in a theoretical framework. 
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3 Perspectives on governance 
The notion of governance has acquired growing importance as governments 
in the UK and elsewhere reform public services and redefine their 
responsibilities and relationships. However, ‘governance’ is a notoriously 
slippery term. It may be associated with a set of principles, the exercise of 
legitimate authority through law and regulation, standards and targets, or 
processes for ensuring accountability and managing risk within 
organisations. It may also apply to the systematic application of procedures. 
Studies of governance may focus on specific topics (as in clinical 
governance), identify new challenges which arise through multi-level, multi-
agency or participatory governance arrangements, or clarify how principles 
of governance are reflected in different decision-making contexts. The 
Healthy NHS Board 29 identifies five models: the agency model, which 
includes performance management regimes, incentives and sanctions; the 
stakeholder model, which involves engaging and balancing a multiplicity of 
stakeholder views; the stewardship model which engages with civic society 
through developing a framework of shared values; policy governance which 
distinguishes between the public and those who deliver services on its 
behalf within a policy framework; and ‘generative governance’ which 
involves active dialogue across board, staff and users. A single definition is 
elusive and authors argue that ‘a sound understanding of governance 
derives from assimilating and blending this range of perspectives’ (p.40). 
However, as evidenced by the investigation into patient safety failures at 
Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust,30 some aspects of governance, 
such as meeting specific targets, may dominate at the expense of others, 
such as openness and promoting the values of the organisation. 
On the basis that the impact of governance structures on commissioning for 
health and well being should be considered in the light of different 
approaches to governance, this chapter begins by identifying perspectives 
on governance: subsequent chapters consider their relevance for 
commissioning for health and well being. Working paper two provides a 
more detailed account. 
3.1 Principles and processes 
Underlying principles of governance shape decision-making. At a cross-
national level the Worldwide Governance Indicators Project 31 includes six 
broad dimensions of governance which allow governance arrangements to 
be measured across countries, namely: accountability; political stability; 
government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of 
corruption. These broad principles are reflected in other approaches to 
governance. At an organisational level, the Independent Commission on 
Good Governance in Public Services32 notes that ‘good governance leads to 
good management, good performance, good stewardship of public money, 
good public engagement and, ultimately, good outcomes’ (p.v) and, 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      33 
 Project 08/1716/208 
building on the Nolan principles for the conduct of individuals in public life, it 
outlines six core principles of good governance. 
• Focusing on the organisation’s purpose and on outcomes for citizens and 
service users. 
• Performing effectively in clearly defined functions and roles. 
• Promoting values for the whole organisation and demonstrating the 
values of good governance through behaviour. 
• Taking informed, transparent decisions and managing risk. 
• Developing the capacity and capability of the governing body to be 
effective. 
• Engaging stakeholders and making accountability real. 
Stewardship of the health of the population has also been identified as a 
core principle of governance and is further discussed in section 3.5, below. 
At a corporate level, governance encompasses the processes, policies and 
laws affecting the ways in which corporations are controlled, and managers 
and others are held to account. The Audit Commission33 defined corporate 
governance as 
‘the framework of accountability to users, stakeholders and the wider community, within 
which organisations take decisions, and lead and control their functions, to achieve their 
objectives.’ (p.4) 
Corporate governance supports effective decision-making at Board level, 
within a clear framework of accountability and in the context of a national 
system which sets standards and monitors through independent systems of 
regulation. The nature of performance management changes over time and 
target-driven cultures have been criticised for their ‘short-termism’ and 
‘neglect of wider organisational objectives’.34 (p.6) 
It is also recognised that performance management systems have often 
proved ill-suited to complex and multi-factorial problems such as tackling 
health inequalities,35 or obesity,36 which require cross-cutting, multi-agency 
action. There may also be tensions between national targets and local needs 
assessments or local engagement.37 The impact of standards and targets on 
commissioning for health and well being is further discussed in Chapter 5. 
Underlying principles of governance and the ways in which these are 
reflected in corporate governance arrangements form only part of the 
picture. Public organisations work in complex governance landscapes and 
reflect different modes and approaches to governance. These are described 
in turn. 
3.2  Modes of governance 
While principles of governance and processes of corporate governance are 
broad and uncontentious, there is far greater debate over modes of 
governance and their impact. Modes of governance have typically been 
classified into markets, hierarchies or networks, and research has identified 
how they are reflected in public services as a whole or within specific 
organisations. This tripartite categorisation is considered too simplistic given 
the hybrid, or mixed forms of governance which currently co-exist within 
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publicly-funded services. One form of governance (such as contracts) may 
obtain within another (such as hierarchical structures). In practice, there 
are varying blends of local flexibility, central control and regulation, 
reflecting the notion of ‘soft bureaucracies’.37, 38 Modes of governance may 
co-exist in practice and the balance between them changes over time. In an 
attempt to codify approaches to governance, Treib et al.39 argue that while 
the form of government or of social organisation may reflect an ‘ideal type’ 
of hierarchy at one end and markets at the other, in practice each form of 
governance may incorporate others. They also argue that different modes of 
governance, including degree of regulation, rigid or flexible approaches to 
implementation or degree of enforceability apply to ‘steering instruments’ 
(such as incentives, regulations, social influence and control). This point is 
returned to in Chapter 5 in relation to the implementation of national 
targets. 
The NHS has elements of each form of governance, and has been described 
as a combination, from its inception, of ‘quasi-hierarchy, quasi-markets and 
quasi-networks’40 although, unlike its counterparts in Scotland and Wales, 
the English NHS has increasingly embraced elements of the market, while 
continuing to work through organisational forms based on trust. Greener 
and Powell41 document a series of tensions that have emerged in the NHS 
through governance changes, arguing that current market reforms provide 
structural competition but ‘lack any underpinning idea of how the market is 
meant to operate’. Networks, although widespread in the NHS, cannot 
depart from national directives. The NHS is still a largely centralised system 
with policies filtered through national targets and priorities reflected in 
performance management systems and detailed assessment of standards 
through the activities of independent regulatory agencies: the CQC (from 
April 2009); Monitor; the Audit Commission; and the National Audit Office. 
PCTs are also involved in a combination of horizontal partnerships (such as 
LSPs) and hierarchical relationships with SHAs and the Department of 
Health (DH). ‘The Healthy NHS Board’ 29 notes that DH at central and 
regional levels, major regulators and NHS Boards all share accountability, 
power and authority. Different approaches to governance thus co-exist and 
cross-cut and the balance across them changes over time. 
Tensions arise not solely as a result of the co-existence of markets, 
hierarchies or networks, but also as a result of ‘newer’ forms of governance 
layered on to existing arrangements, discussed in more detail below. 
3.3 Complex governance landscapes 
The three modes of governance do not capture the complexity of the 
current governance landscape which includes: governance across different 
levels; partnerships across different organisations; and participatory 
governance which emerges from attempts to increase accountability, a key 
principle of governance, through community engagement. These ‘newer’ 
forms of governance are briefly described in turn. 
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3.3.1 Multi-level governance 
There are different ‘tiers’ or ‘levels’ of governance, ranging from EU 
directives and incentives to partnerships at sub-regional and community 
levels, which interrelate in different ways, adding a further complexity to 
collaboration within any single forum or across different geographical 
areas.42 In a study of multi-level governance, Townsend43 documents the 
different levels of governance that have been instituted in England ‘at 
different dates and for different purposes’ commenting on the complex and 
sometime ambiguous accountability arrangements which emerge and the 
capacity for ‘jumping’ across different layers of governance. He argues that 
working across institutional boundaries through personal networks has been 
shown to be an important indicator of success in negotiating the 
complexities of multi-level governance, a point returned to in sub-section 
4.1.4 in discussion of the role of leadership in negotiating different 
governance arrangements. 
3.3.2  Governance between organisations 
Improving population health involves working across different sectors in 
complex partnership arrangements with multiple accountabilities, where 
success is dependent on building sustainable coalitions. Strong and 
Prosperous Communities – the Local Government White Paper calls for 
‘more visible local leadership for health and well being’,44 (p.14) joined up 
performance management and ‘greater clarity’ over agreeing and delivering 
local health and well being targets. In recognition of this, partnership 
governance frameworks and toolkits have been developed.45 Partnerships 
involve risks as well as benefits and, as Bullivant et al.46 point out, 
definitions of contracts, networks and partnerships differ between 
organisations and professional groups. Organisations need assurance from 
partners that they have identified ‘risks to overall objectives and put 
adequate controls in place’. (p.2) A report on NHS Board governance29 
highlighted the importance of partnership agreements, clear perspectives on 
care pathways, transparency of strategic decision-making and clarity of 
outcomes, all of which should be reflected in arrangements for reporting 
and monitoring performance, managing risk and ensuring accountability. 
Partnerships create new governance challenges and Tuohy,47 for example, 
writes of the need for a ‘new governance paradigm’ to ‘connote the 
processes and instruments of governing in the context of complex 
organisational networks in which no one set of actors has the authority to 
‘command and control’. Chapter 6 considers this aspect in more detail. 
As described further in Chapter 4, focus group participants and interviewees 
considered partnership arrangements as a key area of governance concern 
for public health, given the significance of partnership working in addressing 
wider determinants of health, health inequalities and investment across the 
public sector. It was also an area where governance arrangements required 
further development. 
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3.3.3  Participatory governance 
Accountability is an underlying principle of governance and community 
participation has generated a new vocabulary of governance, including 
terms such as, ‘community governance’, ‘citizen-centred governance’ and 
‘participatory (local) governance’. Barnes et al.48 define citizen-centred 
governance as follows: 
‘How to create flexible and effective organisations for delivering public services that also 
reflect the values of local democracy. We call this ‘citizen-centred governance.’ (p.1) 
The commitment of the main political parties to devolving power to local 
democratic structures, users and local communities reflects values of choice 
and diversity in public services and increased accountability. Formal 
structures for user involvement are now embedded within health, education 
and local authority systems, reflecting the importance attached to civil 
renewal, civic participation in governance and the improved delivery, 
management and scrutiny of public services. Community engagement is 
also seen as key to the regeneration of disadvantaged communities. For 
example, a capacity to engage effectively with the VCS was identified as a 
key factor for LSPs if they were to address social exclusion, help regenerate 
neighbourhoods and reduce the ‘health divide’ for their local area, although, 
as further described in this report, this has proved difficult to achieve. 
In England, the importance of public involvement and local engagement for 
health and well being was restated in A Stronger Local Voice,49 Strong and 
Prosperous Communities - the Local Government White Paper,44 and in the 
Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act of 2007. The White 
Paper Communities in Control: Real People, Real Power 50 described ways in 
which people could exert more influence in decision-making, while Real 
Involvement: working with people to improve services 51 outlined principles 
for local accountability and guidance for the NHS on the duty to involve. A 
spectrum of involvement was outlined including involvement in 
commissioning decisions across the commissioning cycle, in practice-based 
commissioning and representation in governance structures (p.28). LINks 
are also identified as a source of information for commissioning. The 
importance attached to patient and public engagement is also reflected in 
competency three for WCC. 
This policy agenda is reflected in a complex blend of structures and 
accountability arrangements at a local level. In England, structures for 
community governance include: ward-based neighbourhood or local area 
forums; regeneration partnerships; LSPs, which are intended to encourage 
VCS involvement in prioritising local services; LINks, which span health and 
social care across a local authority area; and Foundation Trusts (intended to 
promote a level of community ownership, through elected community 
governors). While the localism agenda is intended to help shift the balance 
from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, Barnes et al.48 describe a ‘patchwork of 
governance arrangements’ arising from a plethora of statutory agencies, 
partnerships and boards. Such developments co-exist with local authority 
democratic structures based on representative democracy, appointed PCT 
Non Executive Directors, and various arrangements for consultation with the 
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public over service developments. At a local level, the mix of governance 
arrangements can lead to consultation overlap, confused accountability and 
lack of clarity over representation. Moreover, newer forms of governance 
may not have formal legal status, and show lower levels of transparency 
and accountability to the public than statutory bodies. There are also 
disagreements over the extent to which a shift in meaningful engagement is 
being achieved in practice.52 
Despite the emphasis on public involvement the drive for greater efficiency 
has created services which cover larger geographical areas which are 
remote from local decision-making. These issues are of relevance for 
commissioners as commissioning organisations combine to achieve 
economies of scale but have a duty to engage with local populations. 
Also intended to strengthen patient and public accountability and working 
closely with LINks are OSCs for health, set up in 2003 to scrutinise health 
services and health issues and identify areas of concern to the public. The 
guidance53 notes that: 
 ‘The Government’s intention is that the focus of health scrutiny is on health improvement, 
bringing together the responsibilities of local authorities to promote social, environmental and 
economic well being and the power to scrutinise local services provided and commissioned by 
the NHS’. (p.6) 
Chapter 7 discusses in more detail public involvement in commissioning 
health and well being services. 
3.4 Topic-based approaches 
Governance arrangements are sometimes applied to specific topics such as 
clinical governance, digital governance or carbon governance. Despite 
arguments that clinical governance be incorporated within a system of 
integrated governance, a report by the Audit Commission 33 highlighted the 
existence of separate governance streams for clinical governance and 
corporate governance in committee structures beneath PCT Board level. It 
concludes that: 
‘The consequences of this are that the clinical arm of the organisation wants to, and often 
does, deliver excellent clinical care to some individual patients, but not always with due 
regard for equity, finance and the bigger community picture’. (p.12) 
While their report highlights the importance of combining these streams of 
governance, it also serves to draw attention to the historical emphasis on 
clinical governance and the neglect of a parallel concept of ‘public health 
governance’. Arguably, this emphasis on clinical governance and its status 
as a reference point for quality assurance works against the development of 
its public health equivalent, and governance issues central to public health 
have not been fully developed through clinical governance arrangements. In 
a qualitative study which identified the views of managers on the pattern of 
incentives and regulatory structures in place in relation to promoting health 
Hunter and Marks 54 argued that the fact that public health was largely 
considered as part of the NHS rather than as part of a wider health public 
health system lay behind the ways in which incentives and performance 
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management regimes had been skewed towards health care. Taking their 
cue from the concept of clinical governance, the authors argued that: 
‘A similar definition might be produced for public health governance to include excellence in 
promoting population health’. (p.43) 
The relationship between stewardship and public health governance is 
further discussed below. 
3.5 The concept of stewardship and public health 
governance 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) refers to collective responsibility for 
protecting the health of the population as the stewardship role of 
government:55 
‘The careful and responsible management of the well-being of the population – stewardship – 
is the very essence of good government. The health of people is always a national priority: 
government responsibility for it is continuous and permanent.’ (p.viii) 
The notion of ‘public health governance’ has been described along similar 
lines to stewardship as the ‘means by which society collectively seeks to 
assure the conditions under which the population can live with the highest 
possible level of health and well being’.56 
Developing this notion, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics57 expanded on the 
‘stewardship model’ of the state in relation to public health, commenting 
that: 
‘The stewardship state, in addition to protecting its citizens from harm caused by others sees 
itself as having a responsibility for protecting the health of vulnerable groups, such as children 
and in closing the gap between the most and least healthy.’ (p.v) 
One of the critical identifiers of whether a country exhibits good governance 
is the state of the health of its population including its commitments to 
equity and social justice; a focus on social and economic aspects influencing 
health and well being; and changing risk factors across whole populations. 
In its opening statement, the WHO Commission on Social Determinants of 
Health58 reiterates the impact of social and economic policies on life chances 
and squarely locates these issues within an agenda for social justice: 
‘The development of a society, rich or poor, can be judged by the quality of its population’s 
health, how fairly health is distributed across the social spectrum, and the degree of 
protection provided from disadvantage as a result of ill-health’. 
In the commission’s report, health and health equity are considered to lie at 
the heart of governance. Health equity is considered a marker of 
government performance and it is argued that the impact of policies on 
health equity should be assessed and the stewardship role of government 
strengthened. Policy coherence across different departments of government 
is considered key, as is identifying the health impact of policies and acting 
on the results. The subsequent application of the commission’s approach to 
England, Fair Society Healthy Lives 14 outlined the priority objectives and 
policy recommendations across six key policy areas if entrenched health 
inequalities were to be addressed. 
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If this approach to stewardship is pursued then, at a national level, the 
ways in which the stewardship role of government is discharged influence 
the extent to which a concern with the health of populations permeates 
policy development, health impact assessment, priority-setting, and 
decision-making. It may be reflected in the balance between ‘upstream’ and 
‘downstream’ interventions; in the extent to which prevention of ill health is 
resourced and prioritised; the extent of health inequalities or levels of 
citizen engagement and social inclusion. While the scope and function of the 
public health profession, the public health function and a public health 
system have been variously defined over time (see review in Hunter, Marks 
and Smith),59 analysis of the governance arrangements implied by goals of 
maximising population health, or the development of a local public health 
system remain relatively neglected. 
The stewardship role raises ethical issues and the Nuffield report 57 
suggested an ethical framework for scrutinising public health policies, also 
identifying ethical issues involved in making choices over priorities, 
including problems with the QALY as a way of evaluating public health 
programmes (see detailed discussion in Chapter 9). It reflects growing 
interest in the field of public health ethics.60 - 63 This refers to the range of 
moral and ethical issues which arise from societal approaches to protecting 
and promoting health at a group or population level, reflecting the fact that 
topics central to public health are not adequately covered in mainstream 
medical ethics.64 There are debates over the balance to be negotiated 
across personal and collective responsibility,65 across public and private 
interests, or the rights of the community over personal freedoms. Gostin 
and Stone 66 argue for a new public health ethic committed to ‘ideas of 
community and partnership’. 
Stewardship also raises ethical questions over the primacy of health and 
health improvement in decisions taken in other sectors which may have a 
bearing on health. However, as Peckham and Hann 63 point out, the Nuffield 
report did not provide a framework for the application of ethical concepts in 
public health practice. By extension, neither does it consider how the 
stewardship role is reflected in the decision-making processes of local 
commissioning organisations. 
While links can be forged between responsibilities for collective well being, 
good governance, public health governance and a stewardship role, there 
are differences in how these concepts are understood and operationalised. 
Public health ethics reflects related concerns over the notion of the common 
good, ‘health citizenship’ and the nature of civic engagement and 
responsibility. Wikler and Brock summarise ethical issues in public health as 
follows. 67 
• Decisions over the extent of personal responsibility for health. 
• Priority-setting within existing resources. 
• The use of cost-effectiveness analysis (for example, how to compare 
gains in life expectancy of the population with individual benefits from 
treatment). 
• The balance to be negotiated between maximising and equalising 
 population health. 
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• Reducing risks across whole populations, as opposed to targeting high-
risk groups. 
• Criteria for distributing resources across different groups. 
There are few studies exploring how practitioners negotiate ethical 
dilemmas in public health practice, or how ‘occupational risks’ of public 
health practice, categorised by Cribb68 as paternalism, healthism and 
‘unqualified utilitarianism’, are to be negotiated. 
This rapid review of governance provides a context for understanding 
different approaches and tensions being played out in commissioning 
practice which are reflected in the field work carried out as part of the 
project. Subsequent chapters explore the following as of particular 
relevance to public health: approaches to stewardship and public health 
governance; governance within organisations; governance between 
organisations, public involvement in commissioning for health and well 
being, the use of incentives and the extent to which health promotion is 
prioritised in decision-making processes. 
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4 The stewardship role and commissioning 
for health and well being 
There is debate over whether a value-based approach to governance, or 
‘good governance’, distorts essential generic properties of governance, that 
is, arrangements that entities make for their functioning. However, 
commissioners’ commitment to public health values can influence 
approaches to governance arrangements as well as the deployment of 
incentives. This is indicated by the relative emphasis accorded to specific 
targets, partnership governance, the use of incentives for preventive 
services or the extent to which investment in health and well being is 
prioritised. Moreover, governance of public health raises specific issues 
which may not be adequately reflected in current governance 
arrangements. 
This chapter begins by looking at the stewardship role at a local level and 
then draws on views from focus groups, interviewees and national survey 
respondents to discuss stewardship and the values which support a health 
and well being agenda (4.1). It then discusses views of practice-based 
commissioners on this topic (4.2) before discussing the impact of WCC on 
developing a public health-led model of commissioning (4.3). 
4.1 Stewardship at a local level 
There are parallels between a stewardship role at a national level, as 
described in the previous chapter, and a stewardship role at a local level. 
This is reflected in the requirement for both primary care organisations and 
local authorities, singly and working in partnership, to protect and promote 
the health of their populations. The first of the three main functions of PCTs 
is to engage with the local population to improve health and well being.69 
This has three elements. 
• Improving the health status of its population, and reducing health 
inequalities, in partnership with local authorities. 
• Contributing to well being and sustainable community development, in 
partnership with local authorities. 
• Protecting health including through a robust system of emergency 
planning. 
These aims are reflected in a range of organisational governance and 
performance management arrangements within and between organisations. 
The Healthy NHS Board 29 reiterates the importance of Boards ‘looking out 
to their patients, to their communities and to their partners’, noting ‘the 
enduring principles of high quality governance which transcend immediate 
policy imperatives and the more pressing features of the current health care 
environment.’ (p.6) The importance of adopting a whole health economy 
perspective for health improvement and prevention is emphasised, as is the 
adoption of ‘system governance’ (p.32). 
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Local authorities have a duty to promote social, economic and 
environmental well being through their Community Strategies as set out in 
the Local Government Act (2000) and now replaced by Sustainable 
Community Strategies. The Local Government and Public Involvement in 
Health Act (2007) places a statutory duty on PCTs and local authorities to 
work together on JSNAs, in order to identify the health needs of their local 
population. 
4.1.1 Changing notions of stewardship 
Interviewees and focus group participants commented on changing notions 
of stewardship, the complexity of governance for public health, the nature 
of governance failure and enablers for the health and well being agenda. 
While stewardship of the health of the population was considered a key 
principle of governance, focus group participants described how notions of 
stewardship were changing from a top-down, collective approach to one 
based on choice. This change could be tracked through the increasing 
influence of the personalisation agenda in health and social care, a 
movement towards deprofessionalisation and local engagement, increased 
interest in incentivising individual behaviour change, increasing the capacity 
to exercise choice and using social marketing techniques. However, tensions 
remained over the balance between individualised and collective 
approaches, and these were key to understanding governance of public 
health: 
‘The core of what public health faces, which is how much we emphasise the collective over the 
individual, how much the collective becomes the aggregate of individual decisions, rather than 
collective decisions imposing individual behaviour.’ (National focus group) 
Interviewees from all groups also raised questions over the balance 
between individual responsibility and the responsibility of the PCT, which 
forms part of the complexity of the governance of public health, further 
discussed below. 
4.1.2 Complexity of governance for public health 
The complexity of governance arrangements relevant to improving health 
was a common thread in the focus groups: concentrating on certain aspects 
of governance could lead to the neglect of others. For example, focusing on 
organisational governance arrangements within the NHS could deflect 
attention from underlying principles of stewardship across a local public 
health system. Effective stewardship involved understanding what could be 
achieved at national, regional, or local levels and recognising the breadth of 
a local public health system, along with the levers for change across the 
public sector. Participants argued that public health governance should 
therefore reflect a broader public health system, including social and 
economic regeneration and social care, rather than be associated with a 
professional group or with the NHS. One participant noted that: 
‘It is for me also increasingly difficult to talk about public health in isolation from sort of public 
health and well being and the broader links into local regeneration by social and economic 
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regeneration strategies. And I find it quite artificial to separate it out into a sort of 
compartment of its own, both at that end but also in terms of its links into social care, care of 
the disadvantaged too. It’s the broader basis.’ (National focus group) 
This approach would involve identifying how resources could be mobilised 
across the public sector as a whole and it was argued that current 
governance systems did not enable this debate. Public health professionals 
should clarify the health consequences of public policy, planning and 
economic decision-making. This implied holding agencies to account for 
preventable mortality across the system. 
While clarity over accountability formed a key dimension of governance, 
focus group participants argued that accountability for health and well being 
remained dispersed and pathways ill-defined. If complex arrangements 
were to be successfully negotiated and health integrated into the range of 
governance structures, effective leadership was required. 
For PCT interviewees the stewardship role was often associated with the 
effective and systematic implementation of the commissioning cycle. 
Stewardship of the health of the population was described as the raison 
d’être of the organisation, ‘the entire business of the PCT’, embedded 
throughout the commissioning cycle, and reflected in investment priorities 
and in decision-making processes. Governance was about ensuring that 
processes were in place to link together health needs, strategy, investment 
and outcomes: 
‘The stewardship lies with NHS … which is what we are, and we have to make sure that our 
information, our planning, our strategy is absolutely geared into delivering that, and that the 
contracts and the things that we buy …. . The stewardship is a really essential role, and I feel 
very responsible in terms of carrying the weight of that going forward.’ (PCT Board Chair, 
Phase 1) 
Effective governance was associated with processes of governance related 
to national standards, public accountability, a clear idea of the 
organisation’s purpose and oversight of what needed to be in place to 
achieve the best possible outcomes. For example, implementation of health 
care standards was seen as a route for demonstrating effective governance: 
‘You can demonstrate effective governance through the application of Healthcare Commission 
standards. So if you’re applying appropriate public health standards which apply to all NHS 
bodies, then you can demonstrate good governance.’ (DPH, Phase 1) 
Public health governance was described as embedded in the governance 
arrangements of the organisation. Additional structures would be 
superfluous and could serve to isolate public health which, some argued, 
had become disassociated from the health care agenda. In line with this, 
the concept of ‘public health governance’ was questioned by a number of 
interviewees: 
‘Well no, I think the phrase is unhelpful - public health governance. I think it is because in 
PCTs you have an integrated governance approach, you know, so you have integrated 
systems of direction and control, and dependent on what it is certain people either lead it or 
control it or monitor it or assure it.’ (Deputy Chief Executive, Phase 1) 
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There was therefore less discussion by PCT interviewees of the governance 
implications of working across a local public health system than by focus 
group participants. 
4.1.3 Governance failures 
Lack of governance within organisations could be demonstrated where the 
purpose of the organisation was not reflected in delivery. However, 
performance management frameworks did not necessarily support a health 
and well being agenda. In contrast to process-related targets such as 
access, outcomes were difficult to quantify or measure and were not under 
the control of a single organisation. A Director of Strategy noted: 
‘No, I think the biggest problem the whole system faces is ‘are we measuring the right things’, 
that’s the biggest failure of the system. How can you have governance if you’re not even 
measuring the right thing?’ (DS, Phase 1) 
Focus group participants highlighted a wide range of ‘governance failures’ 
including: lack of clear accountability for the persistence of health 
inequalities; not making the case with the public for investing in public 
health priorities; a lack of due diligence and timely action across a public 
health system on hazards, such as alcohol, obesity or debt; lack of a 
proactive approach to local environmental risk; failure to identify public 
health consequences of policy decisions; and a narrow approach to 
effectiveness. Performance management arrangements were described as 
ill-aligned, focused on specific organisations and weighted towards national 
priorities and targets. A further issue was the underlying downstream 
approach to public health which worked against a stewardship role. One 
participant described it as follows: 
‘The implicit model is we will allow unhealthy social systems to generate disease, but buy it 
back at the cost of a public health programme. And of course you never get out of that cycle …, 
and then efficiency in public health is seeing how quickly can we buy this back, what we’ve 
just lost, through a decision not taken here, or a view not balanced there.’ (Regional focus 
group) 
There were related concerns over lack of ‘due diligence’ in acting on 
emerging public health hazards: 
‘And that’s the bit of public health that’s been consistently lost, despite the fact that from what 
we know had we addressed alcohol, five to ten years ago, we would not be in the position we 
are now, having lost all the gains from the clinical investment.’ (Regional focus group) 
A further governance failure was the lack or inappropriate use of evidence 
and lack of clarity over how to coordinate strategies across different 
agencies. It was considered that the public health evidence base was 
skewed towards clinical work. NICE provided guidelines on interventions 
and programmes but not on policy and strategy, challenges arising from a 
public health system or the consequences of public policy on health. 
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4.1.4 Enabling a health and well being agenda 
The national survey demonstrated the role of leadership and board 
commitment as the two most important factors in enabling the health and 
well being agenda (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Enablers for commissioning for health and well being 
Leadership (71 PCTs)
Board Commitment (69)
Growth Funds (9)
Availability of Resources (47)
Performance Management 
systems (11)
Public involvement (17)
Involvement of PH team in 
commissioning (61)
Joint commissioning with LA 
(37)
PEC/PBC Consortia (20)
Other (13)
 
This finding was reflected in focus group discussions and interviewee 
accounts. In six sites, leadership of the CE and the DPH was considered key 
to ensuring that public health priorities were reflected in processes of 
governance. It was argued by some interviewees that stewardship formed 
an integral part of the public health role which included responsibility for 
safeguarding, anticipating and addressing risks. In two PCTs, the application 
to public health of the systematic approach familiar in clinical governance 
was discussed. For example, one interviewee stated: 
‘So it would be quite interesting to say take what we apply to clinical governance and debate 
whether you have the same thing in public health. So do you have people clearly in charge of 
it, have we got the right training courses so our staff are appropriately skilled, have we got the 
right processes that will get the right bits of public health in the right order. Does the board 
pay significant attention, does it receive the appropriate reports at the appropriate time. So it 
would be quite an interesting line of thought.’ (Assistant CE, Phase 1) 
This was reiterated by an interviewee in a different site, who commented: 
‘I think … something about the failures in public health governance is that for so long public 
health has just been off the radar that any governance of public health is good because at 
least it shows that there’s something to govern, if you like.’ (DS, Phase 1) 
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PCT interviewees (13 interviewees from 8 PCTs) emphasised the 
stewardship role of the PCT Board in enabling the integration of health and 
well being into the strategic plan and commissioning cycle. One participant 
noted: 
‘Our non-executive directors on the board are very much focused on the whole health 
inequalities agenda and, again, as part of that board they’re a very crucial part of ensuring 
that we keep on that line and, you know, there is no doubt the whole health inequalities 
agenda is now running through the organisation like the words on a bit of rock’. (DF, Phase 1) 
Public accountability as a key dimension of effective stewardship was more 
prominent in the definitions put forward by members of OSCs for Health, 
members of the VCS and Board Chairs, as reflected in the following: 
‘But I suppose a really good governance success would be if people felt that they understood 
how the PCT was spending its resources…, I mean actually wanted to engage with us on 
particular aspects of the public health agenda’. (PCT Board Chair, Phase 1) 
They argued that there should be greater involvement of the public and the 
VCS in commissioning for public health outcomes; more transparency in the 
decision-making processes of commissioners; and a proactive approach to 
scrutiny. Successes in health stewardship could be demonstrated through 
an appropriate balance of investment across prevention and health care 
services; pan-borough scrutiny exercises to identify common issues within a 
local authority area, greater accountability to the public and making health 
part of the wider agenda. 
There was less discussion amongst interviewees than focus group 
participants of changing notions of stewardship, due diligence or the 
governance implications of the stewardship role across a local public health 
system. 
4.2 Practice-based commissioning and the stewardship 
role 
Practice-based commissioners interpreted the stewardship role in different 
ways: providing continuity in primary care; financial stewardship; not 
destabilising the local health economy; and reducing health inequalities. 
While some interviewees were clear about the public health role of general 
practice and the potential of practice-based commissioners to commission 
health and well being services, others were concerned over the 
medicalisation of health arguing that many health and well being services 
were better located outside general practice. While PBC had a responsibility 
for maximising the use of resources, this required specific skills and raised 
fundamental tensions, described by one PBC lead as follows: 
‘I mean as a consortium we’ve got in theory £160m to spend to improve the health of our 
population. Well, if we sit down and said what will we do with £160m, we probably wouldn’t 
do everything that we’re doing at the moment, but I don’t think we’ve got the time or the 
expertise up to now or the level of sophistication to understand how we can unpick what we’re 
doing at the moment and do something more effective … this bit of tension between the health 
care intervention for the individual and the health improvement intervention for the population, 
and I think it’s that that we probably will continue to struggle with.’ (PBC lead, Phase 1) 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      47 
 Project 08/1716/208 
It was argued that their training predisposed GPs to focus on individual 
needs rather than on population needs, the wider determinants of health or 
where they could make the greatest impact on health gain for their practice 
populations, acting as either commissioners or providers. One PBC lead 
commented on this as follows: 
‘Do they have access to the necessary public health skills? Are they going to take 
responsibility for the whole population and health improvement across the whole population 
and the partnership work that that engenders and particularly in relation to the wider 
determinants of health? And I think when you set it up like that the answer’s no. They don’t 
have the skills, they don’t have the time, they don’t have the leadership and they don’t really 
have the will. And so my view is if you’re going to set something up to fail then this is the way 
to do it.’ (PBC lead, Phase 1) 
Moreover, while financial balance was important, the stewardship role for 
clinicians was focused on the needs of individual patients, described by one 
PEC chair as follows: 
So the financial balance, I understand why the government needs it to be the be all and end 
all, but it’s not the be all and end all for clinicians by any means; being able to improve the lot 
for our patients is the most important thing.’ (PEC Chair, Phase 1) 
It was argued that practices still largely thought of themselves as providers 
wanting ‘freedom and flexibilities’ and new business opportunities. As the 
health care side of general practice had expanded, GPs needed to be highly 
motivated to focus on prevention. A Director of Finance noted: 
‘They know that there are all these things that cause ill health but actually they’re paid 
primarily to be a general practitioner. So unless they’re really motivated to take time away 
from treating patients to go and do some of the other stuff, and they’d have to be really 
motivated to do that. They get well paid for treating patients.’ (Phase 1) 
In most sites, the involvement of PBC with the wider health and well being 
agenda was not well developed with the emphasis largely on demand 
management and prescribing. A Non-Executive Director commented: 
‘Well theoretically you would say that they were heavily involved. In reality, I would say it's 
fairly minimal. I would say that most family doctor practices see health and well being as a 
public health issue that’s beyond their scope, and unless they’re funded to get involved with it 
like providing screening for cardiovascular risk or providing long-term condition management 
for diabetes then I think most of them would see it as outside of their particular role.’ (NED, 
Phase 1) 
However, there were exceptions both between and within sites. In one site, 
for example, one PBC consortium was involved with local health and well 
being partnerships, but others were not. As discussed in Chapter 6, in a few 
sites there was greater engagement of practices with locality-based 
commissioning and local partnerships. 
4.3 The impact of World Class Commissioning 
WCC was seen as a route to effective stewardship through the systematic 
implementation of a strategic plan to promote health and well being through 
the commissioning cycle. It was argued that WCC was premised on a public 
health model: 
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‘And I’m finding that doors that perhaps were a bit shut are starting to open because people 
are seeing the value of public health in world class commissioning terms. You can’t just do 
cost and volume contracts any more. You’ve got to go down to the value and the efficiency and 
the effectiveness of your contracts, and that is public health. I mean you can’t get away from 
the need for a public health analysis of these things even if you wanted to.’ (DPH, Phase 1) 
However, issues were raised over the extent to which public heath 
perspectives were embedded into each aspect of the commissioning cycle, 
whether there was adequate public health input into PBC and the impact of 
different definitions of health and well being. These are discussed in turn. 
4.3.1 Public health and the commissioning cycle 
It was argued that the commissioning cycle should be public health driven 
and this should be reflected in contract specifications and performance 
management through the contract (further discussed in Chapter 8). A public 
health model would inject a population perspective into care pathway 
development, shifting the focus of commissioning decisions away from 
‘decision trees for treatment’ towards preventive services. 
In phase one, interviewees from six PCTs considered that the ‘silo working’ 
of public health, had been a barrier to commissioning for health and well 
being and PCT interviewees described a restructuring of roles and 
responsibilities to align with the commissioning cycle and encourage matrix 
working. This could result in a more influential role for public health 
through, for example, a fusion of strategic and public health directorates. In 
two case study sites, public health was described as at the heart of this 
process: 
‘We don’t have a Director of Commissioning because that’s what the organisation does … and 
we've broken commissioning down into its component parts. And when we looked at what 
strategy and planning was all about in terms of that part of the commissioning cycle… well 
that’s what Public Health teams do.’ (DS, Phase 1) 
In another site, it was argued that public health resources were limited and 
it was a question of where they could be used most effectively. 
‘I think yes, you could look at it both ways. I mean you could look at it and say well actually 
why is public health not being more actively engaged in core mainstream commissioning, or 
you could say actually there’s a limited public health resource and where do we want to put 
the emphasis … a fundamental part of our role is to get resources out of traditional 
commissioning and into lifestyle services. And so to some extent I think we have a role there in 
terms of questioning it but I don’t think that means that we need to sit on each commissioning 
group.’ (DPH, Phase 2) 
Half of the sites considered that the emphasis on health and well being was 
reflected throughout the commissioning process; four sites commented that 
shifts in emphasis were underway while one site had been largely focused 
on financial recovery. In one site there was a consensus of views across all 
groups of interviewees that health and well being was strongly embedded in 
the work of the PCT and local partners. 
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4.3.2 Public health input into practice-based commissioning 
There was variation in the extent to which public health teams worked with 
practice-based commissioners and some concerns from PBC that public 
heath prevalence data, based on electoral wards, did not align with data on 
practice populations. In six sites, there were close links between public 
health teams and PBC consortia, described as follows by a PEC Chair: 
‘Each of the clusters gets a Public Health input where a representative of Public Health comes 
and does a report and says this is your cluster as we see it. This is where you’re good, this is 
where you’re not so good, this is what your premature death rate is compared with average 
…And each of the clusters gets that input as well, which I think has enabled us to look at 
things slightly differently.’ (Phase 1) 
These findings were reflected in the national survey where 83 per cent of 
respondents said there was involvement from public health specialists with 
PBC consortia/clusters. For a small number of respondents this took the 
form of making available public health data to cluster boards. For the 
majority of these respondents, however, PBC clusters had direct public 
health support from designated consultants and specialists who sat on their 
boards or who covered several different clusters, or through public health 
involvement with PBC leads within the PCT. 
4.3.3 Changing discourse on health and well being 
While PCT commissioners identified a stewardship role with a systematic 
approach to the commissioning cycle, analysis of both first and second 
phase interviews showed that ‘commissioning for health and well being’ was 
interpreted in different ways both within and between sites. Definitions 
included the following: 
(i) Public health values were mainstreamed and led all phases of the 
commissioning cycle. Public health values pervaded decision-making 
processes and were not seen as a preserve of a public health department. 
One interviewee commented: 
‘The worst thing in the world is to see commissioning for health and well being as being 
primarily a public health role. That’s the worst thing in the world; it’s got to be the bread and 
butter of commissioning, mainstream commissioning.’ (DPH, Phase 2) 
(ii) Commissioning ‘upstream’ through partnerships and through preventive 
services. Some interviewees were clear that commissioning for health and 
well being was about focusing upstream and one interviewee further 
distinguished between ‘health’ and ‘well being’ (happiness), given that ‘the 
social gradient for health was not the same as the social gradient for well 
being’. The drivers for well being were more elusive. Some considered 
tackling geographical health inequalities as key, while others focused more 
specifically on healthy lifestyles and commissioning interventions related to 
smoking cessation, reducing obesity or promoting exercise. Multi-agency 
approaches were also highlighted. 
(iii) Commissioning public health services (although the boundary between 
preventive services and treatment services was not always clear). 
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(iv) A strap line for all activities related to commissioning and procurement, 
spanning both prevention and acute care and the patient experience 
described, for example, as ’the total business of this organisation’. This was 
the case in over half the case study sites. 
The ambiguity of the phrase was noted by a few interviewees and health 
and well being could be interpreted differently across different groups. For 
example, while it was argued that there was more interest from GPs in 
encouraging healthy lifestyles and increased public health involvement with 
PBC clusters, one DPH argued that general practice had a limited 
appreciation of the health and well being agenda: 
‘There's a barrier which is around a lack of understanding about what the well being agenda 
is about. … there's still quite a large element of general practice that views public health and 
well being in very traditional terms as being about the kind of old fashioned health promotion 
and public health campaigns with posters on the walls and adverts telling people to do this 
and not do that and handing out leaflets at general practices and in pharmacies. And whilst 
that undoubtedly has a role it’s really only a very, it’s only a part, and you could say a small 
part of the way that we would want to go about health improvement in the City. So there is a 
barrier about their lack of a real understanding about the way that we want to address a 
health improvement agenda.’ (Phase 1) 
Another DPH argued that there was an advantage in including both ‘health’ 
and ‘well being’ as it kept the preventive agenda alive: 
‘It keeps the preventative aspect on the agenda. You know, because it forces people to define 
health as opposed to health care. Because, you know, that’s the danger if you’re 
commissioning for health, then people will just think health services and then health care, 
whereas health and well being reminds them that it’s much more than that.’ (DPH, Phase 2) 
However, ambiguity also had its dangers. If everything was defined as 
health and well being then there was risk that a focus on prevention would 
be lost and reduced funding for preventive services could be masked. One 
DPH described it in these terms: 
‘I think what’s happened in the last year, in particular, and the current financial forecast for 
the NHS has made us very much refocus on NHS services again, and in a way it’s to the 
detriment of some of the partnership agenda that we were exploring through our public health 
roles in the organisation… now it’s a very tight NHS focus and getting much more efficiencies 
out of the NHS, and it may well be to the detriment of broader Public Health programmes I 
think.’ (DPH, Phase 2) 
In summary, stewardship of the health of the population was seen as 
emerging from effective implementation of the commissioning cycle and a 
recognition of the complexity of governance for public health. However this 
was complicated by changing notions of stewardship and different 
interpretations of health and well being. Differences between sites in the 
extent to which commissioning reflects a public health ethos are likely to 
become more significant as the need to make savings makes it more 
difficult to invest for health in the longer term. There was a possibility that 
economic stringency would mean that the focus of commissioning for health 
and well being would become redefined and narrowed. This could be 
reflected in how the stewardship role was being understood within local 
organisations. 
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5 Governance in PCTs 
This chapter is concerned with the impact of governance structures on 
commissioning for health and well being in PCTs with particular reference to 
the framework of standards, targets and regulation which shapes 
governance activities. Research questions include the extent to which this 
framework serves to prioritise health and well being in practice and the 
alignment of performance management regimes across organisations. The 
chapter begins by outlining the background to governance arrangements in 
PCTs (5.1) and describes standards (5.2) and targets (5.3) for health and 
well being which obtained at the time of the study, reviewing the extent to 
which such performance management regimes were seen as barriers or 
enablers for the health and well being agenda. The impact of changes in 
regulatory arrangements are then discussed (5.4) followed by the impact of 
WCC, introduced during the period of the study, as an additional 
performance management framework for PCTs (5.5). Appendix four includes 
further detail on standards and targets related to health and well being, 
including the WCC framework. 
5.1 Governance arrangements in PCTs 
PCTs have complex processes for governance and assurance. There are 
often separate committees for clinical, corporate and information 
governance but separate governance areas are increasingly organised 
within a framework for integrated governance, intended to streamline 
different systems and improve accountability. Governance arrangements 
are shaped by the range of audit and performance management activities 
which address the demands of independent regulators and by national 
guidance and policy priorities. They also serve to identify and monitor risks 
to delivery and reflect the statutory duty of PCTs to maintain financial 
balance. A key assurance framework for NHS organisations is that of clinical 
governance, described as the ‘primary quality assurance framework’ for 
NHS Boards70 and incorporated into broader governance frameworks.71 
PCT Boards have collective responsibility for performance and are 
accountable to DH through SHAs, to parliament through independent 
regulators and to local populations through OSCs. Accountability for 
contributing to partnerships and shared targets was assessed at the time of 
the study through the annual CAA. It has been argued that assessments 
through the Annual Health Check by the former Healthcare Commission, 
and since April 2009, through the CQC are considered key to ‘good 
governance’.72 However the WCC assurance process proved increasingly 
influential over the course of the study, shaping the governance structures 
of PCTs as commissioning organisations. 
Despite the key role in governance accorded to PCT Boards, Abbott et al.73 
note that strategy was crowded out by policy implementation and public 
health formed one of the low frequency topics for Board discussion. The 
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authors argued that Boards should be understood not primarily as 
accountable bodies but, in line with the analysis of Rhodes74 in his 
discussion of the shift from government to governance, as forming part of a 
policy network, that is ‘a mechanism whereby multiple agendas and 
accountabilities are negotiated within and across organisations and interest 
groups’. 
5.2 Standards for health and well being 
Standards for health and well being are included as part of the following: 
National Service Frameworks (NSFs), which followed the White Paper The 
New NHS, modern, dependable;75 separate national topic–based strategies 
(such as the obesity strategy);76 and core standards (assessed annually at 
the time of writing through the Annual Health Check). However there is 
sometimes a lag between the identification of public health problems and 
the development of national strategy. It has been pointed out, for example, 
that the national strategy for obesity did not appear until 2008 and the 
target for obesity, set in 1992, was dropped in 1997 and did not reappear 
as a PSA until 2004.13 
NICE public health guidance informs implementation of the NSFs and a 
number of the standards; it also provides guidance for evidence-based 
interventions and implementation strategies of local partnerships. The NHS 
has a legal obligation to meet NICE guidelines. The guidance is developed in 
the context of a broad conceptual framework for public health.77 However, 
the evidence base is underdeveloped as a basis for decision-making and 
prioritisation. Public health guidance often lacks the specificity of clinical 
guidance and this is particularly the case in relation to wider determinants 
of health. This point is returned to in Chapter 9. 
NSFs include measurable goals and are updated and reported on (although 
at variable intervals). Many of the NSFs include preventive components, for 
example, standards one and two of the NSF for coronary heart disease 
relate to reducing heart disease in the population and reducing smoking. 
Progress reports on NSFs and some monitoring activity was carried out via 
the improvement reviews of the former Healthcare Commission, for 
example on tobacco control,78 sexual health services,79 and diabetes.80 
However, NSF recommendations and milestones for prevention are not 
routinely prioritised in the performance management system. 
Currently, public health occupies a separate (seventh) domain in the Annual 
Health Check but public health aspects of the other domains, such as 
governance, are less well developed. Public health is also less reflected in 
the core than in the developmental standards, which are no longer 
assessed. The Annual Health Check was considered a key assurance process 
by PCT interviewees. Accounts of the impact of NICE public health guidance 
and the economic evaluation of public health interventions are discussed in 
Chapter 9. NSFs did not emerge as a separate influence and were rarely 
mentioned by interviewees. 
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5.3 Targets and performance management regimes 
Changes in targets and performance management regimes since 2007 were 
intended to promote a more streamlined approach to assessment and 
regulation, a better alignment of performance regimes and a more flexible 
approach to choosing local targets. There were changes in three year PSAs, 
in LAAs and in the AOP for the NHS. A large number of indicators remains, 
often in the form of sub-indicators or performance objectives under headline 
targets. There are 157 indicators for the 30 PSAs 81 plus ‘legacy indicators’ 
and each organisation has targets of its own. Local authorities are also 
monitored on all 198 indicators of the new National Indicator Set (NIS).82 
Research carried out by the Institute for Government34 showed that some 
targets were widely considered unachievable within a three year time frame 
(such as reductions in All Age All Cause Mortality (AAACM), others were 
difficult for some areas to achieve (such as teenage pregnancy), baseline 
data were often lacking, and some indicators were unclear or poorly 
designed. It was also difficult to prioritise across different targets. Splits 
were described between strategic priority-setting through the Sustainable 
Community Strategy and the process for deciding LAAs. Moreover, despite 
being intended as a route for local autonomy and devolved control, some 
saw statutory LAAs as further examples of top down control, with less room 
for manoeuvre than anticipated. 
Interviewee accounts of performance management regimes are discussed 
following a brief summary of targets. 
5.3.1 Public Service Agreements 
Thirty PSAs emerged from the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review 
(CSR).83 PSAs 12, 18 and 19 are of particular relevance to health and well 
being (see Appendix 4). The national inequalities target formed part of the 
PSA for 2002, 2004 and 2007 and was reaffirmed as part of PSA 18 where 
AAACM is used as a proxy measure for the life expectancy element of the 
target, although the 2010 national inequalities target, with its emphasis on 
narrowing the gap, also remained in force. AAACM is also reflected in the 
NHS Operating Framework22 (see Vital Signs, below) and as part of the NIS 
(see below), as indicator N120 in the category ‘Adult Health and Well 
Being’. Reducing health inequalities and increasing life expectancy are 
mandatory health outcomes for all PCTs as part of WCC. Encouraging 
partnerships is built into the structure of LAAs and PSAs and reflected in 
assessment procedures. 
5.3.2 The National Indicator Set and Local Area Agreements 
The 2007 CSR also announced a new NIS for local authorities and local 
authority partnerships. From 2009, the NIS was used to monitor the 
performance of local authorities and partnerships through an annual CAA. 
LSPs choose 35 locally appropriate targets from the NIS and may also 
choose additional local targets, in line with the findings of local JSNAs. 
Targets are negotiated with Government Offices. LAAs, a vehicle for 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      54 
 Project 08/1716/208 
commissioning health and well being across partnerships are now statutory 
and rolled out across England. They are the delivery mechanism for these 
targets and achievements are rewarded through an area-based grant thus 
giving local councils more control over how to distribute funding. The focus 
on LAAs underlines the importance of the joint setting and delivery of 
targets and of partnership working to deliver better outcomes in both health 
and social care. However, there are discrepancies across LAAs and WCC 
health outcomes. For example, a reduction in AAACM is a mandatory 
outcome for WCC and all PCTs, but an analysis of priorities reflected in LAAs 
shows that this target was adopted by only 88 LSPs.15 This could indicate 
that this key indicator was often perceived as an NHS issue. 
Interviewees and focus group participants expressed optimism over the 
potential role of LAAs to make public health a shared priority for wider 
partnerships and to shift the focus away from the current emphasis on 
organisational governance towards partnership governance focused on a 
local area. However, LAAs raised issues of accountability for achieving 
health outcomes and concerns were also expressed that they could become 
reduced to debates about indicators and the process of measurement: 
‘I think there’s been so much top down effort put into them, that they’re almost guaranteed to 
be delivered by the time that they’re actually put in place, and therefore it just feels like a 
grant condition, rather than actually something which is genuinely owned.’ (National focus 
group) 
Despite policy intentions to reduce the number of national targets, and 
focus on targets which were locally relevant, there was pressure to include 
specific targets and measures in LAAs, some of which were considered 
unachievable. Tensions remained between national targets and local 
priorities and the inability to target investment at local problems. However, 
where they were locally relevant, LAAs could provide a spur to local action: 
‘No one really cares how we do in relation to someone else but in the city, the councillors, 
everyone else, are thinking about their relevance to local people, you do care about that and 
also you live there and that affects how you think of your city as a place. That drive to 
localism is a really powerful governance lever.’ (Regional stakeholder) 
5.3.3 Vital signs 
The 20010/11 AOP for the NHS in England22 continued to adopt ‘Vital Signs’, 
first introduced in the 2008/09 operating framework,21 as the basis for 
assessing health outcomes and health care. There are five headline 
priorities: improving cleanliness and reducing health care associated 
infections; improving access through the 18 week referral to treatment 
pledge and improving access to GP surgeries; keeping adults and children 
well, improving their health and reducing health inequalities; improving 
patient experience, staff satisfaction and engagement; and preparing to 
respond in a state of emergency. These are associated with 13 indicators. 
‘Vital signs’ has a three tier approach: national headline priorities, as 
outlined above; national priorities for local delivery (associated with 17 
indicators) where there is some flexibility about local targets; and local 
priorities associated with 33 indicators, although PCTs are not limited to 
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these (see Appendix 4 for details of indicators for tiers 2 and 3). Where 
there is overlap with indicators in the NIS these may also be pursued 
through a LAA and there are 31 indicators in Vital Signs which form part of 
the NIS. While local priorities are to be determined and set locally, in 
consultation with patients, public, staff, the findings of JSNAs and agreed 
with partners there is no performance management role through DH. 
With the introduction of the NIS and ‘Vital Signs’ the Annual Health Check 
for 2008/09 included PSAs as set out in the 2007 CSR and Operating 
Framework as benchmark indicators to rate PCTs. It also included older 
targets set as part of the 2004 CSR, where targets were outstanding until 
2010. 
Despite attempts to streamline targets, it is questionable whether the target 
burden is reducing as ‘Vital Signs’ do not represent the whole picture. There 
is a range of existing commitments and previous priorities. Although there 
are financial penalties for failing to meet certain priorities, these do not 
apply to health improvement. It has been pointed out 13 that overlapping 
layers of standards and targets in health improvement over the last ten 
years, combined with inconsistent prioritising has led to some confusion. For 
example, fuel poverty was a priority in Tackling Health Inequalities. 
Programme for Action 17 but not included in the public health White Paper, 
Choosing Health.84 There is also some confusion about the status of health 
improvement issues not included as PSAs. The relationships between PSAs, 
the NIS, Departmental Strategic Objectives and Vital Signs are complex, 
leading to attempts to map overlaps between them, further described in 
Appendix four. 
5.3.4 Views of the target culture 
Targets and performance management regimes figured prominently in focus 
group discussions and PCT interviewee accounts. Views of performance 
management regimes derive from PCT interviewees, as knowledge of them 
was limited amongst other interviewees, including practice-based 
commissioners. 
The national survey provided an overview of the nature of support for 
health and well being. It asked respondents to rate how supportive each of 
the areas itemised in Table 5 were for the health and well being agenda. 
The percentages are the proportion of individuals who selected that 
particular rating. This demonstrated the relatively minor role played by 
various performance management regimes as compared with Board values, 
and the relatively greater role accorded to the LAA than the Annual Health 
Check. 
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Table 5. Support for the health and well being agenda 
 
 
Strongly 
support 
 
Quite 
strongly 
support 
Medium 
support 
Weak 
support 
Very 
weak 
support 
N/A Total 
responses 
Board values 
 
63.2% 
(55) 
25.3% 
(22) 
11.5% 
(10) 
0 0 0 87 
Current 
performance 
management 
systems 
14.9% 
(13) 
32.2% 
(28) 
34.5% 
(30) 
12.6% 
(11) 
4.6% 
(4) 
1.1% 
(1) 
87 
Financial 
allocations 
 
23.9% 
(21) 
17.0% 
(15) 
12.5% 
(11) 
18.2% 
(16) 
26.1% 
(23) 
2.3% 
(2) 
88 
Annual health 
check 
 
16.1% 
(14) 
34.5% 
(30) 
26.4% 
(23) 
17.2% 
(15) 
5.7% 
(5) 
0 87 
Comprehensive 
area 
assessment 
18.4% 
(16) 
47.1% 
(41) 
20.7% 
(18) 
9.2% 
(8) 
3.4% 
(3) 
1.1% 
(1) 
87 
PBC priorities 
 
8.2% 
(7) 
24.7% 
(21) 
22.4% 
(19) 
35.3% 
(30) 
9.4% 
(8) 
0 85 
PCT 
prioritisation 
methods  
27.6% 
(24) 
37.9% 
(33) 
19.5% 
(17) 
 
11.5% 
(10) 
2.3% 
(2) 
1.1% 
(1) 
87 
LAAs 
 
20.9% 
(18) 
57.0% 
(49) 
19.8% 
(17) 
1.2% 
(1) 
1.2% 
(1) 
 86 
Public 
involvement 
strategies 
9.2% 
(8) 
36.8% 
(32) 
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There was a range of views on targets, their benefits and limitations. Most 
commissioners considered performance management regimes as a driver 
for improvement, and interviewees from three PCTs commented on the 
benefits of Vital Signs for the health and well being agenda as the 
organisation could be held to account for delivery of health and well being 
targets. However, questions were raised over the extent to which indicators 
supported longer term outcomes, whether health and well being indicators 
were prioritised and over inadequate alignment across performance 
management systems. 
A key criticism was that a short-term target culture could work against a 
stewardship role and assessing longer term risks to public health: 
‘But the bit that’s missing is the kind of due diligence, the bit that in twenty years’ time … 
they’d say why on earth didn’t you notice that and do something about it? And the answer of 
course is “it wasn’t a target”. Or “it wasn’t required of us”.’ (Regional focus group) 
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Focusing on targets could distract attention from overall prevalence or gaps 
in service provision, while the annual financial planning round discouraged a 
focus on improving health over the longer term in favour of investments 
where payback was more immediate: 
‘The problem we have at the moment in having to do the yearly cycle means that some of the 
things if they’re not going to pay back within a year or two then you very quickly lose interest 
in investing in them because something that’s going to pay back this year is actually going to 
be far more of a draw to the finance team.’ (PEC Chair, Phase 1) 
There was general agreement, expressed in seven case study sites, that the 
system was overloaded with targets. One interviewee noted: 
‘I think the problem is there’s just so many of the blooming things. You know, there’s so many 
vital signs, and no matter how many new initiatives we get, they add to the existing list of 
targets that we have rather than actually reduce them.’ (DPH, Phase 1) 
Others saw Vital Signs as a blunt tool, given that some of the data were out 
of date and the evidence base needed development: 
‘The data we’re getting today is two years old, what are we supposed to make of that for 
current practice? I mean if they’re serious about vital signs, what we need is a vital signs 
roadmap or route map that for each vital sign you have to have a suite of evidence-based 
interventions.’ (DPH, Phase 2) 
As demonstrated in previous studies,35, 54 not all targets were subject to the 
same level of scrutiny: despite national targets for narrowing the health 
gap, and an emphasis on reducing health inequalities in national guidance, 
this proved no guarantee for their being prioritised in practice. Over 80 per 
cent of PCT interviewees considered that their focus remained on central 
priorities: the control of health care acquired infections; an 18 week limit on 
referral to treatment time; Accident and Emergency waits under four hours; 
and the duty to remain in financial balance. These were reflected in 
performance management arrangements with the SHA as well as with 
external regulatory bodies and were non-negotiable. They also influenced 
spending priorities. SHAs were described as being largely focused on central 
priorities, which did not always align with local priorities and targets, LAAs 
or with the public health agenda. This was the case despite inclusion of 
health improvement targets in performance management systems: 
‘I think it’s very frustrating that some of the high level targets around all-age, all-cause 
mortality, IMD, life expectancy are all supposed to be very, very important but actually when 
the Strategic Health Authority comes to visit they’re mostly interested in 18 week waits … I’m 
glad that we do have priorities for performance management, and I’m a real strong advocate 
for if they’re the right targets then if we deliver on it we’ll have the impact that we desire. But 
it does sometimes feel, as I said, like we’ve got them but actually people aren’t particularly 
interested in them.’ (DPH, Phase 1) 
Moreover, electoral cycles predisposed to short-term targets, and only some 
targets were considered ‘career limiting’. 
‘I just think the realpolitik is what am I going to get sacked over, failure to deliver smoking 
cessation or failure to deliver the 18 week target? When smoking cessation has the same 
value and priority as the other 152 targets then it’ll get the same emphasis. Have you heard of 
a Chief Executive in the NHS being sacked for failing to deliver smoking cessation? Have you 
heard of them being sacked for failing to deliver 18 weeks?’ (Director of Strategy, Phase 1) 
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Moreover, trajectories agreed with the SHA could prove unrealistic in 
practice. Two PCTs gave examples of challenging smoking cessation targets 
which had been met but without the trajectory being redefined. 
Performance management regimes were also criticised by commissioners in 
eight case study sites for encouraging issues to be considered in isolation 
and, in particular, for focusing on process measures and activity rather than 
on outcomes. Measurement of processes was often appropriate for 
secondary care activity but raised a number of issues for health and well 
being. Links between processes and outcomes were not always clear: as 
one example, measuring progress towards meeting the target for four week 
quitters or 13 week quitters for smoking cessation was not a valid indicator 
of improved outcomes. Furthermore, processes for achieving the targets 
were not under commissioner control. One interviewee described this in 
terms of the AAACM target: 
‘Now, if you look at targets, for example, for All Age All Cause Mortality, it’s very different 
because …. you can’t manage the process of reducing All Age All Cause Mortality in anything 
like the same way that you can manage the process of waiting times for surgery. You know, 
you just can’t say right well if we invest a million pounds in this it will bring it down by this 
much or if we invest a million pounds there it will bring it down by that much and therefore 
that’s what we’ll do. And the second thing is that even if you could do that and you reduced 
All Age All Cause Mortality which for men in [name] at the moment is somewhere around 600 
per 100,000 population, supposing they reduced it to 550, would we want to reduce it further? 
Well yes of course we would because ideally we get it as low as we can.’ (DPH, Phase 1) 
It was argued that targets should be outcomes-based and influenced by 
clinicians and public health. 
In five case study sites, and including the two highest performing sites, 
targets were viewed in a different light. It was argued that, for high 
performing organisations, targets should be a by product of culture, 
systems and processes, rather than the focus of endeavour. What lay 
behind the target needed to be understood in order to avoid ‘hitting the 
target but missing the point’. Only by performing well against targets in 
general should organisations be given the freedom to innovate. As reflected 
in the discussion on prioritising investment in health and well being 
(Chapter 9), some interviewees also emphasised that the health and well 
being agenda was an ‘earned agenda’, dependent on the achievement of 
financial balance and delivering key targets. This was reflected across both 
PBC and PCT interviewees: 
‘Where you have a culture in performance, you keep financial balance, you deliver the targets 
and that’s what gives you the platform from which to practice the public health agenda. … (it) 
gives you the licence to do the rest.’ (PCT Chief Executive, Phase 1) 
The same sentiment was echoed by a PBC lead from another site: 
‘I mean well commissioning isn’t that old anyway and therefore in the first couple of years of 
commissioning, you’ve got to go for the big hits really and prescribing and scheduled care 
alternatives to hospital for kind of outpatient-type procedures and surgery, these are all the 
obvious early areas of work. I think once you’ve got beyond that bulge, which has to happen 
first I think, then we certainly as a cluster have started to think on the health and well being 
strategy.’ (PBC lead, Phase 1) 
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5.3.5 Views over alignment of performance management regimes 
PCTs typically tried to achieve alignment across the range of targets, 
including WCC health outcomes, LAAs and Vital Signs but this was not 
always considered possible as NHS targets were not the same as LAAs. QOF 
targets also differed from PCT targets. There were challenges in achieving 
alignment across LAAs where PCTs spanned a number of local authorities. 
However there had been improvements in alignment across the regulators, 
as one interviewee commented: 
 ‘Eighty per cent of our time was spent responding to different external organisations which 
were asking slightly different questions and wanting all the different formats.’ (Associate 
DPH, Phase 2) 
It was argued that alignment was more evident at a strategic level than at 
the ‘sharp end’ of assessment. Concern over a lack of alignment across the 
SHA and Government Office was of concern to commissioners in all case 
study sites. One interviewee commented: 
‘So Monitor, the Care Quality Commission, the Strategic Health Authority and the Audit 
Commission, and they all have very, very different agendas, all of which impact on different 
bits of the health care and indeed social care system, and indeed more broadly into the sort of 
partnership agenda with comprehensive area assessment, and they are aligned in the very 
broadest most strategic sense, but when it comes to checking things at the sharp end, of 
course they don’t join up.’ (DS, Phase 2) 
The existence of an intermediate layer of performance management, in the 
form of the SHA, was a major difference between the NHS and local 
government and this was reflected in difficulties over negotiating local 
targets. Lack of alignment between PCT and SHA priorities was seen as a 
barrier in five case study sites. Failure to integrate performance 
management regimes was commonly cited as a governance issue and 
reflected in difficulties in monitoring LAAs. One interviewee commented: 
‘I think the SHA struggled to understand the Local Area Agreement, have failed to actually 
integrate its performance management into their performance management systems and 
haven’t even managed to turn on the Government Office computer that we can monitor our 
own LAA through… So it is not joined up, the LAA are monitored down the one side, and in 
fact we were filling CAA monitoring and LAA monitoring stuff recently, at the same time as 
filling in exactly the same forms, with slightly different data for world class commissioning 
outcomes - I mean what a nonsense, no integration across. No integration across Government 
Office and SHA.’ (PCT Chief Executive, Phase 1) 
Interviewees also commented on the lack of alignment between ambitious 
SHA indicators and targets and those negotiated with Government Office 
and reflected in the LAA. As a result PCTs often ended up attempting to 
renegotiate one common target where councils were unwilling to sign up to 
‘undeliverable targets’ or working towards two different targets with dual 
reporting. It was pointed out, for example, that ‘Vital Signs’ trajectories 
were ‘refreshed’ at a different time to the LAA indicators which could create 
problems: one interviewee described how a range of targets could be 
related to one indicator, depending on whether it formed part of the LAA or 
of Vital Signs and this led to ambiguity which made it difficult to make 
progress against the target. 
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At a local level, however, there were joint approaches to performance 
management across PCTs and local authorities. In one site, some 
performance management staff were paid by the PCT but managed by the 
council so that a coordinated management process was in place. Some PCTs 
had developed web-based systems for monitoring strategic objectives, 
including partnership objectives which were shared with the local authority 
and which, it was argued, helped to keep a focus on the health and well 
being agenda. 
5.4 Regulation and monitoring 
PCTs are regulated by the CQC and the Audit Commission. Local monitoring 
is carried out through OSCs and LINks. It has been pointed out13 that, 
internationally, the Healthcare Commission was the only regulator with 
statutory responsibilities to assess health care organisations in relation to 
public health delivery - a feature, it is argued, that has proved beneficial for 
local health improvement (p. 41). From April 2010, after a transitional year, 
the CQC replaced the Annual Health Check with a new system of provider 
registration and separate assessment of PCTs as commissioners, working 
more closely with other regulators. The focus is on quality of care measured 
across six domains of quality.85 
In its capacity as auditor of organisations which spend significant amounts 
of public money, the Audit Commission (though local auditors) assesses 
PCTs and produces the annual Auditors’ Local Evaluation (ALE letter). 
Through the ‘use of resources framework’ (introduced in May 2008) auditors 
consider how well organisations are managing and using their resources to 
deliver value for money and better and sustainable outcomes for local 
people. The framework is structured into three themes: sound and strategic 
financial management; strategic commissioning and good governance; and 
the effective management of natural resources, assets and people. From 
2009, the use of resources framework forms part of the CAA and other 
performance management frameworks. It also draws on the findings of the 
assurance process for WCC. Crucially, partners will be held collectively to 
account for their performance and the extent to which they achieve aims for 
the local area by main public sector inspectorates working more closely 
together, as opposed to the previous system of the Audit Commission 
performance managing councils through the Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment process. This would help assess whether investment was 
aligned with the needs of the community. 
PCT commissioners from all sites commented on the CAA, which was viewed 
as potentially encouraging a focus on health and well being for non-NHS 
organisations, increasing the emphasis on health and well being within 
partnerships and reducing the tendency for health to be perceived solely as 
PCT business. Interviewees in three sites considered the assessment 
process would encourage partner agencies to work together for common 
outcomes. All partners across a local area would need to consider how their 
services could improve the health and well being of their local population: 
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‘I hope it will have the effect of making the local authority more aware of its health and well 
being responsibilities and more willing to cooperate with the PCT in delivering those 
responsibilities. Clearly there's a very explicit focus in the Comprehensive Area Assessment on 
the way in which local organisations work together, so I guess it will make us consider that in 
more specific detail.’ (DPH, Phase 1) 
It was also argued that the CAA would focus on the overall impact of 
partnerships on the local population rather than on the performance of 
individual organisations. This would encourage a shift to partnership 
working: 
‘Everyone will realise that they’re dependent on each other in a way that they haven't been 
before in terms of partnership working, in order to attain their rating that it will actually make 
people work together for the better… It will make partnership very much more real.’ (OSC 
Chair, Phase 1) 
Moreover the publicly available assessment results would be a useful 
resource, providing comparative information about services. 
Some interviewees were concerned that the CAA could become an 
additional and separate burden and that it would prove difficult to meet the 
assessment criteria. Others argued that the CAA was perceived as council-
led: 
‘Everybody at the PCT today will tell you in an instant what world class commissioning is, 
what their part to play is in it. Half of them wouldn’t know what CAA stood for to be honest 
because it’s not seen as relevant.’ (DS, Phase 1) 
Interviewees from the OSC and the VCS also questioned the extent to which 
the public or scrutiny committees would be involved, whether public views 
would be incorporated in the assessments and if the CAA would assess how 
well public agencies engaged with the voluntary sector. 
5.5 World Class Commissioning as a performance 
management regime 
Although originally a developmental process WCC2 was considered an 
influential performance management regime and a key route for achieving 
improved health outcomes through encouraging a systematic approach to 
the commissioning cycle. The assurance system assessed PCTs against 
three core areas, governance, outcomes and competencies, described in 
more detail in Appendix four. Failure to meet minimum standards could 
result in further action being taken through SHAs, and in extreme cases, 
PCTs could be subject to a failure regime. 
Interviewees from all case study sites considered WCC as an effective 
assurance process allowing PCTs to benchmark their progress. Interviewees 
in four sites felt that WCC had allowed the health and well being agenda to 
be taken forward both through a focus on health outcomes and a shift in the 
power between commissioners and providers: 
‘There seems to be a policy shift as a result of world class commissioning that pushes us that 
way because we will be performance managed and therefore incentivised on performance in 
relation to life expectancy, health inequalities and the suite of public health outcome areas 
that we've determined as part of our world class commissioning approach.’ (DPH, Phase 1) 
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In two sites it was argued that WCC had not encouraged any extra 
emphasis on health and well being within their PCT as this was already well 
established. Organisational restructuring around the commissioning cycle in 
eight of the sites at the time of first phase interviews had encouraged 
matrix working and closer involvement of public health in the 
commissioning cycle, which was increasingly based on the JSNA. However, 
partnership commissioning processes required development and one 
interviewee questioned whether WCC placed enough emphasis on 
partnership working in commissioning for health and in working with local 
authorities. 
PBC created separate governance tensions due to potential conflicts of 
interest arising from the combination of commissioning and provider roles 
and issues of alignment across PCT and PBC. One PEC Chair described it as 
follows: 
‘I mean I think practice-based commissioning, it’s a mess. It’s a hodge-podge. It’s not at all 
what they call a Ronseal product. It’s a confused amalgam of a whole load of different things 
that had guidance which was slightly unclear I think. ’ (Phase 1) 
Some interviewees were confident that their governance structures 
provided effective firewalls between the two roles and, in four sites, 
interviewees considered PBC was making good progress. In one site, 
conflicts of interest had been addressed through an annual review with 
external facilitators and practices had set up their own provider company. 
In another site, however, there were clear tensions between what was 
perceived as central control by PCTs and the need for local autonomy. 
Nevertheless, a degree of alignment across PBC and PCT plans was 
generally achieved. As one interviewee commented: 
We’ve had to ensure that the commissioning plans that we’ve put forward can at least 
nominally be aligned to the various targets which the PCT has to meet. But I wouldn’t say 
they were in any sense a driving force behind what PBC is trying to achieve.’ (PBC lead, 
Phase 1) 
Involvement of practice-based commissioners in the commissioning cycle 
was variable, consensus across consortia could prove elusive, and PBC was 
often seen as falling outside the commissioning cycle, unaware of PCT 
priorities, WCC competencies, local partnerships, demands on PCTs or QIPP: 
‘There aren’t clear commissioning principles embedded into the practice-based commissioning 
process, although there are in the PCT process. So that’s the problem.’ (PBC lead, Phase 2) 
And from another site: 
‘I have to say at the moment that recognition of the World Class Commissioning competence 
framework amongst practice-based commissioners is pretty low. I mean I’m sure they, I think 
they probably now know what we’re talking about.’ (DPH, Phase 2) 
Interviewees raised a number of skills deficits: practice-based 
commissioners needed skills in commissioning on a larger scale and in more 
complex areas; developing strong business cases; having increased 
understanding of the larger strategic picture and the broader health 
agenda; and understanding how to commission from wider partnerships. 
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However, this was not the case in all sites and a few PCTs described active 
PBC consortia informing strategic plans, and acting as a driving force. In 
other sites they mainly provided an important communication link between 
practices and the PCT. 
Before the introduction of WCC in 2007, the Commissioning Framework for 
Health and Well Being7 noted that incentives did not yet ‘fully support the 
delivery of better health and well being’, that skills for forward looking 
commissioning and focusing on prevention were scarce and that health and 
local authorities were ‘structurally complex and culturally different 
organisations’ (para. 1.12). At a local level, there is evidence that the 
complex system of targets and regulation which frames priority-setting 
within commissioning organisations, imperfectly translates government 
intentions for promoting health and well being. Problems of complexity, lack 
of alignment of targets across agencies, an emphasis on short-term process 
variables and an unspoken hierarchy of targets combined to ensure that an 
emphasis on health and well being largely exists in spite of rather than as a 
result of performance management frameworks. Nevertheless WCC was 
seen as a counterbalance, combining an outcomes-based approach with a 
systematic process underpinned by commissioning competencies. The test 
would lie in the extent to which this framework led to changes in delivery. 
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6 Governance between organisations 
Working through partnerships is considered key to improving health and 
well being, although it is recognised that strong partnerships with well-
developed performance management arrangements are needed.86 This 
chapter begins by outlining the policy background for local partnerships for 
health and well being (6.1) and then discusses interviewee accounts in 
relation to the following key themes: views of partnership (6.2); partnership 
working in relation to the JSNA (6.3); joint DPH posts (6.4); and joint 
commissioning arrangements (6.5). The chapter concludes with views from 
second phase interviewees on the impact of the economic climate on 
partnership working. 
6.1 Policy context 
An emphasis on partnership working at a local level is reflected in the 
Annual Health Check and in the WCC assurance process (through 
competency 2). It is fundamental to the CAA and reflected through the 
agreement and monitoring of LAAs. It is also reflected in national policy 
initiatives for joint working such as ‘Total Place’, a whole area approach to 
public services,87 integrated care pilots; and integrated working under the 
aegis of statutory Children’s Trusts. Bernstein et al.88 reiterate arguments 
for an integrated commissioning model for health and well being 
commenting that: 
‘The specific roles of primary care and different sectors of the NHS, social care and other local 
authority services, and other public sector partners are key in ensuring effective delivery, as is 
the role of local area agreements and other partnership arrangements in supporting integrated 
action on health and well being. We envisage this integrated commissioning model being 
driven by local strategic partnerships, with localised health and well being strategies and 
delivery plans being developed in response to local needs.’ (p.8) 
LSPs and their themed sub-groups are responsible for delivery of the 
Sustainable Community Strategy and therefore for many areas of health 
and well being. They have been described as a key governance structure 
‘highlighting and resolving cross departmental and cross-agency conflicts’.34 
While they are not statutory organisations (although there is a statutory 
duty of partnership), lines of accountability are to the respective 
organisations making up the partnership while, at the same time, there is 
horizontal accountability across the partnership as a whole. Despite the 
original intention that LSPs would simplify local partnerships, there are 
complex accountability arrangements between LSPs and local authorities 
and between VCS members of LSPs and the organisations or community 
networks they represent. Cutting across these organisational 
accountabilities are tensions between participatory styles of decision-
making and accountability based on local democracy.89 These difficulties are 
likely to be compounded by tensions between different national policy 
priorities, such as affording greater choice to consumers while at the same 
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time reducing inequalities, or by the creation of performance management 
systems which undermine local priority-setting. 
Johnson and Osborne90 showed that, despite a framework designed to 
combine coordination of activities through LSPs with co-governance, the 
former was supported through a range of processes including funding, 
target setting and accreditation, while the latter was neglected. Partnerships 
at a local level are also influenced by a lack of cross-departmental working 
at national level. A report from the Institute for Government 34 noted that: 
‘Incentives for Whitehall to work cross departmentally remain weak. There is virtually no 
pooling of resources to support cross departmental policies despite the fact that central 
government itself recognises that such pooling is a powerful incentive for partners to work 
collectively and to make the necessary trade offs between conflicting priorities.’ (p.10) 
We explored views of partnerships and partnership governance through 
focus groups and the views of interviewees, and also addressed related 
topics such as the JSNA, joint posts and the CAA. 
6.2 Views of partnership 
All study sites had a health partnership sub-group of the main LSP which 
generally included representation from two or more VCS organisations, 
(although not always the same groups as were represented on the main 
LSP). All groups of interviewees recognised that promoting health and well 
being required working across agencies to address the wider determinants 
of health. Partnership working was emphasised by approximately two thirds 
of PCT interviewees, all VCS and the majority of OSC interviewees as an 
important factor in commissioning for health and well being and improving 
health outcomes over the longer term: 
‘And there’s issues around improving lifestyles which will help in the shorter term and that’s 
partly within the gift of the health services and partly within the gift of partners ... As you get 
into the longer term, it's around working with local authorities to get regeneration into there 
and get employment opportunities, improve educational attainment, get the right kind of levels 
of training and education for people to take the jobs that would come into the area.’ (DPH, 
Phase 1) 
The areas of partnership working discussed by interviewees differed 
according to their role. While PCT commissioners and the VCS discussed 
governance, partnerships for health, barriers and enablers for partnership 
working, practice-based commissioners largely focused on partnership 
working with the PCT. They also discussed the involvement of partners in 
reconfiguring services or in managing demand, reflected, for example, in 
the inclusion of social services in care pathway redesign. The following sub-
sections discuss accountability arrangements and levers and barriers to 
partnership working. 
6.2.1 Accountability arrangements in partnerships 
Partnerships reflected different kinds of accountability: partners were 
accountable to partnerships as well as to their respective organisations; 
local authorities also had a democratic mandate; community participants 
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sought to reflect a diverse VCS; and there were complex arrangements 
across the various themed sub-groups. Focus groups and interviewees 
discussed partnership governance, including ways of monitoring and 
evaluating initiatives across partnerships, ensuring that governance 
between organisations met agreed criteria and creating clear accountability 
arrangements. However, it was argued that arrangements for partnership 
governance lacked clarity given different systems of regulation in local 
authorities and it was argued that public health targets were less rigorously 
monitored. 
One of the major barriers to partnership working was the emphasis on 
‘single organisational success’, which was reinforced in governance 
mechanisms. Governance structures for health and well being were unclear 
at the interfaces of interagency working: 
‘But actually, you know, when it comes down to the inter-agency bit, all those systems seem 
to collapse … And that seems to me the territory that public health is in, you know, that’s 
where public health governance is, and actually we haven’t solved the governance system 
there.’ (National focus group) 
Whilst PCT interviewees generally viewed PCT governance mechanisms as 
robust, partnership governance was considered less developed: 
‘But there’s also I think big questions around integrated and partnership governance, whereby 
where we’re making joint investments in quite a lot of things. I'm thinking around children’s 
services as a for instance. That currently as I said earlier is tracked separately through our 
own boards and through our own corporations… there’s a kind of issue around satisfying and 
continuing to satisfy our own organisations and the regulatory bodies that currently exist but 
also doing it also in a more integrated way.’ (PCT Chair, Phase 1) 
A Chief Executive went further in his criticisms of partnership governance: 
‘I’ve never yet seen an organisation that can list all its staff that attend the relevant, even the 
statutory partnerships, that if a partnership agrees the strategy do they then work out the 
implications for each organisation? Does that implication get communicated back to the 
organisation…. Having agreed it how do others then hold them to account? And if you’re 
running a shared target through it how do we hold somebody else to account for their bit? And 
I’ve never yet come across anyone or any place that can give me clear answers to those sorts 
of questions, so I think there is a major weakness about this, about partnership governance 
that needs to be better addressed than it is at the moment.’ (Phase 1) 
Accountability arrangements between partnerships and their sub-groups 
could also create difficulties. While health partnerships had developed terms 
of reference for working within their partnership with accountability to the 
LSP, links between sub-groups did not reflect the cross-cutting nature of the 
health and well being agenda. Concerns were expressed in by VCS 
interviewees in all case study sites that themed partnerships under the LSP 
could work against a whole system approach: 
‘Well in terms of commissioning, commissioning is largely done with a relatively narrow focus. 
So there’s little in terms of cross-cutting agenda commissioning with this holistic approach in 
mind, it’s very much on specific service delivery. So there’s too many opportunities for 
duplication and lack of coordination.’ (VCS, Phase 1) 
One of the consequences of governance complexity was an emphasis on 
local leaders with the skill to understand and negotiate a wide range of 
governance arrangements. 
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6.2.2  Levers and barriers to working in partnership 
Partnerships for health and well being were encouraged through good 
working relationships, the introduction of the CAA, jointly agreed LAAs and 
the WCC initiative. However, a number of barriers to effective partnership 
working for health and well being were also identified. 
First the breadth of the health and well being agenda made it difficult to 
engage with, as one interviewee noted: 
 ‘Because certainly the discussions we've had at local strategic partnership level has been 
actually health and well being is so all encompassing that there’s a tendency for everybody to 
go it's not my problem.’ (DS, Phase 1) 
In one site, it was argued by PCT interviewees that the local authority saw 
the PCT as responsible for health promotion and prevention services with 
other partners responsible for social care and wider determinants. In two 
sites it was argued that local authority and PCT had different approaches to 
this agenda and, despite joint appointments, the influence of DsPH on the 
local authority agenda was limited. This is further discussed in sub-section 
6.4 below. 
Second partnerships and governance arrangements were prey to constant 
change through reorganisations and shifts in the political agenda and this 
had proved a barrier in three case study sites. A PEC Chair commented: 
‘And every time you have a shift of structure, you have to reorganise your governance 
structures, which potentially undermines those structures. Because governance is around 
having a clear idea of what you’re measuring, how you’re measuring it, and making sure it’s 
safe and effective. You get that in place and then say oh no, no, we’re reorganising it all … . 
So I think every time you have a reorganisation or a restructure, not that they shouldn’t 
happen, I think it potentially undermines governance for some length of time.’ (Phase 1) 
Moreover the reorganisation of PCTs had led to a loss of locality focus which 
was considered a retrograde step, breaking up partnerships and making it 
more difficult to link into neighbourhood management structures. This had 
affected two sites, in particular. 
Third were problems of co-terminosity. A lack of co-terminosity across PCTs 
and local authorities and multiple partnerships spanning different 
boundaries could lead to lack of capacity to engage. As demonstrated in the 
descriptions of case study sites (Appendix 3) five PCTs worked across a 
number of local authorities. This created problems in aligning priorities, 
providing input and manpower to local partnerships especially in areas with 
numerous district councils or supporting LAAs across different councils. The 
OSCs struggled to engage all the stakeholders across such a wide area and 
the VCS described difficulties in co-ordinating their work across large 
geographical areas. Resources to cover the costs of VCS involvement were 
limited and the lack of an umbrella VCS body could make it difficult to 
coordinate views. 
Fourth were perceptions over unequal status of the VCS. In four sites 
interviewees from the VCS expressed the view that engagement in 
partnerships was tokenistic, as one interviewee commented: 
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‘The VCS is often seen as a kind of poorer partner, you know, we need to feel privileged to be 
able to get at the table. Well that’s not the right approach and actually it should be what we 
can learn from each other.’ (Phase 1) 
This could lead to a failure to link the work of the local VCS into wider 
partnership strategies and targets. However in one case study site there 
were joint strategies for commissioning from the VCS. 
The JSNA, further described below, was seen as promoting partnership 
activity. 
6.3 The Joint Strategic Needs Assessment 
The JSNA is intended to inform commissioning strategies through an 
assessment of the health needs of the population across a local authority 
area. It provides a more systematic approach to the analysis of local data 
combining health, social care and other information. It also had the 
potential for monitoring the impact of investments over time. 
Having just completed the first round of JSNAs at the time of first phase 
interviews, PCTs broadly viewed them as being ‘work in progress’. 
Interviewees in a majority of sites claimed that while the issues raised in 
the JSNA were not new, the JSNA had informed commissioning decisions, 
aided targeting and locality planning, improved links between health and 
social care and in sharing information sometimes at locality level. In some 
cases, it had informed the work of joint health and social care teams, 
promoted a shared understanding of concepts such as needs assessment 
and developed joint commissioning. One interviewee commented: 
‘So I suppose the difference the joint strategic needs assessment has made is it is a more 
systematic approach to looking at data sources and making judgments, drawing hypotheses 
about what those data sources tell you in a way that we haven't been able to do before. So 
that’s really helpful, and because our services are joined up, we have joint health and social 
care teams, that makes a lot of sense in planning terms.’ (DPH, Phase 1) 
In some cases, the JSNA had highlighted variations in access between 
localities or had helped align priorities across local organisations, such as 
district councils, PCTs and county councils. Some JSNAs included scenario 
modelling across PCTs and local authorities in relation to changing health 
needs. In four sites, the JSNA was locality based or was being developed in 
this direction. Interviewees raised a number of issues, discussed below. 
6.3.1 How joint is the JSNA? 
While the JSNA was generally perceived as a spur to wider partnership 
working, interviewees also raised questions over the extent to which JSNAs 
were built on joint approaches to assessing needs, to accessing and 
triangulating data or as a resource to underpin commissioning and priority- 
setting across both organisations. There was variation in the extent to 
which it was considered a joint document reflected, for example, in the 
existence of JSNA leads in the local authority, a shared evidence base 
aligned with key themes of the Sustainable Community Strategy or a shared 
definition of key concepts, such as needs assessment. It was noted by some 
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PCT interviewees, for example, that local authorities often considered PCTs 
responsible for health, and health needs assessments could therefore 
conjure up quite different tasks in the two organisations. In two sites, the 
JSNA had been led by the local authority and in one site there had been 
difficulties over sharing health and local authority data, which had affected 
the development of the LAA. 
While public health teams and local authority managers from the relevant 
directorates were routinely involved in developing JSNAs, progress was 
influenced by the extent to which there was already a shared data platform. 
In some of the sites, shared web-based systems which made it easier to 
collate and present findings had been in place for up to 10 years. 
6.3.2 Involvement of practice-based commissioners 
The Commissioning Framework for Health and Well Being7 described the 
JSNA as a joint endeavour across councils, PCTs and practice-based 
commissioners (p.8). The national survey of PCTs showed that 37 per cent 
of respondents thought practice-based commissioners were involved in the 
JSNA, although there was no indication of the degree of involvement. 
While business cases prepared by practice-based commissioners had to 
demonstrate relevance to the JSNA, there was little engagement of 
practice-based commissioners with the JSNA in our case study sites and 
involvement with (as opposed to knowledge of) the JSNA was evident in one 
site only. In another site, engagement was being developed through 
working with practice-based commissioners in locality-based 
commissioning, to be reflected in the JSNA. One interviewee commented 
that practice-based commissioners should ‘demand more’ of the JSNA 
process and influence its design while another noted the benefits of 
involving GPs with the JSNA as it helped demonstrate how their activities 
contributed to city-wide benefits. This reflects the often tangential 
relationship between PBC and PCT commissioning processes. 
6.3.3 Involvement of the Voluntary and Community Sector in 
JSNAs 
Involvement of the VCS in the JSNA appeared limited. In three sites, VCS 
interviewees had little knowledge of it and in five sites, while VCS 
interviewees were aware of the JSNA, they had little influence over its 
development. In one site, some VCS groups had been excluded as it was 
considered there were conflicts of interest as a result of their also being 
involved in providing services. Only one of the interviewees from LINks had 
been involved (further discussed in Chapter 7). These results differed from 
the national survey which showed that 58 per cent of PCT respondents said 
the voluntary sector was involved and 43 per cent said LINks had been 
involved. 
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6.3.4 Local variation 
Despite the small number of case studies involved, different approaches to 
developing the JSNA were evident: one site chose to focus on areas where 
(1) not enough information was available; (2) there were joint concerns; 
and (3) action could be taken on findings. In this example, a joint approach 
was taken from the outset: 
‘So for each of those projects there’s someone from the public health department, there’s a 
local authority officer and there’s a steering group above it. So every project has …local 
authority/public health working together on an area of joint concern, and so there’s an 
operational group which kind of oversees that which reports to the steering group.’ (Associate 
DPH, Phase 2) 
Another site chose to triangulate information from different sources to test 
assumptions, model scenarios of the impact of changes in the demographic 
structure and encourage discussion over the wider determinants of health 
across different sectors. 
A third site was using forecasting software which enabled recent information 
to be weighted, thereby providing a more accurate picture of future trends. 
One PCT had enabled joint working across the local authority and the PCT 
through a joint performance management tool. However, a number of 
concerns were raised by PCT interviewees regarding performance 
management across organisations, including a lack of an equivalent 
performance management system to WCC within the local authority and 
difficulties in providing joint data for performance management. The extent 
to which the JSNA influenced commissioning decisions and the deployment 
of resources was an area that required evaluation. 
It was argued that the JSNA was constantly developing and should act as an 
evidence-based resource across the different partners reflecting ways of 
working, rather than a product, or ‘glossy document’. For example, a core 
database could be made available on-line, shared and linked to more 
detailed health needs assessments. 
6.4 Joint posts for Directors of Public Health 
Most of the DsPH in the study were jointly appointed across the PCT and the 
local authority, but typically continued to work within, and remain 
accountable, to the local PCT. It has been argued91 that the creation of joint 
posts is an attempt to resolve tensions between the local authority role in 
improving the health of the population and the location of DsPH within the 
NHS since the 1974 reorganisation. This is both a recognition of complex 
governance and accountability arrangements at a local level in relation to 
health and well being and a response to it. However, much appears to 
depend on the individual qualities of those concerned. 
While discussion of joint posts with local authorities was largely limited to 
DsPH, there were also examples of joint appointments for services for 
children and young people and plans for joint executive teams to facilitate 
joint working and oversee progress. Joint DPH appointments across PCTs 
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and local authorities were in place across eight out of our ten case study 
sites and were considered a further lever for joint working, through aligning 
PCT priorities and LAAs, sharing data and bridging the organisational and 
cultural divide. However, there were difficulties in carrying out a joint role, 
in influencing the local authority in relation to wider determinants of health 
and in aligning financial decisions across the organisations. In one site, for 
example, changes in the political complexion of the local authority had 
meant that planned joint appointments had had to be shelved. 
One concern was that the health and well being agenda was dispersed 
across most local authority activities: 
‘Things that influence public health that are within the remit of the local authority are actually 
spread throughout the structure of the local authority, so there's no one bit of the local 
authority that does public health because everything from housing, transport, economic policy, 
parks and countryside, children and young people services, adult social services, I mean you 
name it, it all has an impact, one way or another, on public health. … .But because it’s not 
brought together and focused in one place it’s very difficult to get a handle on it all.’ (DPH, 
Phase 1) 
This view was reflected in comments over the way that a health and well 
being agenda was dispersed through the partnerships feeding into the main 
LSP. 
Second there were problems with ’serving two masters’ and one interviewee 
questioned whether it was possible to span both roles given the fact that 
governance arrangements for DsPH ran through the PCT rather than 
through the partnership. In particular, there was a contrast between a PCT 
agenda, which was largely about healthy lifestyles, and a local authority role 
in assessing the health impact of local policies and promoting environmental 
and social regeneration: 
‘The impression I get is that it’s only the real minority of local authorities that have really 
embraced the idea of a jointly appointed director of public health and given that person real 
managerial responsibility in the local authority and the wherewithal to deliver what's 
required.’ (DPH, Phase 1) 
There were arguments for separating functions, described as follows: 
‘ Someone who really focuses on world class commissioning, PCT agenda and kind of really 
focused on perhaps the integration of all the healthy lifestyle work, sort of behavioural, a bit of 
weight management, all that kind of stuff. And then you have someone in the local authority 
who actually is the one who kind of talks about the health impacts of what is going on in the 
local authority, and about shaping the environment and regeneration and local development 
frameworks and spatial policies and all those sorts of things. I don’t think you can 
satisfactorily do the two things.’(Deputy DPH, Phase 1) 
Third local authorities had a democratic mandate and a relationship with the 
political community that was lacking in the NHS. This led to different ways 
of working from PCTs. It also led to ambiguities over public health 
leadership across PCTs and local authorities: 
‘Local authorities have some form of democratic accountability but the lack of clear co-
ordination ... in terms of public health leadership between local authorities and NHS 
organisations, and PCTs in particular, have meant it is very hard to understand where 
leadership on a public health agenda is, what communities or local areas are covered and 
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how that actually, you know, is planned, organised and how there’s strategic direction.’ 
(National stakeholder) 
One suggestion was that public health teams should be located within the 
local authority with accountability to the LSP. 
6.5 Joint commissioning 
Interviewees were positive about the potential of joint commissioning, 
which reduced time consuming wrangling about relative contributions to a 
budget and helped promote shared priorities and outcomes. Some described 
how the impetus for joint working in relation to health and well being had 
been inspired by a recognition that improvement could only be achieved 
through working together and that working collaboratively with social care 
could help shift the balance towards prevention: 
‘And when you look at that and the information we put in DPH Annual Reports etc it’s people 
recognising that they didn’t like the picture that was emerging … and recognition that the only 
way we’re going to make a difference is by working together.’ (DPH, Phase 2) 
There were debates over how formal the process needed to be or whether 
budgets could simply be aligned under a memorandum of understanding. It 
was argued that much could be achieved through alignment, avoiding the 
complex governance arrangements required in order formally to pool 
budgets but arrangements had to be clear. Six of the case studies had 
pooled budgets for health and well being services. While clear governance 
arrangements were needed for shared budgets, there were concerns from 
interviewees that such arrangements were not always in place. 
‘You can have all the best partnership arrangements but unless you bring the resources 
together under a pooled budget or a very clear aligned budget with a memorandum of 
understanding you inevitably, no matter how good the relationship is, there are moments of 
tension and difficulty, you know, when wider organisational pressures kick in.’ (Director of 
Commissioning, Phase 2) 
Interviewees highlighted a number of healthy lifestyle initiatives where 
organisations were working in partnership, mainly funded through growth 
money. Examples included the following. 
•  Weight management and smoking cessation services. 
• Health and well being funds shared with the local authority where 
PCTs provided most of the funding but the local authority was the 
accountable body. This had the benefit of protecting resource over a 
longer period in order to achieve health outcomes. 
•  Joint posts for developing local neighbourhood approaches. 
•  Initiatives related to food and physical activity. 
• Joint commissioning groups across the health and local authority 
reporting to the partnership structure. 
• A public heath coordinating group in a local authority, chaired by a 
joint DPH. 
• Healthy lifestyle managers integrated with PBC consortia to 
encourage health and well being initiatives in PBC. 
• PBC working with local authorities to develop healthy walks and 
employ health trainers. 
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• Joint working across health and social services over telecare services. 
• Free swimming during the day. 
It was argued that the impact of ‘collective public health effort’ needed to 
be evaluated through health impact assessments. There were areas of joint 
investment but these were tracked through the governance arrangements 
of different organisations. It was argued that an integrated governance 
solution across agencies needed to be developed. 
6.6 The impact of the economic downturn 
Second phase interviews, in particular, reflected concerns that financial 
stringency could promote ‘cost shunting’ across organisations, with each 
organisation focusing on its own boundaries and budgets. Others thought 
the opposite - that a lack of resources would make organisations keener to 
share functions and work together in order to make the best use of limited 
resources. In one of the sites, stakeholder meetings across the local health 
economy had been held, including the PCT, the voluntary sector, local 
authorities and the private sector, in order to discuss the economic 
downturn. The aim was to consider effects across the whole health economy 
and to ensure that decisions were not made in isolation. A Director of 
Finance commented: 
‘Because the danger in all of this is that if you do something in one part of the economy and it 
has an unintended or sometimes intended consequential effect somewhere else you just move 
the problem. We want to avoid that by, and I think the only way you can really do that is truly 
understanding what all of the partners’ strategic direction and intentions are so that we aren’t 
creating additional problems for ourselves.’ (Phase 2) 
In the same way, the QIPP initiative could encourage a creative approach to 
partnership and care pathway development across health and social 
services. In one site, the local authority was represented on the strategic 
commissioning group of the PCT and participated in joint QIPP events. 
In summary, governance issues between organisations related to cultural 
differences between partners; the conjunction of democratic accountability 
with other governance arrangements; the impact of an active relationship 
with the political community in local authorities; ambiguity in carrying out 
joint DPH roles; and difficulties in targeting effort given the breadth of the 
agenda. Successful partnerships could be gauged by the extent to which 
public health had been mainstreamed within the wider partnership and 
subsequently reflected within LAAs and the extent to which partners were 
held to account through the mechanism of the LSP. Governance failures 
could be represented through continued ‘silo working’ in public health and 
the lack of integrated multi-agency structures. 
The following chapter outlines issues raised by interviewees in relation to 
the principle of accountability to the public. 
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7  Public involvement in commissioning 
Accountability to the public is a key aspect of governance and this chapter 
is concerned with public involvement in commissioning decisions and in 
local scrutiny. It begins by outlining the policy context (7.1) then discusses 
the range of initiatives for involvement in PCT commissioning and barriers 
to greater involvement (7.2). It reviews accounts of public involvement in 
PBC (7.3) and discusses the developing role of LINks (7.4). Views of VCS 
members of health and well being sub-groups of LSPs on their role in 
decision-making are reviewed (7.5) followed by a discussion of public 
involvement in the scrutiny function (7.6). While there is a spectrum of 
engagement from involvement in decision-making at one end to receiving 
information at the other, the study demonstrated that more effective 
involvement was needed and illustrated a number of barriers to achieving 
this, especially in relation to the preventive agenda. 
7.1 Policy context 
As discussed in Chapter 3, policy and commissioning guidance emphasises 
the role of patient and public involvement in commissioning decisions. It is 
intended that involvement should mirror the commissioning cycle from 
assessment of health needs to strategies for prioritising investment (or 
disinvestment).51 In addition to one-off events, this may be achieved 
through formal membership or involvement of the VCS or LINks in decision-
making bodies such as LSPs and their various sub-groups, in PBC consortia; 
or through PCT Boards and committees. OSCs are also a key route for 
ensuring public accountability, given their role in promoting the well being 
of local communities through ‘effective scrutiny of health care planning and 
delivery and wider public health issues’.92 PCT interviewees described a wide 
range of schemes, further described below. 
7.2 Involvement in PCT commissioning 
PCT interviewees described a range of initiatives for involving the public in 
decision-making, although interviewees in half the sites considered that 
more needed to be done. Initiatives included the following: 
• large stakeholder events to inform strategy 
• focus groups and patient panels 
• ‘health’ conversations 
• telephone surveys 
• a public strategic commissioning forum 
• the payment of sessional fees to members of the public 
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• developing networks for patients to become involved in service 
redesign, pathway work and service specification 
• population profiling and social marketing to identify better ways of 
• engaging with specific populations and also to encourage greater 
involvement 
• lay representatives on sub-committees of the PCT Board 
• public consultation events prior to PCT Board meetings 
• meeting in different locations 
• engaging with patients already in the health care system 
• joint strategies with local authorities, including locality forums 
• working through local VCS organisations 
• representative patient advisory forums. 
The national survey indicated most commonly used routes. We asked 
respondents the following question: can you describe what mechanisms 
exist in your PCT for involving local people/groups in decision-making 
relating to commissioning for health and well being? We received responses 
from 70 PCTs. Respondents were told they could select as many choices as 
applicable to their PCT. The results are illustrated in Figure 2, with the 
number of PCTs using these methods appearing on the x axis. 
The survey also requested examples of where local people or groups had 
influenced commissioning for health and well being services. There were 
more than 70 responses to this question with most falling into the following 
categories in order of popularity: consultation as part of JSNA process 
(focus groups and surveys); consultation as part of formulating 
commissioning strategy plans (e.g. ‘visioning events’); input into service 
(re)design (e.g. sexual health, mental health); consultation as part of 
prioritisation processes and focus groups used in developing social 
marketing. 
There was variation in the extent of public involvement. In one site there 
was direct involvement in commissioning through participation in assessing 
bids but, in general, public involvement was considered difficult to achieve 
and PCT interviewees identified a number of barriers to effective 
engagement. First was the difficulty of representation and the importance of 
avoiding over-representation of ‘single issue’ factions. For example, in two 
of the sites, engaging with rural populations created difficulties. One 
interviewee also argued that the definition of ‘‘hard to reach’’ should not 
become stereotyped: commissioning strategies should also include 
commuters living in dormitory flats. 
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Figure 2. Ways of involving local people 
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Second PCT interviewees from eight sites commented on the relative lack of 
interest in population health from the public which meant that public 
interest and involvement was skewed towards health care services. 
‘I keep saying this to loads of people very boringly that most people, you know, if they’re not 
ill, are not really focused on health. What they’re focused on is have they got enough money to 
live, you know, is their house in good condition, you know, is there poverty around and all 
sorts of other things that absolutely are determinants of ill health, but they’re the most 
important things in people’s heads.’ (Deputy CE, Phase 1) 
Public health lacked visibility, received less public and media attention, was 
interconnected with broader social issues and was described as low on the 
public’s ‘worry list’. There was little demand for preventive services. 
‘It's not unique to the UK, most countries have this problem, and that’s because the public can 
see health care. They can see health care, for some reason, but they can’t see health; health is 
pretty much invisible.’ (NED, Phase 1) 
A further barrier was a lack of natural points of contact for engaging the 
public with the health and well being agenda, as opposed to a health care 
agenda. The same interviewee commented: 
‘The problem we've got with public involvement, as a concept, is that we tend to involve people 
who are or have been ill to get into these decisions because their experience of the service 
allows them to bring a perception or a perspective to the purchasing of future services. Of 
course what we’re trying to do here is to involve the people who’ve never been ill … and so 
involving the public in public health is quite a difficult thing to do.’ (NED, Phase 1) 
Despite policy priorities for a stronger voice for local communities in 
commissioning, focus group participants and VCS interviewees indicated 
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that, in practice, local engagement in decision-making was minimal and 
there was little local accountability. While the process for prioritising was 
likely to become more transparent as patients and the public became 
involved, tensions would remain between achieving economies of scale 
offered by large commissioning organisations while at the same time 
encouraging local involvement. 
7.3 Involvement in practice-based commissioning 
In most sites, public involvement in PBC was described as ‘developing’. 
Examples included: the public being invited to attend consultations on PBC 
plans; PBC developing links with local groups around specific conditions; 
public representation on a local PBC board; public involvement included as 
part of Local Enhanced Services; and public involvement in pathway 
redesign. In two sites, however, PBC consortia had wide membership 
including social services and representatives of the public and in one of 
these sites there was public involvement not only at practice level but also 
within locally-based partnerships. In two sites, public involvement at PBC 
level was poorly developed, with a PBC lead commenting: 
‘The other gap I think in terms of practice-based commissioning is that there isn't much direct 
patient or public involvement in it either, so perhaps we’re not seeing things from that 
perspective as much as we could do.’ (Phase 1) 
Even where there was apparent involvement, a PBC lead stated that public 
views were insufficiently represented: 
‘I mean every practice has a public involvement group, and the practices are represented by 
the elected members, and the elected members sit on the executive. You know, from that point 
of view you could say we are represented ... . But it's, again a lot of the meetings we talk in 
medical jargon, and it's quite strange for somebody sitting in on a meeting.’ (Phase 1) 
With the exception of one site, PBC interviewees had not heard of LINks, 
and a few were sceptical about the benefits of public involvement in 
decision-making: 
‘I think you can go too far because at the end of the day we’re the experts. What we have to 
do is look at what’s going on around, apply our experience and knowledge to it, knock it into 
shape, and then try and get it in a form that we can share with the public so that they can see 
what we’re doing.’ (PBC lead, Phase 2) 
However, as discussed below, representatives from the VCS and LINks felt 
they could play an important role in influencing commissioning strategies. 
This would improve accountability to the public, as they could both gather 
and disseminate relevant information through their members and through 
local networks. The following section begins by discussing in more detail the 
influence of LINks in the case study sites before discussing the role of the 
VCS in LSPs. 
7.4 Accountability through Local Involvement Networks 
LINks are accountable to the public through publishing an annual report of 
activities and report directly to the Secretary of State for Health. Operating 
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independently from the local authority, they have their own governance 
structures and decision-making processes. 
LINks were in place in seven of the case study sites in first phase 
interviews, although five of these were still working through interim 
arrangements (see Appendix 3). There was usually an overarching board, 
which included individuals and representatives from organisations. Where 
permanent arrangements for the LINk were in place, the board had been 
elected and governance arrangements and a code of conduct agreed. 
At the time of the interviews, none of the case study LINks had developed a 
work programme for health and well being. They saw their role as 
developing networks and engaging at grass roots level, taking the views of 
local people to commissioners and vice versa. In addition, LINk interviewees 
saw their role as constructive partners, challenging commissioners to 
achieve the best possible services for local populations, and as educators, 
encouraging local populations to understand and engage in decision-
making. They could also act as a counterbalance to a medical model of 
health and well being. LINks offered an opportunity for wider networks to be 
developed, including health and social care and the VCS. In one site, for 
example, the LINk was developing a stakeholder group with representation 
from the PCT, local authority and additional partners. 
LINks engaged with the public in various ways, including stakeholder 
events, open board meetings and communication through the local VCS. 
Information was disseminated through websites, leaflets, minutes from 
meetings and an annual report. The partnership and membership within 
LINks, particularly of the VCS, was seen as a useful way to cascade and 
disseminate information to a variety of organisations. However, LINks faced 
a number of challenges common to public involvement strategies, in 
particular, achieving representative membership: 
‘But I do think that LINks has got to make sure that it doesn’t become ... the ‘usual suspects’ 
syndrome where you just turn out the same people all the time. There’s nothing that makes 
you less credible than that, and LINks has got to make sure that doesn’t happen.’ (LINk Chair, 
Phase 1) 
Moreover, two LINk interviewees raised issues of insufficient financial 
resource or time to fulfil duties; lack of support from the hosts; concerns 
that LINks was just reinventing the wheel and the lack of a government 
campaign to publicise their existence. It was more difficult to engage with 
social care than with health and LSPs could prove difficult to ‘break in to’. 
Most interviewees felt that it was too early to influence PCT decision-making 
as they were still forming relationships. Most had little or no input into 
targets or priority-setting although there was some ‘informal 
acknowledgement’ by PCTs of their views. Some considered that LINks had 
achieved less engagement than the PPIFs which preceded them, although it 
was difficult to measure public engagement in commissioning or assess 
influence: 
‘I think it's a difficult thing to do because there are various strands to it and not all easily 
understandable and you can be involved in something like being consulted on some service or 
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some change in service without realising that you’re actually being involved in commissioning, 
and I think there’s quite a lot of that going on.’ (LINk Chair, Phase 1) 
PCTs were often perceived as commissioning according to a preconceived 
agenda and it was argued that greater clarity was needed over the role of 
LINks within statutory organisations: 
‘It still sort of feels as though it's very much like yes we’re really interested in what you think 
about what we’re doing, rather than ‘what should we be doing’.’ (LINk Chair, Phase 1) 
Given the early stage of LINKs in first phase interviews, second phase 
interviews included three interviews with LINk Chairs. In two sites, there 
seemed little interest or engagement from the public and one interviewee 
commented that the public was only interested when they wanted to use 
the service: that there was a need ‘to awaken public interest in their own 
responsibility in this regard’. This meant that recruitment to LINk 
management boards had proved difficult and raised questions about their 
sustainability. There had been little engagement to date with formal 
decision-making structures of the PCT, with PBC, with the LSP, the JSNA or 
with local voluntary organisations. 
In one site, however, there was one very active LINk that had exerted an 
impact on PCT specifications and contracts. It held a non-voting seat on the 
PCT board and was represented on the provider arm of the PCT, various 
task groups and committees and the local health and well being committee. 
There was extensive membership with around 600 members and 200 
organisations, described as follows: 
‘So, for example, LINk works on the premise that anybody can be a member of LINk, whatever 
member means, and our job is to make sure that we are continually giving them information 
about what’s happening in the health and social care world … it’s no good a group of 
clinicians and administrators sitting in the PCT working out what specification it ought to be, 
because they get some disasters. They’ve got to be out there in the community and in my 
opinion they have to use LINk to do it.’ (LINk Chair, Phase 2) 
In this case, a clear distinction was made between the PPI forum, the voice 
of the patient, and the LINk, the ‘facilitator of the voice’ with its connection 
to the community. 
Although, as reflected in guidance, LINks were linked with OSCs, they were 
yet to form strong relationships with partnership organisations, such as 
LSPs, or with practice-based commissioners, many of whom seemed 
unaware of LINks at the time of the interviews. Where relationships with 
LSPs were present, these were often as a result of pre-existing contacts. It 
was argued that the structure of local partnerships and LINks’s place within 
them needed to be to be clarified, and that there should also be clear routes 
through which LINks could influence social care. 
The majority of PCT interviewees acknowledged LINks’ potential value as a 
source of information and a gateway to systematic engagement with the 
VCS. In one site, the LINk was integrated into the JSNA process as well as 
into commissioning sub-committees of the PCT Board, and in two sites 
LINKs had a seat on the PCT Board. However, many PCT interviewees were 
unclear to what extent patient representatives might also be members of 
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LINks, which were generally viewed as forming only a part of wider 
engagement strategies. One interviewee considered that they reflected a 
‘diffuse series of constituencies’, and were not a suitable proxy for patient 
and public engagement. The latter was of a higher priority than involving 
LINks per se: 
‘It doesn’t matter to me, do you know what I mean? As long as I’ve got members of the public 
engaged in it, in terms of looking at what we’re going to do.’ (Director of Quality, Phase 2) 
In both phases of interviews, relationships between LINks and umbrella 
bodies for local voluntary organisations could be a source of tension, due to 
overlapping networks and some duplication. The study demonstrated wide 
variation in the development of LINks and as well as in engagement with 
them and this variation was more marked than for any other aspect of the 
study. 
7.5 Accountability through partnerships 
VCS members of health and well being sub-groups of the LSP commented 
on ways of improving public involvement and the VCS role in influencing 
priorities through the LSP. These are described in turn. 
7.5.1 Developing public involvement 
VCS interviewees made a number of suggestions for improving public 
involvement in decision-making. It was important to engage with the public 
over issues of local concern or changes in services but there was inadequate 
feedback to the public over how decisions were made, a view that was also 
shared by PCT interviewees from two sites. Two VCS interviewees stated 
public involvement and engagement with the VCS had been a largely ‘tick 
box’ exercise: 
‘It doesn’t really happen, well not in commissioning. I mean everybody talks about 
commissioning. I think it's very hard to see the direct relationship between local people’s input 
and how that’s actually influenced the commissioning decisions.’ (VCS member, Phase 1) 
The impact of involvement should be made clear with better channels of 
communication between commissioners and the public: 
 ‘I mean I think people are more likely to become involved in activities if they think they’re 
making a difference, and I think what has happened in some cases in the past has been 
where people have come along to consultation events, they’ve given their views, they’ve taken 
the time to do that, and they never know what has happened to them, or they think perhaps 
they’ve been ignored.’ (VCS member, Phase 1) 
Two VCS interviewees felt PCTs sought public views after a decision had 
been made. Public involvement needed to be improved across the 
commissioning cycle and in investment scenarios. Links with PBC were 
poorly developed and the VCS role within formal partnerships could be 
strengthened. However, structures for involving the public in decision-
making were complex and the use of NHS jargon could prove a barrier. 
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7.5.2 Accountability through the Voluntary and Community Sector 
In three sites, VCS members of partnerships saw their accountability to the 
public as achieved through their networks. Also as one interviewee 
commented, the VCS were accountable through their membership and 
governance structure: 
‘I think one of the things that the voluntary sector has got by dint of its structure … every 
charity has a governing body, a board, which is made up of voluntary trustees, that’s why it’s 
the voluntary sector, so you’ve got people who are drawn from local communities who are, if 
you like, in charge of these organisations and if boards are functioning properly that’s where a 
great deal of your public accountability comes from.’ (VCS, Phase 1) 
However there were difficulties in influencing partnerships and a number of 
difficulties were voiced by VCS members of health and well being 
partnerships of the LSP. It was considered by one interviewee that not 
bringing money to partnerships meant that the VCS was considered an 
inferior partner. Decision-making was described as taking place in the main 
LSP and while the VCS was involved in the delivery of priorities, there was 
less influence on setting targets and agreeing priorities. This was 
particularly the case for two tier authorities. Engagement was often 
tokenistic but in two sites VCS interviewees described themselves as playing 
a role in choosing LAA priorities and, in one of them, a third sector 
assembly had been established around LAA themes. 
The potential synergy between partnership strategies and the work of the 
VCS was not adequately exploited as partnerships were often unaware of 
activities carried out in the sector. This could lead to duplication, 
opportunities to build on existing plans could be missed and commissioning 
decisions were not informed by intelligence from the VCS. 
‘I think most of the time they (VCS) spend just reacting and doing rather than thinking 
proactively about how they could get involved more in the strategic areas and how they fit 
with certain policies and strategic direction. …They don’t see how they fit with some of the 
targets, they don’t see that they fit with the local area agreement and that some of the work 
that they’re doing contributes to that.’ (VCS member, Phase 1) 
Involving the VCS had been made more complex due to competitive 
tendering and changes in procurement guidance. The combination of 
commissioning and provider roles could also create conflicts of interest. It 
was argued that one of the drawbacks of WCC was that it was geared to 
major providers and this made it difficult to contract with the VCS even 
though they were in touch with those least likely to engage with services. A 
number of interviewees commented on the need to take a more radical 
approach to commissioning preventive services, drawing on new ways of 
working from the VCS. One interviewee commented: 
‘Instead they’re giving the contracts to the big nationals and those nationals haven’t got the 
local social capital, the local sign-up, the localism.’ (VCS member, Phase 1) 
Interviewees described ways of improving partnership working at a local 
level although much depended on the local context. Locality networks of 
various kinds could span health and social care and the wider health 
agenda, and community assemblies could provide a focus for community 
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views. Practice-based commissioners could also become involved on a 
locality basis. 
7.6 Public involvement in health scrutiny 
Chairs of health scrutiny committees are publicly accountable through being 
elected as councillors. OSC interviewees concurred with VCS interviewees 
that public involvement in PCT decision-making required development. 
However Chairs of health scrutiny committees described public involvement 
in the scrutiny function as minimal. One interviewee commented: 
‘Pretty poor, I’d say, because basically I would say most of the public would be completely 
unaware of the work of the scrutiny side of things. I think in my time I've chaired health for a 
year and a half, and we’ve had one deputation, which bearing in mind that would be the only 
way of the public getting involved is pretty low.’ (OSC Chair, Phase 1) 
Sites differed in the extent to which members of scrutiny committees 
sought out views of the public and in two sites there was a more proactive 
approach to public engagement. One interviewee described how they were 
improving engagement: 
‘So it’s taking scrutiny into the community where it should be, not just tied up as we’re sitting 
up in ivory towers so to speak and sending loads of literature out to people, a waste of time. 
You meet people face to face … .’ (OSC Chair, Phase 1) 
As part of this, it was argued the public needed to be more aware of how 
they could influence decision-making in the health care system. On the 
other hand, commissioners needed a better understanding of levers to 
promote communication and engagement with the populations that they 
served. A number of different routes were discussed including Mosaic 
profiling, working through umbrella VCS organisations or LINks, 
independent social marketing initiatives and raising the profile of the PCT 
through sponsorship. Other examples included face to face canvassing to 
increase public awareness of the health agenda and marketing routes 
through which the public could potentially influence commissioning 
decisions. 
In common with LSP sub-groups, scrutiny committees were themed and 
each had a discrete remit, making it difficult to make links across a wider 
health and well being agenda. There were a few examples of scrutiny of 
health and well being strategies, health inequalities and the LAAs, but, in 
general, there was little scrutiny of partnerships, of LAAs, of preventive 
services or of health protection. Instead the focus was largely on scrutiny of 
PCT targets and priorities, often in response to public concern. OSCs did not 
figure prominently in PCT accounts of governance and some argued that 
they did not present enough of a challenge to PCTs. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the lack of visibility of public 
health means that reflecting concerns of the public by scrutiny committees 
may not lead to the scrutiny of services for public health and well being, 
despite the role envisaged for OSCs in this regard. Focus groups 
commented that OSCs were typically focused on the health care system and 
did not reflect the wider public health system. 
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From a governance perspective a number of themes emerge from this 
chapter. First is a lack of clarity over the degree of influence to be exercised 
in statutory organisations, reflected in the varied involvement of LINks in 
PCT Boards and sub-committees. Second there are differences in how public 
involvement is interpreted. It was clear from interviewees in four PCTs (and 
the corresponding LINks interviews) that, while the PCT was trying to 
involve the public in commissioning for health and well being, there was 
little evidence of the public influencing commissioning decisions. PCT 
interviewees saw public involvement in commissioning as reflected through 
informal engagement with the public while VCS interviewees expected more 
influence and direct formal involvement in decision-making, a view 
expressed by one interviewee as follows: 
‘But when you ask public to be involved, engaged, their hopes are high, and they think they’re 
going to alter or are able to alter the decision, whereas for the commissioners engagement 
means something else.’ (VCS member, Phase 1) 
Paradoxically, increased public involvement may lead to less emphasis on a 
public health agenda. The economics report carried out as part of the 
project noted the relevance of one of the theorems of public choice theory, 
the Median Voter model. This suggests that the rate of output of public 
goods is determined by the median voter, because the government 
maximises its chances of re-election by reflecting the median voter 
preferences (or, more accurately, the government’s perceptions of these).93 
Focusing on median voter preferences may neglect the needs of minority 
groups and those with the poorest levels of health and well being and so 
exacerbate existing inequalities. Moreover, longer term needs for investing 
in health and well being may not be appropriately valued by the median 
voter because of uncertainty about longer term benefits. This has direct 
relevance for commissioners who act as ‘agents’ representing the principal 
(the public). They need to ensure that their role as ‘agent’ on behalf of 
principals fairly reflects the needs of the most deprived groups and that 
robust, longer term evidence informs commissioning decisions. If 
commissioners invest for the longer term the opportunity cost of that 
investment may be the more urgent and immediate demand for funds from 
the acute sector. This issue is further discussed in Chapter 9. 
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8 Economic perspectives on incentives and 
contractual flexibilities 
While governance structures described in Chapters 5 and 6 can also act as 
incentives and shape performance, this chapter focuses on incentive 
arrangements and contractual flexibilities available to commissioners, with 
particular emphasis on their applicability and deployment to health and well 
being. Data from the national survey and from both phases of fieldwork are 
analysed in the context of economic perspectives on incentives. A more 
detailed analysis is provided in a review of the economic literature on 
incentives for commissioners (working paper 3). 
Commissioners can draw on a range of incentives to encourage the 
provision of additional services or improved performance to meet specific 
targets. Incentives may also be included in contracts for providers, whether 
located in the NHS, the private sector or the VCS. They may also be 
targeted at consumers to incentivise changes in lifestyle or to encourage 
access to services.94 With the separation of commissioning from provision 
there is a requirement to specify contracts (and the option of including 
performance incentives) and promote competition through the tendering 
process. High Quality Care for All 19 suggested incentivising quality 
improvement through ‘Commissioning for Quality and Improvement’ 
(CQUIN); prevention through improvements to the GP pay-for-performance 
system, the QOF; and integrated care through support for practice-based 
commissioning and the introduction of integrated care pilots. Other 
incentives available to commissioners included the optional Local Enhanced 
Services (LES) element of the GP contract, reward schemes for practice-
based commissioners or extensions to nationally agreed contracts, such as 
‘QOF plus’ schemes. Financial incentives are also linked to the reward 
element of LAAs, which are shared among partners. This chapter considers 
options available to commissioners and explores the extent to which LESs, 
reward schemes and contractual flexibilities are effectively deployed for 
promoting health and well being. 
8.1 Theoretical background 
While ideas of agency, motivation and incentives are often considered 
central to improved performance, there is a ‘lack of coherent established 
theory with predictive validity’ on the use of incentives in health care and 
‘we are still a long-way distant from any comprehensive theoretical and 
empirical accounts’.95 Notwithstanding these limitations, this section 
considers a selection of theoretical economic approaches and explores their 
implications for commissioning health and well being services. It builds on a 
previous review by Davies et al.26 who used a Governance-Incentives-
Outcomes (GIO) model to analyse incentives and outcomes associated with 
three different forms of governance: markets, hierarchies and networks. 
The NHS in England can be characterised as a ‘quasi-market’, because it is 
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a public sector organisation which incorporates market features. The WCC 
framework, for example, explicitly requires commissioners to ‘effectively 
stimulate the market to meet demand’ and secure required clinical and 
health and well being outcomes. The co-existence of market, network and 
hierarchical modes of governance within the NHS gives rise to tensions, 
including that between cooperation and competition, integration of services 
and development of a competitive market and complex governance 
arrangements with practice-based commissioners, who both commission 
and provide primary care services. A market mode of governance also has 
limited applicability to partnership working and collaborative commissioning 
which are increasingly seen as a route to limiting both ‘risk shunting’ across 
commissioners and providers and ‘cost shunting’ across different parts of 
the local health system. The health and well being agenda also reflects the 
importance of considering ‘whole system’ impacts of incentives and these 
aspects are discussed following a discussion of economic models for 
understanding incentives. 
Davies et al.26 identified four theoretical economic models of relevance for 
understanding how incentives work. 
(1) Neoclassical economics, the foundation of most economic theory, 
explains why markets may fail and provides a rationale for 
government intervention in the form of national targets, regulation 
and taxes. It also explains why principal-agent relationships arise, for 
example where demand for services is expressed by commissioners 
on behalf of their populations: if left solely to individuals, demand for 
and provision of public health services would be suboptimal. Health 
care clearly does not fulfil the conditions for market equilibrium: 
there are monopolistic organisations; one person’s consumption may 
not preclude (dis)benefits for others (externalities); patients 
(principals) may delegate decisions to doctors (agents) in 
relationships based on trust; and there is unequal access to and use 
of information, potentially resulting in doctors acting as imperfect 
agents. Other developments of the neoclassical framework include 
economic evaluation (such as cost-effectiveness analysis, further 
discussed in Chapter 9) and the ‘characteristics approach’, which can 
usefully inform local consultation to determine priorities and service 
design. 
(2) Game theory modifies some of the assumptions of neoclassical 
theory, addresses the problems of strategic behaviour and can shed 
light on reasons why commissioners face problems identifying 
suitable providers and managing their behaviour. It deals with 
concepts of uncertainty, risk, and the principal-agent relationship and 
explores how strategic behaviour affects resource allocations. It 
concerns the outcomes (expected utility) of rational individual 
decisions taken under uncertainty which gives rise to risk and 
subsequent ‘gaming’ by individuals as they interact during the 
decision-making process and can result in ‘opportunism’, that is, 
efforts to realise individual gains through a lack of honesty in 
transactions.96 In a world with uncertainty, there are informational 
differences between agents: employers may not know how much 
effort employees are making, particularly where outputs are difficult 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      86 
 Project 08/1716/208 
to measure – this is often the case in promoting health and in 
providing health care. These difficulties explain why commissioners 
use incentives, contracts and performance indicators to manage 
providers, but the unintended consequences of these approaches 
should also be considered. While neoclassical theory assumes that 
people will only do what they perceive to be in their own interests 
game theory recognises that individuals are likely to be a 
combination of ‘knights and knaves’97 and may also value non-
pecuniary gains such as fair treatment of themselves and others.96 
Davies and colleagues26 note that game theory is being developed to 
tackle some of the complexities of decision-making in the public 
sector, and it appears that an understanding of the principal-agent 
problem is increasingly informing the design of performance 
management within the NHS. 
(3) Institutional economics and experimental economics can help to shed 
light on potential solutions to the problems identified by game theory. 
Institutional economics is of particular relevance to commissioners as 
it provides a ‘science of contracts’ which gives insights into contracts 
and incentives and can either be incorporated into contracts, or used 
separately.98 Contracts are a way of mediating the relationship 
between commissioners (principals) and providers (agents). 
Institutional economics also sheds light on contractual relationships, 
defining the associated costs as ‘transactions costs’.99 Theories are 
based on an analysis of principal-agent relationships in centralised 
(hierarchical arrangements) and devolved systems (market-type 
arrangements). This is further described in section 8.2. 
(4) Experimental economics suggest that individual-level incentives can 
be effective in changing behaviour, but that it is important to work 
with ‘human frailty’ rather than trying to override it. It explores how 
‘extrinsic’ motivations provided by those attempting to manage 
performance can affect ‘intrinsic’ motivations of those being 
managed.100 It has potential to address the ‘crowding out problem’, in 
which the use of targets or financial incentives damages altruism or 
intrinsic motivation.26 Davies et al.26 cite theoretical analyses which 
suggest that low-powered incentives, and low levels of monitoring, 
allow principals to communicate their trust and value to agents. This 
branch of economics is particularly useful when changes in individual 
behaviour are sought, but commissioners should also be aware of 
these factors as they can help differentiate the potential effectiveness 
of alternative provider schemes. ‘Nudge economics’ offers approaches 
to promote and encourage behaviour that improves health and well 
being, whilst supporting free choice. This is discussed further in 
relation to incentives for behaviour change. 
8.2 Institutional economics and incentive contracts 
This section considers how commissioners can use contracts and incentives. 
Incentive contracts are one way of ensuring that the agent bears some of 
the risk or responsibility for the outcomes of their actions. There are several 
principles governing the design of optimal incentive contracts 101 (pp. 240-
241) and Table 6 summarises these principles and their implications for 
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commissioners’ use of incentives drawing on Milgrom and Roberts 101 and 
Williamson.96 Activity-based funding as a means of incentivising improved 
health outcomes and the efficiency and quality of care is also considered. 
Table 6. Economic principles for optimal incentive contracts 
Principle  Definition Implications for 
commissioners 
The 
informativenes
s principle 
Factor in performance 
measures that allow agent 
effort to be estimated more 
precisely and exclude 
measures that chiefly reflect 
factors outside of the agent’s 
control. 
Commissioners may require 
agents to report activity data, 
e.g. on efforts to follow up non-
attenders at weight loss clinics.  
The incentive-
intensity 
principle 
The strength of incentives 
should reflect the marginal 
returns to task, the accuracy 
with which performance is 
measured, the responsiveness 
of the agent’s efforts to 
incentives, and the agent’s risk 
tolerance. 
Sometimes, the most difficult to 
reach populations are those 
with greatest capacity to 
benefit. Additional payments 
could be made for reaching 
these populations.  
The 
monitoring 
intensity 
principle 
Monitoring is a costly activity. 
More resources should be 
spent monitoring when it is 
desirable to give strong 
incentives, e.g. substantial 
variation in performance or 
poor performance. 
If benchmarking data suggest 
that a PCT is performing 
significantly below national 
average standards provider 
performance may be monitored 
more intensively. 
The equal 
compensation 
principle 
If principals cannot monitor an 
agent’s allocation of time, 
incentives should ensure that 
the marginal returns earned by 
the agent are equal for all 
tasks the agent undertakes. 
Providing strong incentives for 
only some activities can cause 
agents to reduce effort 
elsewhere. 
If local public health indicators 
are added to the QOF, care 
should be taken to ensure that 
targets are aligned with 
commissioner aims, e.g. 
thresholds for triggering 
maximum payments could be 
raised if unmet need is 
concentrated in lower income 
groups.  
Bounded rationality, the limited capacity to process information, means that 
it can be difficult to agree contract terms. As real contracts are not perfect, 
they must allow parties to adapt but this opens the door for opportunistic 
behaviour.101 In response, relational contracts may be written that ‘frame 
the relationship’, outline objectives and procedures for governing decision-
making rather than agreeing detailed plans of action. These can be enforced 
by a reputation mechanism. 
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Within this framework, this section considers the use of incentives in 
commissioning for health and well being through QOF, and LESs, drawing 
on interview and survey analysis. LESs were the most frequently cited 
incentive both in the survey and by interviewees and are discussed in some 
detail. 
8.2.1 Incentives through national contracts: the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework 
The voluntary pay-for-performance (P4P) part of the GP contract, the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), designed to reward quality in 
primary care, includes several preventative indicators. Most of these 
address secondary prevention, but the 2009/10 QOF includes two primary 
prevention indicators for cardiovascular disease and two smoking cessation 
indicators.102 There are also indicators for cervical screening and 
vaccinations. 
Although regularly updated, the QOF has been criticised for its lack of 
capacity to incentivise a population-based approach to health and well 
being. There is little incentive to proactively identify populations at risk who 
are not currently on disease registers, a task which is key to targeting 
populations most at risk of premature mortality. Furthermore, what is not 
incentivised may be marginalised or neglected.103 The QOF focuses on 
‘activity’ and provides little information on outcomes a point recently 
reiterated in the report of the House of Commons Health Committee on 
health inequalities12 (p.9) in the context of the importance of measuring the 
number of successful quitters rather than the numbers given advice. There 
is a lack of baseline measurement for the framework and it is therefore 
impossible to know if real changes are being measured or current practice is 
simply being described.11 The QOF currently offers little financial reward for 
additional health improvement services and has been described as a crude 
measure of patient management with emphasis placed on computerised 
data recording instead of tailored advice and support for individuals.104 
However, research has also shown some benefits of incentives built into the 
QOF. Millett et al.105 concluded that financial incentives introduced in UK 
primary care appear to have increased cessation advice given by primary 
care staff and reduced the percentage of people with diabetes who smoke, 
with improvements generally greatest in the groups with the poorest 
performance before these incentives were introduced. 
While evaluations of the QOF suggest that it has the potential to narrow 
health inequalities,106 rates of exception reporting – where patients can be 
excluded from the calculation of performance – need to be taken into 
account when determining the actual impact.107 However, as maximum 
payments are made when 90 per cent of eligible patients are ‘treated’, there 
is little financial incentive for GPs to offer services to hardest-to-reach 
patients who arguably have the greatest capacity to benefit. An illustration 
of ‘the equal compensation principle’ is found in recent research evaluating 
the impact of the QOF in primary care on targeted and untargeted clinical 
practice.108 Delivery of services rewarded with performance payments 
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improved while untargeted services declined. Taking a different approach, 
Bernstein et al.88 argued that reductions in NHS spending due to GPs 
‘assertively’ addressing lifestyle risk factors such as smoking, obesity and 
alcohol consumption should be passed on in the form of larger PBC budgets, 
which would act as an incentive to improve preventive care. 
A systematic review of pay-for-performance schemes, many of which 
covered preventative services, found mixed evidence that schemes 
improved quality of care. The review highlighted shortcomings in the 
current evidence base, which was unable to address key questions such as 
the optimal duration for payments or whether effects endured after rewards 
were removed.109 A more recent study of P4P schemes in Massachusetts, 
US, which also covered preventative services such as well-child-adolescent 
visits, found no evidence of positive effects on the quality of care.110 
Amongst some interviewees there was frustration over the inflexibility and 
limited opportunities for performance managing national GMS contracts, 
despite initiatives such as balanced scorecards or monitoring QOF points: 
‘The general medical contract for GPs needs to be taken apart root and branch and put back 
together again on evidence and policy based medicine. That won’t happen because there are 
too many vested interests …. But if it did happen, you could theoretically transform the 
landscape by making it much more cost-efficient and much more effective in terms of curative 
services, rehabilitative services and preventative services.’ (DPH, Phase 2) 
Some considered that QOF had encouraged proactive case finding but most 
interviewees considered that, as currently configured, it did not adequately 
incentivise a proactive and population-based approach to health and well 
being services but had incentivised the management of long-term 
conditions. It was also more likely to act as an incentive for smaller and 
non-prescribing practices or those without large numbers of LESs. If the 
QOF was to support improved health and well being, new QOF points were 
needed: 
‘I think the government needs to put its money where its mouth is and it needs to change 
some of the QOF points to say we want a really assertive approach to obesity, we want a 
really assertive approach … to smoking, to drinking, to drug taking, to exercise.’ (PCT Chair, 
Phase 2) 
In first phase interviews, two PCTs planned to develop ‘QOF Plus’ schemes 
to build in extra health and well being indicators and provide additional 
rewards to high performing practices, whilst offering incentives to the 
poorer performing practices to improve. In the national survey, we asked 
PCTs whether they had plans to extend QOF to incentivise health and well 
being. Thirty eight PCTs reported they had no plans whilst 16 PCTs did have 
plans. In terms of how this group described how QOF would be extended, 
the following areas were cited: smoking cessation; cardiovascular disease; 
obesity; and diabetes. 
8.2.2 Local Enhanced Services 
LESs are optional, locally determined service agreements with independent 
contractors, usually agreed on an annual basis. There is no clear definition, 
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but since their introduction in 2004 as part of the new GMS contract, they 
have provided an attractive and flexible route through which PCTs can 
harness a quick response from general practice in addressing local needs or 
specific targets for delivery. Spending on LESs has doubled since 2006, and 
in 2008/9, around £323 million was spent on LESs in England,111 excluding 
APMS and PCTMS enhanced services. 
LESs were the most widely commented on financial incentive scheme by 
first phase PCT and PBC interviewees (33/45 and 8/8 respectively) and 
interviewees from all sites agreed that they were successful in motivating 
GPs. They were useful for meeting national or local targets, for example, in 
relation to smoking and obesity, but they were also seen by PCT 
interviewees as a way of filling gaps in the QOF, such as proactive 
approaches to identifying populations at risk. Some PCTs chose to weight 
LESs to encourage targeting of specific populations or areas (in line with the 
‘incentive intensity’ principle in Table 6). At least two PCTs had incorporated 
a public involvement element into their practice-based commissioning LES 
and one wished to develop a LES to support healthy behaviour change 
through motivational interviewing. LESs fit neatly into a ‘small business’ 
model of primary care. However, they have been developed in an 
incremental and piecemeal fashion with some PCTs agreeing large numbers 
of LESs, not always aligned with their strategic plan. 
As part of the study we gathered (through FOI requests) all LESs in the ten 
case study sites during the first phase. There was variability in the numbers 
and content of the LESs. Numbers ranged from ten to 26: areas commonly 
included were contraception, Chlamydia screening, immunisation and 
vaccination, tests provided closer to home and extended hours. More rarely 
included were agreements with practices to provide patient data on areas 
such as smoking, obesity, breastfeeding; information on ethnicity and first 
language; or initiatives related to falls prevention, proactive care of the 
elderly or substance abuse. Five sites had specific smoking cessation LESs 
with practices or community pharmacies. Many LESs related to payment for 
extensions to core clinical services such as immunisation and vaccination. 
The national survey showed that LESs were the most commonly cited 
vehicle for incentivising activities to reach local targets. The survey also 
asked whether the PCTs used LESs to incentivise health and well being 
interventions. Around 70 per cent of PCTs used LESs for this purpose. We 
asked respondents to give examples of how LESs were used (see Figure 3). 
The y axis denotes the number of PCTs that informed us they were using 
LESs for the most mentioned conditions. 
We followed this up by asking if respondents thought LESs were an effective 
way of commissioning health and well being services. Eight per cent of 
respondents rate LESs as ‘very effective’, 65 per cent ‘quite effective’, 23 
per cent ‘not very effective’ and three per cent ‘very ineffective’. 
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Figure 3. Local enhanced services 
 
Arguably, LESs reflect both the advantages and disadvantages of incentive 
arrangements, although much depends on getting the level of incentive 
right. There was evidence of their success, for example, practices taking on 
care for a nursing home, doing ‘ward rounds’ which had dramatically 
reduced emergency admissions. Smoking cessation targets in one site had 
been exceeded by creating a LES for general practice that funded a more 
comprehensive approach to smoking cessation - with dramatic results: 
‘So if the practice now sees a person for the full sort of four to six weeks, they’ve got the 
person who’s quit smoking and had that confirmed by carbon monoxide testing. Whereas in 
the past they might have got a fiver for it, they can now get up to hundred and twenty quid for 
that. All of a sudden, we’ve gone from missing the target, missing the target, missing target, to 
so overachieving it, it’s amazing. And, you know, these are genuine quitters.’ (DS, Phase 2) 
Despite these advantages there were also criticisms levelled at LESs. They 
could increase inequalities if targeted practices did not choose to take them 
up and if practices did not need additional income they would not take 
advantage of them. Some practices were accused of ‘cherry picking’ LESs 
which led interviewees to consider that instead of there being individual 
LESs, they should form part of a wider package across practices. The view 
was expressed that providers assumed they would always be available but 
this was unlikely to be the case, particularly in an economic downturn. LESs 
did not reflect a strategic approach, were not always outcome based, there 
was not always adequate evidence of benefits to population health and they 
tended to be poorly performance managed, with weak contract 
specifications and few sanctions. 
Interviewee accounts reflected ambivalence over the benefits of 
incentivising through LESs, particularly over the longer term. Over the 
course of the project there was also evidence of a shift from the use of LESs 
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to the use of contractual flexibilities and more rigorous performance 
management of primary care. Interviewees thought it important that levers 
for health and well being formed an integral part of contracts rather than 
incentivised ‘add ons’: 
‘Because we have ended up in the situation where we have lots of little LESs or contracts that 
actually we’re not performance managing, we don’t know what they’re delivering in terms of 
quality, and … you can’t tell the difference between what was previously happening and what 
wasn’t. So we’ve tried to withdraw from those services. Whether I think we need to in the 
future I think the answer to that is yes, but it goes back to we need to be much better then 
about how we performance manage and write those contracts.’ (DPH, Phase 2) 
The fact that some practices carried out the same activities for which other 
practices were being incentivised meant that LESs were being used to 
address variability in the level of care provided through general practice. It 
was argued that engagement could prove a more successful route: 
‘I don’t think financial incentives are necessary, I think it’s really important to get engagement 
at a local level first of all … with our vascular risk policy there is a scheme that will come into 
effect from next year so that will be focusing on specific areas of our borough. But other GP 
practices will still be doing those vascular risk assessments without a financial incentive 
because they do understand how important those things are. So I don’t think you necessarily 
need to throw money to fix the problem.’ (PEC Chair, Phase 2) 
Moreover, LESs could often be introduced without regard to effects on 
increased activity in other parts of the health care system. An example was 
given of a ‘falls LES’ that failed because there was not the capacity to 
respond to referrals from these practices: 
‘If you put an incentive in one part of the system how’s the rest of the system aligned to that? 
Because you can do all the proactive work in the world but if the rest of the system has still 
only got the capacity to respond to reactive and it can't refocus quick enough it doesn't take 
long for the system to get clogged.’ (Director of Strategic Commissioning, Phase 2) 
Many interviewees argued that the most appropriate form of incentivisation 
depended on the nature of the service and those who were to deliver it and 
no broad generalisations could be made. Nevertheless, a number of case 
study sites were seeking to amend, reduce or package LESs in various 
ways. The latter could include combining or clustering related LESs into a 
Service Level Agreement with general practice networks and including a 
more detailed specification of what was required as part of the LES. There 
was also the suggestion that LESs as currently conceived did not encourage 
an integrated approach which would be incentivised through budgets related 
to care pathways. Other PCTs were clear that there would be fewer LESs in 
future as they would gradually be replaced by different contractual 
arrangements. There needed to be more clarity about what was included as 
part of the baseline GMS contract, for example. 
Interviewees in a number of sites were also not in favour of individual 
incentives because it detracted from the values of partnership. Instead of 
pursuing a transactional approach, as reflected in the LES and also the QOF, 
it was argued that there should be a new approach to partnership and 
although this would probably be reflected in a PBC incentive scheme and a 
LES, the important issue was to change the culture rather than adopt a top 
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down approach to contract management. One interviewee described it as 
follows: 
‘And actually we, as a PCT we don’t treat them as partners in the process of delivering health 
care, we try and treat them as if they’re effectively an employed part of the health care 
system, which they’re not … . It’s about saying if you want to come into a slightly more 
partnership model with the PCT, we will do this, we will enhance your GMS baseline, but we 
will expect you to deliver it to a higher level, and we will expect you to work jointly with us to 
deliver the targets.’ (PEC Chair, Phase 2) 
In other cases, as mentioned above, it was decided to try and channel 
contracts through networks of GPs rather than incentivise individual 
practices, in order to encourage standardisation of care, improve 
performance management and provide support for weaker practices. 
Information which allowed practices to benchmark their performance was 
also a key factor in motivating practices to improve their performance. 
The interviews also demonstrated differences in the extent to which DsPH 
were involved in incentivising primary care to provide health and well being 
services, through LESs or through APMS contracts. This was sometimes 
described as the province of separate departments concerned with primary 
care commissioning and outside their remit. Given that LESs are both 
optional and a main route for incentivising additional preventive services, 
there may be risks to preventive services if they are withdrawn. 
8.2.3 Incentives within contracts for acute providers 
Payment by Results (PbR), is steadily replacing the previous system of block 
contracting 99 and, in 2008/09, it covered 45 per cent of all secondary 
health care purchased by PCTs. 
Empirical evaluations suggest that PbR has led to modest increases in 
activity, with little or no detrimental impact on quality.112, 113 In terms of 
provider behaviour, there is evidence of increased efficiency (by lowering 
providers’ unit costs), limited evidence of changes in the pattern of coding – 
miscoding caused both over- and under-funding, with no systematic pattern 
– and encouraged providers to improve financial and information technology 
management and overall planning approaches.112, 114 In terms of transaction 
costs, PbR has lowered the costs of price negotiation, but costs associated 
with volume control, data collection, contract monitoring, and contract 
enforcement are higher.99 These changes in transaction costs affect both 
providers and commissioners. It has been argued however that PbR 
incentivises hospital activity rather than health outcomes and can work 
against a focus on preventive care and collaboration, a view reiterated 
below: 
‘The difficulty can be countering the perverse incentives in the system, and one of the biggest 
ones of those is payment by results, period. It's just, in terms of commissioning for health and 
well being, payment by results is almost a disaster, because it's not payment by results at all, 
it's payment by activity. And if you just think about it with the pure accountancy hat on from a 
hospital point of view, if they’re paid for admissions, then there’s no incentive to reduce 
admissions.’ (DS, Phase 1) 
One interviewee identified tensions between PbR and PBC: 
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‘Payment by results and practice-based commissioning, if working effectively, are going to 
divide primary and secondary care working effectively together, and we need to work out very 
carefully how to not let that happen locally.’ (PEC Chair, Phase 1) 
Both primary and secondary preventative services are currently outside the 
scope of PbR.115 However, the West Midlands SHA116 has introduced 
mandatory tariffs for lifestyle risk management services such as health 
trainers, smoking cessation clinics, and expert patient programmes. The 
aim is to address supply side barriers by providing financial incentives to 
expand provision of preventative services. Providers accredited by a PCT are 
free to recruit participants and provide services in line with a detailed 
service specification. Providers must also provide activity information for 
audit purposes. Tariffs are payable for achievement of specific outcomes, or 
intermediate outcomes, rather than for activity. For example, smoking 
cessation tariffs are payable for 4-week quitters.117 
Payments are adjusted to reflect efforts to recruit ‘hard to reach’ 
participants (to discourage adverse selection, or ‘cherry picking’), such as 
people from minority ethnic groups or from the most deprived areas. There 
are also higher payments for smoking cessation by pregnant women.117 
Transition payments are available (to reduce the risk of short-term financial 
instability), and auditable codes of conduct are written into contracts (to 
discourage gaming and to help align principal-agent incentives). 116 This 
regional experiment was under review at the time of writing.115 
One of the focus groups, conducted as part of the study, discussed tariffs 
for health improvement services: 
‘But if you think about smoking cessation services, weight management services, these are 
health wellness services, is what I call them, and if you have a tariff concept in wellness 
services, you’d actually really focus people’s attention on delivering it cost effectively, 
commissioning it cost effectively, and I think it changes behaviour. So I think there are some 
policy incentives, if you like, that we really haven’t explored fully in public health terms.’ 
(Regional focus group) 
The tariff could be weighted towards the ‘hard to reach’ populations with the 
aim of actively encouraging identification and targeting. However, there was 
some dispute in the focus group whether this approach would be effective in 
all areas, especially where there were high rates of population turnover. The 
amount of time to be spent on reaching the most ‘hard to reach’ populations 
was also questioned in respect of other demands on services. The national 
survey asked whether tariffs had been included in contracts to reflect health 
improvement targets. Around 39 per cent of PCTs said no whilst only 14 per 
cent said yes. Of those that said tariffs were included, most were using it 
for smoking cessation. 
CQUIN and incentives through the acute contract 
In the NHS Operating Framework for 09/10 118 new incentives were 
introduced to link payment to quality improvement in 2009/10 contracts 
through the commissioning for quality and innovation initiative (CQUIN). 
Approximately a quarter of PCT interviewees (12) discussed the idea of 
commissioning for quality but this was currently being considered only in 
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respect of acute and mental health service providers. However, in 
discussion, the complexity of introducing such payments emerged and 
reflects the ‘monitoring intensity’ and ‘incentive intensity’ principles 
summarised in Table 6: 
‘Actually it wasn’t always straightforward to think what those quality indicators could be. It 
was really easy to think of what the topic matters were, you know, there are things that are 
very important to us, but actually nailing them down to something that (a) can be measured, 
(b) can be measured without too much added grief, (c) where there wasn’t a get out of jail free 
card for the provider in the sense that oh well, you know, actually we didn’t perform well but 
actually that wasn’t our fault, that was somebody else’s fault, you know, you could be 
specific about what the provider’s role was in that part of the quality measure, and then 
setting a realistic target for the improvement of the quality, is actually really difficult.’ (Director 
of Strategy, Phase 1) 
CQUIN was generally focused on better health outcomes for patients, and 
not on a preventative agenda, although there was evidence of using CQUIN 
(or quality indicators which predated its introduction in acute contracts) to 
promote preventive services. Examples were given of incentivising smoking 
cessation services (for maternity services or screening all elective patients 
for smoking status) or Accident and Emergency Departments sharing 
information on alcohol-related injuries with other agencies. Recent changes 
at a national level would ensure that the tariff paid to providers would 
reduce while the proportion rewarded through CQUIN would increase, and it 
was considered this should lead to CQUIN tariffs which were better 
specified. However, it was pointed out that these targets were difficult to 
monitor and it was possible that some interventions, such as smoking 
cessation, could be better located in primary care. 
8.2.4 Local Area Agreements 
LAAs are a jointly agreed delivery plan for achieving the aims of the 
Sustainable Community Strategy. Rewards are available (through pump 
priming and a performance reward grant for achievement of stretch 
targets). It has been argued 34 that financial incentives are small in relation 
to the administrative input involved - and less than in previous LAA rounds. 
Changes in the reward structure mean that individual departments will no 
longer be individually rewarded, but the reward will be shared by all 
partners involved, encouraging the pooling of budgets. Although LAAs were 
considered important for promoting a health and well being agenda and 
partnership working, financial benefits were not discussed by interviewees. 
8.3 Incentives outside contracts 
While contracts and transaction costs have been the subject of research, 
many financial incentives fall outside a contractual framework. This applies 
to Spearhead status and rewards to practice based commissioners which 
are discussed in turn. 
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8.3.1 The impact of Spearhead status 
One of the research questions we addressed was the impact of Spearhead 
status on commissioning in PCTs. Half the case study sites were Spearhead 
PCTs or contained Spearhead areas. The funding formula for PCTs includes 
a health inequalities element and Spearhead areas have more to spend than 
the England average.15 However, it is difficult to identify how much has 
been spent on narrowing health inequalities and reducing the causes of ill 
health. 
Twenty PCT interviewees and four PBC interviewees commented on the 
impact of Spearhead status. Although knowledge was limited among 
practice-based commissioners, both practice-based commissioners and PCT 
interviewees agreed that Spearhead status did not impact on or change the 
way in which PCTs worked - striving to reduce inequalities was something 
they would be doing anyway and Spearhead status was seldom referred to: 
‘The impact, I’m not sure it’s had any impact whatsoever. Well the point is do you need to be a 
Spearhead to know that you’ve got to get to grips with health and well being and prevention. 
You’re just going to do it anyway… If you said is our work around health and well being and 
prevention delivered because of being a Spearhead, no, it would have been done anyway.’ 
(Deputy Chief Executive, Phase 1) 
While the extra funding associated with Spearhead status was 
acknowledged, none of the interviewees could give examples of how 
Spearhead monies had been spent to reduce inequalities or of projects 
funded through Spearhead resources which had then been mainstreamed. It 
had simply formed part of the baseline: 
‘I’m sure any Spearhead money that ever did come through - again I wasn’t here - has 
disappeared. We certainly haven’t got any earmarked funds, I’m not aware of anything that 
says Spearhead money here.’ (DPH, Phase 1) 
A small number of PCT interviewees felt Spearhead status had raised their 
PCT’s profile and increased the focus on public health and inequalities 
including at board level. In some instances, it had aided the targeting of 
resources to areas of greatest need (though some argued that they would 
be doing this anyway). One interviewee stated the PCT had set more 
challenging trajectories for targets and an additional interviewee stated it 
had encouraged partnership working. Two PCT interviewees felt there was a 
lack of accountability for the performance of Spearhead areas. 
‘I certainly don’t feel that anybody at the SHA has ever been held to account, in any way, 
shape or form, for the Spearhead area making different progress.’ (Chief Executive, Phase 1) 
And in another site: 
‘I don’t think there’s any mechanism for particularly sharing amongst Spearheads except to 
compare yourselves. I don’t think there’s any sort of review of how performance is against 
those Spearheads or any kind of real feeling about what the role of local government is within 
that.’ (DPH, Phase 1) 
In order to locate these findings in a national context the survey asked if 
having Spearhead status acted as an incentive to focus on health and well 
being. The results from 43 responses received were split as follows. Over 
half saw little or no effects. 
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Not at all 27.9 per cent (12) 
Slightly  27.9 per cent (12) 
Quite a bit 32.6 per cent (14) 
A lot  11.6 per cent (5) 
These results reflect the lack of a contractual element and of routine 
performance monitoring in relation to this financial incentive. 
8.3.2 Reward systems for practice-based commissioning 
PBC is encouraged through a series of rewards, first for involvement in PBC 
(often through a PBC LES), and second through being able to use 70 per 
cent of any savings (Freed up Resources (FUR)), derived from the 
reconfiguration of care or efficiency savings for developing services to meet 
local health needs. This depends on PCTs agreeing a PBC business plan, 
alignment of the plan with the strategic objectives of the PCT and 
availability of resources. Difficulties in PBC have been well documented 119 
and different kinds of reward element were used in a number of PCTs to 
encourage clinical engagement. For example, the PBC LES could also 
require monitoring of non-elective activity, public involvement and 
management of budgets. It could simply refer to time spent in which case it 
could be interpreted as due payment rather than as an incentive. The 
extent to which FUR was targeted towards health and well being was one of 
the questions addressed through the project. 
Although this study did not focus on the development of PBC, issues related 
to the governance, development and orientation of PBC clearly influence the 
extent to which PBC is likely to become a force in commissioning for health 
and well being for practice populations. Also important is the extent to 
which PBC is involved in deciding commissioning priorities as opposed to 
simply commenting on them or reflecting them in their business plans. 
This section begins by summarising views about incentives for PBC before 
looking at how practice-based commissioners in our study engaged with 
health and well being services. 
Views on PBC incentives 
There was some scepticism about the role of incentives in encouraging 
practices to become involved in PBC in both first and second phase 
interviews. It was argued that it kept them away from their practices and 
there was little profit to be gained. As one interviewee commented: 
‘The most remarkable thing about practice-based commissioning is that anybody does it at all, 
because there’s no profit it… and certainly no personal gain.’ (DS, Phase 2) 
FUR appeared a substantial incentive in theory, as PCTs could allocate 70 
per cent of FUR to PBC for developing services to meet local health needs. 
In practice, however, this was dependent on the financial situation of the 
PCT, and influenced by the extent of overspend in other practices, as well 
as by the approach of the individual PCT. All such savings could be withheld 
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and were being withheld at the time of the interviews in a number of the 
case study sites. This meant that there was little incentive to develop 
business plans. One interviewee commented that: 
‘We did have a number of GPs quite engaged in practice-based commissioning and that all fell 
apart in 2007/8 because they were offered the incentive to join up but then they were told 
during the course of the year there wouldn’t be an achievement payment. So there was 
basically a breakdown in the relationship between the PCT and the practices where they felt, 
if it’s not too strong a word to say, betrayed.’ (Director of Primary Care Commissioning, Phase 
1) 
The effectiveness of FUR as an incentive was further questioned by a 
number of interviewees, especially given the annual planning and 
monitoring cycles which made ‘investing to save’ difficult. Many health and 
well being initiatives were small-scale pilot projects and often unable to 
demonstrate effectiveness in a short time period. It was difficult to 
commission services ‘off the shelf’ or be clear about expected outcomes. In 
the same way, it was difficult to quantify savings from health promotion or 
public health interventions and use these resources elsewhere. In contrast, 
it was clear how money could be released through service reconfiguration. 
Both the ‘pilot nature’ of initiatives and the lack of recurrent funding were 
considered significant barriers to engagement with a health and well being 
agenda. Moreover, extra resources could be required to make savings which 
were then used to commission additional services: 
‘If I’m going to start saying well I will set up a new service internally within the practice to look 
after all these people in a much more assertive way, and take one of the doctors out of the 
surgery to do all that, that is, or I’m going to sit down and pull all these people and review 
their medication in a much more rigorous way, there is no finance to support that. If I’m going 
to improve my access sufficiently so that people don’t go to A&E, it saves all the money on the 
budget, but actually I've employed more doctors and nurses to do all that sort of stuff, and 
there’s no incentive in the system.’ (PEC Chair, Phase 2) 
In other cases, however, FUR was seen more in terms of a quid pro quo for 
demand management in primary care, in the context of a collaborative 
approach, rather than directly related to the resources saved through 
effective demand management: 
‘I think we need to see it as a process of ‘we’ve saved the PCT some money so they give us 
some to do something else’ really, rather than thinking, you know, that’s a tenner so we can 
spend a tenner. I don’t think it’s helpful to think of it in those terms, and I would hope that the 
PCT would support through whatever mechanism a good work that was suggested regardless 
of freed-up resources.’ (PBC lead, Phase 2) 
In one site, a more strategic approach had been adopted to the deployment 
of FUR, and an element of FUR had been made recurrent in the first year so 
that redesign work in line with strategic objectives could be completed. 
Pooling arrangements were also in place to allow the development of larger 
schemes. 
From a system-wide perspective it was argued that potential savings from 
service redesign were often less than assumed. Even if progress was made 
in achieving earlier discharge, for example, new patients would take their 
place and could be costlier making it difficult to release resources from the 
acute sector. While there were incentives for PCTs to manage demand 
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through PBC, as failure to do so would threaten their financial viability, one 
of the aims of NHS Trusts was to increase their activity and this resulted in 
a fundamental imbalance and tension inherent in the system. The impact of 
specific incentives was reduced if incentives in the system worked against 
each other or failed to cohere. One interviewee commented: 
‘At the other end of the spectrum you’ve got Foundation Trusts who as a requirement of their 
operating licence with MONITOR requires them to produce a surplus. So they have no incentive 
to do other than to suck more and more work into their hospital or whatever their institution is. 
Now there is a complete absence of any notion that these things are aligned.’ (DS Phase 2) 
Innovation budgets, which provided funds for developing and piloting ideas, 
were used in two of the sites and were seen as an incentive to participate in 
PBC and engage in health and well being activities. A further PCT decided 
savings would be pooled and a 50/50 split would be implemented. As a 
result 50 per cent of the saving would be returned to the practices which 
had made the savings for them to develop plans on how this could be spent 
locally while the other 50 per cent would be spent on developing pooled 
bids. This was seen as an incentive through reducing financial risk and 
strengthening partnership working and occurred in a site which cited strong 
clinical leadership and collaboration with practices. 
Although many questioned the current emphasis on financial incentives, it 
was agreed they acted as a lever for achieving strategic goals. However, 
they formed only part of the picture and while the majority of interviewees 
considered them a spur to action, they needed to be complemented with 
PCT support in order for change to occur. Development support, leadership 
and management skills were all important as was benchmarking across 
practices, demonstration of success and peer approval. 
While there was one example in the case study sites of FUR being used to 
set up a health café, engaging with a wide range of partners, the more 
common finding was that PBC involvement with the broader health and 
well-being agenda or with identifying the needs of their localities was 
minimal. One interviewee commented: 
‘But I think by and large practice-based commissioning has not really got to the health and 
well being agenda. I think it’s been very much about service delivery and, you know, 
community assessment services or joint problems, that kind of thing.’ (DPH, Phase 2) 
The national survey did not identify many examples of practice-based 
commissioners commissioning health and well being services from 
themselves or from other providers. Those that could identify examples of 
this commissioning strategy cited weight management, sexual health and 
enhanced health check (from themselves) and exercise trainers, 
dermatology services and a traveller outreach project (from other 
providers). When asked how PCTs were encouraging PBC to commission 
health and well being services, the most popular method was through FUR 
(52 per cent of 82 responses), followed by the use of an innovation fund 
(34 per cent). 
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8.4 Experimental economics and individual incentives 
Experimental economics provides approaches to decision-making and 
individual incentives. These are discussed before focusing on the research 
on individual incentives and views from interviewees. 
8.4.1 From decision-making to nudge economics 
Empirical evidence suggests that as tasks become more complex, 
individuals adopt simplifying decision-making strategies, such as the use of 
heuristics (rules of thumb) 120 (p 193). These simplistic approaches can 
produce decisions that are systematically biased, but are nonetheless often 
used, even when the stakes are high or financial rewards are available for 
making the ‘right’ decision.120 There are three types of heuristic that 
economic experiments show can lead to predictable, systematic errors.120, 
121 
(1) The availability heuristic: people estimate the frequency of a class by 
the ease with which they can recall specific instances of that class. 
This may be due to internal recall bias, or to external factors such as 
media coverage. For example, people overestimate the incidence of 
highly publicised causes of death. 
(2) The anchoring heuristic: judgments are based on information we 
already hold, or are given (‘anchors’). Answers depend on the 
method used to elicit them. 121 For example, if commissioners are 
interested in finding out willingness to pay for swimming sessions or 
weight loss clinics, they should be aware that responses will depend 
on the order in which price options are offered. 
(3) The representativeness heuristic: judgements about the likelihood 
that a particular event or case belongs to a certain class, based on 
the perceived similarity of the case to the judge’s stereotype of the 
class. For example. awareness that random events occur is displaced 
by the immediate ‘evidence’. Experiments support the view that 
individuals tend to give too little weight to prior information and too 
much weight to new information.120 (p.154) 
In addition to biases associated with heuristics, other systematic errors can 
occur during decision-making such as the ‘sunk costs’ effect where 
judgement may be based on costs already incurred. For example, if a fixed 
payment has to be made to go along to weight management classes, 
participants may be more likely to attend than if they just pay for each class 
attended.120 (p.193) ‘Prospect theory’ offers an alternative descriptive 
model of economic behaviour to that proposed by game theory. According 
to prospect theory changes in wealth are more important than final 
outcomes; gains are treated differently to losses; and outcomes with 
certainty are over-weighted relative to uncertain outcomes.120 (p. 5-6) 
Therefore willingness to pay and willingness to accept may differ: 
individuals may be willing to pay a lower amount to receive services that 
are not currently provided than the amount they would be willing to accept 
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to compensate for the loss of identical services that they currently enjoy. 
This discrepancy can be harnessed when designing health and well being 
services, a topic addressed by ‘nudge economics’. 
 ‘Nudge economics’, 121 a recent experimental approach, considers how 
to make it easier for individuals to choose what is best for themselves, 
their families, and their society. It has parallels with ‘making healthier 
choices easier choices’ 84 a mainstay of health promotion strategy.122 
Drawing on the evidence that individuals may make systematic errors 
in their decisions, nudge economics describes the ways that the ‘choice 
environment’ can be designed to encourage (‘nudge’) individuals to 
make beneficial choices without restricting freedom of choice. The 
process is known as ‘choice architecture’ and essentially involves 
incorporating human factors into design, working with human ‘frailty’ 
rather than trying to override it. Examples of nudges include default 
rules, feedback mechanisms, incentives (market-based or socially 
created), structure choice systems, social cues, frames, and 
transparent designs.121 
Loss aversion helps to produce inertia, a strong desire to stick with the 
status quo or to ‘do nothing’.121 This is particularly the case when 
benefits and costs are separated in time: people may need 
encouragement to invest in pensions or health, because the costs are 
immediate but the benefits are attained only in the distant future.123 
Policies need to address this imbalance by either increasing present 
benefits or decreasing present costs of healthy options. Inertia means 
that if individuals are offered a choice with a default option, many will 
‘choose’ the default even if it is not in their interests to do so. Well-
designed default rules can act as powerful nudges to encourage better 
choices. Feedback mechanisms are another way of improving 
performance by providing positive feedback when performance is good 
and providing information on mistakes. For example, visual displays of 
‘calories burned’ on gym equipment provide positive feedback, helping 
to close the gap between current costs (effort) and future gains 
(fitness). Incentives can be financial or non-financial. In markets, 
incentives are an inbuilt part of the price system, working to match 
supply and demand. However ‘incentive conflicts’ can arise. Thaler and 
Sunstein 121 recommend that four key questions need to be considered 
about incentives: 
• Who uses? 
• Who chooses? 
• Who pays? 
• Who profits? 
The answers to these questions can help highlight the differing and 
conflicting incentives within a service and appropriate adjustments can 
be made to help align the incentives.121 For example, financial 
incentive schemes may comprise payments for weight loss or for 
smoking cessation.124 
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Social marketing can also draw on these techniques to achieve 
particular behavioural changes. 
8.4.2 Incentives for public health and individual behaviour 
Individual-level incentives can also be used to encourage healthy 
behaviour.125, 126 Early evaluations suggest that incentives have more 
impact on participation in health promotion programmes than on changes in 
lifestyle behaviours.126 There is a growing body of evidence that financial 
incentives targeted at individuals can effect changes in short-term 
behaviour – such as smoking cessation, physical activity or weight loss – 
but it is less clear that changes persist after financial rewards have 
ceased.94 
There has been an increase in PCTs offering incentives to consumers to 
carry out lifestyle change. Incentives can also be ‘negative’: some are 
broadly targeted, such as taxes on alcohol and tobacco, whereas others 
may penalise individuals, such as insurance schemes that increase 
premiums for those who do not participate in screening programmes. Taxes 
may help address health inequalities, if a fixed increase in price has a 
greater impact on demand for lower income groups. However, some argue 
that penalties imposed on individuals can risk exacerbating existing health 
inequalities and heighten the potential for coercion.127 To help ensure that 
incentives are ethical, several steps can be taken. These include involving 
users when designing programmes; providing a choice of health promotion 
tools; and allowing opt-outs when there is good cause.127 Health England 
echoes the importance of considering the implications for autonomy when 
evaluating incentive schemes.94 Other criteria for assessing incentive 
schemes listed by Health England include effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, 
equity and feasibility. Based on these criteria, matching grants for 
commissioners and direct payments to individuals were rated most highly of 
the schemes considered. Other criteria that may be relevant for 
commissioners to consider include safety (e.g. risks of unintended 
consequences) and ‘efficiency’ or budgetary impact.124 
Individual incentives for behaviour change 
Some case study sites were offering incentives to individuals to promote 
behaviour change, sometimes related to meeting targets. Incentives 
included the use of loyalty cards with points added for healthy behaviours 
which could be converted to benefits through a local company set up as a 
social enterprise, and cinema tickets in return for Chlamydia screening. 
Interviewees considered that incentives were more effective for screening 
than for long-term behaviour change. Incentives for stopping smoking in 
pregnancy had been tried in one site but proved unsuccessful. 
8.5 Incentives in context 
Despite misgivings over the current emphasis on financial incentives, 
interviewees nevertheless considered incentives provided a flexible lever for 
achieving strategic goals and addressing shortcomings and inflexibilities in 
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the GMS contract. However, a public sector ethos and ‘softer’ motivational 
skills were also important and some considered that financial incentives 
could undermine intrinsic motivation (the ‘crowding out’ problem). 
Incentives needed to be coupled with longer term changes in mainstream 
services. Although often intended to kick start changes, there was a danger 
they would be seen as a permanent financial resource: 
‘But, you know, it’s about funding change. But then the change becomes the mainstream. If 
the change doesn’t become the mainstream way of working, then you’re stuffed, because 
you’re either left with a decision of well we’re going to have to incentivise this forever, or we 
stop incentivising it, and it stops happening.’ (DPH, Phase 1) 
Failure to meet the requirements of performance management regimes or 
sanctions arising from poor ratings also acted as incentives to improve 
performance. However, incentives could lead to perverse consequences and 
there were possibilities of gaming, paying for services which might have 
been provided anyway, and an over reliance on incentives to improve 
performance and quality of care. 
 ‘Solidaristic’ incentives could prove of more importance than individual 
incentives. Non-financial incentives were emphasised by a number of 
interviewees and included earned autonomy of practice-based 
commissioners; increased choice as a method of encouraging providers to 
improve local services; gaining peer approval; gaining support from the 
PCT; performance management; and the feeling of ‘doing the right thing’ 
for local populations. 
As mentioned earlier, the impact of individual incentives was reduced if 
incentives in the system conflicted or were misaligned. The consensus of 
opinion was that PbR worked against commissioning for health and well 
being and it was difficult to release resources to reinvest in preventive 
services. A number of interviewees considered that ‘collaborative 
commissioning’ was a way forward and described a number of options under 
debate. One example was to involve primary and secondary clinicians within 
localities based around hospitals, working with social services to manage a 
budget. At the same time, there was uncertainty given political differences 
in the extent to which budgets could or should be devolved. Another was to 
provide a budget with a local network of GPs (through a Service Level 
Agreement) for a specific pathway of care which would also incorporate 
preventive services. The networks were also aligned with local partnership 
structures to encourage broader partnership working, particularly with 
borough-based services. This was described as follows: 
‘It’ll enable us to do two things that we haven’t really been able to do, previously, and that’s 
work well at a local level on relatively small-scale things and do that by getting health and 
well being better integrated within primary care.’ (DPH, Phase 2) 
Another proposition was to establish devolved budgets for GPs to manage 
their population’s health needs, combined with more control of community 
services, although this model would need to be piloted in order to identify 
optimal size of budgets and establish the nature of collaborative 
arrangements across PCTs in order to share risk. It was argued in one site 
that new kinds of contract were required, based on categories of care and 
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drawing on more sophisticated data than currently available through 
programme budgeting. 
Although care pathway development is a common theme, these approaches 
have different implications for the extent to which PBC becomes more 
involved in the health and well being agenda or with local partnerships 
outside the acute sector. 
Looking forward, some interviewees saw distinctions emerging between 
‘strategic commissioners’ (PCTs) who set and monitored outcome measures 
and their ‘accountable providers’ who could themselves commission 
elements of the care pathway to achieve strategic outcomes. Children’s 
services could integrate commissioners and providers across health and 
social care and ‘risk sharing’ across commissioners and providers was being 
discussed. Where PCTs had formed clusters to provide acute services 
commissioning the point was made that a public health presence was still 
needed if a return to ‘old style’ procurement was to be prevented. 
8.5.1 Contractual flexibilities and performance monitoring 
Although there was evidence of declining enthusiasm for using incentives in 
phase one interviews, by phase two, there was a shift in emphasis towards 
the following: 
(a) PCTs requiring a clear notion of what GPs should be providing as part 
of a core contract and therefore which areas needed to be 
incentivised or separately funded. 
(b) Concentrating on contract specification and the performance 
management of GP contracts and using all available contractual 
levers. 
(c) How far networks of GPs, rather than individual practices, should be 
incentivised. 
(d) The extent to which contractual arrangements with GPs could be 
placed on a different footing, such as APMS, so that performance 
management arrangements flowed from the nature of the contract. 
PCTs could exploit contractual flexibilities through APMS, PMS and SPMS. 
PMS agreements provided essential services, with greater freedom to meet 
the health needs of local populations. PMS contracts were restricted to 
medical practitioners while APMS contracts offered greater flexibility 
allowing services to be commissioned from a wide variety of sectors, 
including commercial organisations, voluntary and charitable organisations, 
social enterprises, mutual providers and public bodies. Their use was 
becoming increasingly popular as it allowed commissioners to clearly define 
what was needed from the outset. However, core contracts were already in 
place and re-commissioning through APMS and PMS could only take place 
when these contracts came to an end. 
The national survey demonstrated similar percentages of GPs with GMS and 
PMS contracts but only an average of four per cent of GPs with APMS 
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contracts across the 43 PCTs that responded to this question. We asked 
whether PMS and APMS contracts were being specified or reworked to 
explicitly address health and well being. Around 22 per cent of PCTs said no 
and 49 per cent said yes or had these contracts under review. Few gave 
examples, however. 
Interviewees were often uncertain over the balance to be achieved across 
incentives and contracts as this could be influenced by political changes. 
There was far less enthusiasm for APMS among practice-based 
commissioners in our case studies, as contracts were considered too short-
term. In any event, it could be difficult to remove contracts without leaving 
populations at risk. While it was recognised that performance management 
had been neglected, the point was also made that practices were not 
adequately involved in strategic discussions but ‘bombarded’ with 
operational and transactional information which originated from different 
parts of the PCT. There could be separate activities for medicines 
management, contracts or clinical governance which all took place in 
separate silos: 
‘And there was a whole process whereby bits of the PCT that related to general practice were 
all in little silos. There was sort of medicines management, there’s the contract, there’s clinical 
governance, there’s, you know, all those sorts of things were all in completely separate silos 
and we had to bring them together.’ (PEC Chair, Phase 2) 
PMS contracts were described as disappointing and not adequately exploited 
and there were a number of attempts to ensure that the PMS practices were 
providing value for money. Contracts needed to be explicit and include 
health improvement targets. 
As mentioned above, the emphasis was shifting towards better performance 
management of PMS contracts and the added value they might bring, and 
better monitoring of QOF payments, both recognised as relatively neglected 
areas. PCTs were increasingly holding practice-based commissioners to 
account in relation to reducing referrals, non-elective admissions, 
prescribing budgets and attendances at Accident and Emergency 
Departments. Finally, there was increased interest in APMS contracts, 
especially for new contracts, which might include incentives or penalties for 
not reaching targets agreed in the contract. There would be a core GMS 
contract with an APMS contract covering all other services. Such contracts 
could also incorporate preventive components. 
Despite the importance of incentives and contractual levers there was some 
variation in the extent to which DsPH were engaged with this aspect, which 
often fell under the aegis of a different part of the PCT devoted to primary 
care contracting. 
This chapter demonstrates that individual incentives, such as FUR are 
limited in their potential to promote health and well being, that the balance 
between incentivisation and contract specification (including the nature of 
core contracts) is changing and that a transactional approach may 
undermine engagement and local involvement. PbR incentivised increased 
activity and there were few incentives for partnership governance. New 
approaches to devolved budgets were being considered as a way to increase 
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the focus on outcomes. Newman,128 quoted in Davies et al.,26 distinguishes 
between ‘solidaristic incentives’ reflected in self and in network governance 
and ‘individualised’ incentives reflected in hierarchies and market 
governance. Changes in this balance were being negotiated in a number of 
our case study sites. 
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9 Prioritising investment for health and well 
being 
‘We must reorientate our health and social care services to focus together on prevention and 
health promotion. This means a shift in the centre of gravity of spending.’ (Our Health, Our 
Care, Our Say 6 (p.9)) 
There is a long standing aspiration to ‘move upstream’ and invest for 
health, through re-orientating health care systems towards preventing ill 
health and through working across a wider public health system to address 
wider determinants of health. This chapter begins by describing the policy 
context (9.1) and then draws on both interviewee accounts and survey data 
to illustrate influences on PCT priorities (9.2), investing for health and well 
being (9.3) and methods for prioritising investment (9.4). Subsequent sub-
sections discuss economic evaluation of public health in the light of the 
NICE approach; views on preventative health spend (PHS); and benefits 
and limitations of prioritisation tools currently used by commissioners. The 
usefulness of prioritisation tools in general is assessed against the range of 
criteria outlined in relevant WCC competencies, with particular reference to 
issues arising in prioritising health and well being. Appendix five provides 
more detail on prioritisation tools. 
9.1 Policy context 
A number of reports have drawn attention to the implications for the NHS 
and for the wider economy of failing to ‘invest for health’9 and the need for 
the NHS to refocus, with performance management systems and regulatory 
arrangements aligned accordingly.10 
The Commissioning Framework for Health and Well Being 7 which built on 
Our Health Our Care Our Say,6 was designed to help commissioners achieve 
a more strategic orientation towards promoting health and well being, 
reflected in a stronger focus on commissioning services and interventions 
across health and local government (para.1.1). As part of this there would 
be flexibility in ‘shifting resources to where investment can have the 
greatest impact on current and future health and well being needs’ (para. 
1.11). Subsequently the importance of identifying resources spent on health 
improvement was emphasised 13 (a theme subsequently pursued through 
Health England)123 as well as of developing programme budgeting (PB), 
which currently did not allow for ‘sufficient understanding’ of spend on 
preventative programmes and services. Despite the scale and cost of 
preventable ill health, methods for prioritising prevention within the NHS 
and in partnership with local authorities and others, remain poorly 
developed. Attention is being directed to estimating the financial and non-
financial impact of health improvement activity.88, 129 
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Ethical, practical and methodological issues in priority-setting have been 
well rehearsed, but the need for commissioners to develop such skills 
gained a higher profile through WCC and, in particular, competency six:5 
‘To prioritise investment of all spend in line with different financial scenarios and according to 
local needs, service requirements and the values of the NHS … . This will include investment 
and disinvestment plans to achieve health gains and address areas of greatest health 
inequality… . Part of the requirements for meeting level four in the WCC assessment scale (the 
highest level) is that ‘the PCT invests for longer-term health outcome gains and can quantify 
impact.’ (p.80) 
Competency eleven5 is related, focusing on efficiency and effectiveness of 
total expenditure and on the ‘core purpose’ of commissioners, that is: 
‘to make sustainable trade-off decisions and sound investments across all spend, to deliver 
the highest level of health benefit and quality of care for a given level of spend along each care 
pathway. Robust analysis of spend and its impact on health benefit enables PCTs to make 
well-informed investment decisions.’ (p.85) 
Prioritising investment and making decisions over disinvestment are now 
key tasks for commissioners. This raises questions of how such decisions 
are reached and the extent to which they reflect the underlying values of 
the commissioning organisation or longer term health gain. Cribb68 identifies 
common patterns of ‘ethics avoidance’ of challenges raised by public health 
decision-making. These include treating all issues as scientific technical 
questions subject to technical decision-making; accepting given frameworks 
of targets; and the notion of a public mandate, achieved through 
consultation. 
It has been argued130 that methods for priority-setting within the NHS need 
developing given a number of key challenges: how to manage a large 
number of decisions; how to ensure that priorities are adhered to; how to 
fairly compare different sorts of interventions; how to ensure that 
investments reflect priorities; and how to fully engage the wider NHS and 
the public. It is suggested that, as a minimum, priority-setting should 
consider programme goals across an entire patient pathway, including the 
protection of good health; disinvestment strategies; and how to move from 
reactive to proactive commissioning. This is key to commissioning for health 
and well being, which demands a proactive approach and investment over 
the longer term. NHS resource constraints from 2011 were likely further to 
promote strategies for efficiency and for disinvestment. 
9.2 Influences on PCT commissioning for health and well 
being 
There are many influences on PCT decision-making, including WCC, a public 
health-led approach to commissioning, NICE guidance, JSNAs, DPH reports, 
national targets and public consultation. The extent to which decisions 
reflect the values of the organisation are matters of governance and 
prioritising prevention depends on high level support. The PCT Board plays 
a key role in influencing values which inform the choice and weighting of 
criteria used in prioritisation processes. As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
majority of interviewees cited the Chief Executive, the DPH or the Board in 
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this respect, stating, for example, that Board commitment had been a 
significant lever for investing in health and well being: 
 ‘I’ve been here now nearly five years, and it's the only organisation I’ve ever come to where 
absolutely everybody, including the Board, believe that the only way that we’re going to 
reduce health inequality and increase health and well being is to do things differently and to 
put more emphasis on upstream work, and they just get it.’ (Deputy Chief Executive, Phase 1) 
In another site, leadership of the Chief Executive was considered by most of 
the interviewees, including those in the VCS, to have driven the health 
agenda as a local leader in partnership working. 
The national survey reflected this emphasis with 90 per cent of respondents 
locating priority-setting at Board level. 
Figure 4. Deciding priorities for commissioning for health and well being 
 
Sub-committees were also influential and the following were mentioned by 
one fifth of respondents as influencing priorities: public health or health and 
well being committees; commissioning committees; executive team 
meetings. Other relevant committees included partnership boards, financial 
oversight committees, PBC governance sub-committees, quality and 
governance committees and one WCC committee. In terms of the 43 ‘other’ 
responses the bulk involved partnerships with local authorities, SHAs or 
joint commissioning arrangements with other PCTs. Two responses 
mentioned the role of public engagement strategies. 
The influence exerted by practice-based commissioners and representatives 
of the public on priorities was variable, although PCT interviewees 
highlighted the importance of PBC being integrated into priority-setting, and 
of avoiding a tokenistic approach with the public. Some interviewees from 
PBC consortia saw PBC as largely centrally controlled, following PCT 
priorities with ‘not a lot of room for any local ones’. While priorities might 
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have been agreed by PBC clusters, it was less clear how these decisions 
then influenced the PCT prioritisation process or the annual operating plan. 
In others, as described below, practice-based commissioners were highly 
involved: 
‘They were involved in determining what the criteria were, what the weighting should be. We 
basically involve them in everything. We have a very proactive PBC group … we don’t have to 
drag them to the table put it that way.’ (Finance Director, Phase 2) 
PBC leads were often involved in prioritising across a particular programme 
or pathway of care, examining the cost-effectiveness of each initiative, 
sometimes segmented by different groups and including some consultation 
with the community. The preventative element of pathway redesign was 
less developed, however. Redesign was also more difficult where aspects of 
the pathway were outside the remit of the commissioner or where 
information was required from other organisations. 
9.3 Investing in health and well being 
The survey showed that a majority of PCTs had increased their investment 
in health and well being in 2008-9 compared with 2007-8. The majority of 
those who increased investment attributed it to deliberate, strategic 
decisions taken at Board level, SHA level or in partnership with local 
authorities. Investment was directed to ‘upstream’ interventions, preventive 
care or reducing demand in secondary care, and sometimes implemented in 
the context of LAAs or other targets. A small number of PCTs had recently 
achieved financial balance enabling them to increase investment from a low 
baseline in 2007/8. However, there remained concern that investment was 
still inadequate. 
According to the national survey, 70 PCTs claimed to have a strategy for 
shifting investment towards health and well being. We asked those 70 PCTs 
to identify how this shift was being achieved and Figure 5 illustrates that 
growth money and efficiency savings were deemed the most influential. 
The ‘other’ strategies that were mentioned by respondents included local 
authority grants, QIPP and PHS, service re-design, programme budgeting, 
pump-priming investment and through the PCT’s five year strategy. 
Respondents to the national survey also identified barriers to commissioning 
for health and well being (see Figure 6). Pressure from acute budgets was 
emphatically viewed as the greatest barrier (by 84 PCTs). Financial 
pressures were next (59 PCTs), followed by an emphasis on short-term 
gains (50 PCTs). 
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Figure 5. Strategies for shifting investment 
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Figure 6. Barriers to commissioning for health and well being 
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First phase interviewees also emphasised the importance of growth money 
on the ability to invest in health promotion and in services to reduce health 
inequalities. In second phase interviews in particular, PCT interviewees 
described themselves as moving into a different mode as a result of the 
economic downturn, where prioritising investment of growth money would 
be superseded by decisions over disinvestment across total spend. Without 
disinvestment in acute care and reductions in prescribing costs, it would be 
difficult to fulfil strategic priorities, including those related to health 
promotion, even if return on investment in preventive care could be 
demonstrated. A number of interviewees noted that preventive services, 
including vascular checks and referral to Weight Watchers, had already 
been cut back: 
‘They will drop off the bottom of the list, and all we can do is continue to look for cost-effective 
ways of doing it but, you know, for us especially in the next year or two we’ve really got to 
target those areas where we can get most money back out of the system… unless we get 
those right now and get the big chunks of money out of the system, we won’t be able to afford 
to do the health and well being agenda.’ (Director of Quality, Phase 2) 
Efficiency, value for money in more clearly specified contracts, and the 
development of tools for prioritising investment and disinvestment therefore 
gained in importance, although it was recognised that modelling skills were 
currently poorly developed. There was a widely shared concern to assess all 
interventions, including existing services, in relation to their outcomes for 
the population and their cost-effectiveness. In the same way, contracts 
would be tightly managed, there would be a greater focus on high-cost 
areas, and coding issues would be monitored in order to cost secondary 
care events more accurately. This approach also applied to new 
developments and to the reconfiguration of services intended to provide 
care closer to home. However, there was some scepticism about the ability 
to disinvest in services, an area where there was limited experience. There 
would be public and possibly political opposition, resistance from the acute 
sector or a risk of destabilising the local health economy. Reducing spending 
on health and well being was a ‘soft option’ given that it was ‘invisible’, 
benefits were long-term and, unlike changes to health care provision, it did 
not lead to a public outcry: 
‘You know, there are not ten thousand disappointed people who are fed up because they’re 
not getting something to stop them getting bronchitis or lung cancer in five or ten years' time.’ 
(DPH, Phase 2) 
Others were of the opinion that the economic downturn would also prevent 
piloting innovative approaches which could be mainstreamed over the 
longer term if found effective. An additional problem was limited evidence 
on the effectiveness of public health programmes at a time of increased 
emphasis on presenting the business case for health improvement (further 
discussed in sub-section 9.4.1 below) not just for new initiatives but 
increasingly to preserve funding for existing services. 
While this was the predominant view it was also argued that commissioners 
should not be shoring up problems for the future by neglecting health 
improvement, as had been demonstrated in some sites where preventive 
services had been cut in the past due to financial circumstances. Moreover a 
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few interviewees saw some positive aspects: economic stringency was an 
opportunity for radical restructuring as well as a spur for prevention and 
‘investing to save’. Financial pressures might encourage whole system 
thinking: 
‘But I think the financial pressure might actually help us to think as a whole system, and 
that's certainly the position we're trying to get to here locally is how do we start changing the 
pathway and upstreaming services, so we can have the community focus on early intervention 
and our key partners are very much part of that. It's not easy obviously because everybody 
organisationally needs to keep their services well resourced but everyone recognises that's the 
change that we have to deliver.’ (Director of Strategic Commissioning, Phase 2) 
In the same way, the QIPP initiative could encourage a creative approach to 
partnership and to developing care pathways across health and social 
services, with the aims of avoiding duplication, improving efficiency and 
avoiding transfer problems across services. One site had carried out 
stakeholder events, including local authorities and the VCS, to explore the 
potential for joint working in the current economic climate. 
The national survey also identified some positive views: for a small number 
of respondents, tightened budgets would mean an opportunity to tackle 
acute spend and plan disinvestment. Furthermore, a few respondents 
argued that a shift ‘upstream’ was gaining greater attention as a means of 
maximising return on investment. 
9.4 Prioritising investment 
As outlined in Chapter 4, WCC had promoted a public health-led approach 
to priority-setting, described by one interviewee as follows: 
‘And the criteria would be public health criteria in the main, ie the prevalence of the disease, 
the importance of the disease, in terms of burden … the distribution of health needs by 
economic group, by ethnic group, by area, the cost-effectiveness of the existing treatments, the 
analysis of the existing service, and the gap between the existing service and the service you 
want, and so on and so forth.’ (DPH, Phase 1) 
In order to reach decisions on priorities, a combination of epidemiological, 
economic and modelling skills is required. Decisions can be informed by the 
following kinds of information. 
• Epidemiological studies which estimate the burden of preventable 
disease. For example, the World Health Report 131 quantified more than 
25 preventable risks to health and assessed cost-effective measures to 
reduce them. 
• Estimates of costs linked to preventable illnesses or health damaging 
behaviours across health and other sectors. 
• Scenario planning where health outcomes over specified time periods are 
modelled in relation to levels of investment. For example, ‘scenario 
generator’ 132 allows simulation of whole health and social care systems 
and is configured with data on prevalence and with a number of generic 
pathways of care. 
• Predictive models showing the extent and direction of travel of major 
preventable health problems and associated costs. 
• Discrete-event simulation models that allow different intervention 
scenarios to be costed. 
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• Programme budgeting and marginal analysis. 
• Economic evaluation of evidence-based public health interventions. 
• Identifying, measuring and tracking preventative health spend both as a 
measure of overall spend and within programmes of care. 
The following section begins by summarising NICE’s approach to assessing 
the cost-effectiveness of clinical interventions through its technology 
appraisal process, then analyses difficulties specific to the evaluation of 
public health interventions together with the potential candidate economic 
methods on offer. Although decisions over the balance of investment across 
total health spend raise additional issues to prioritising between 
interventions, the quality of predictive modelling and scenario generation 
partly rests on the evidence base in public health and economic evaluation 
of public health interventions. Subsequent sub-sections discuss preventative 
health spend and review a range of prioritisation tools. 
9.4.1 Economic evaluation of public health interventions and 
‘return on investment’ 
One aspect of Wanless’s fully engaged’ scenario9 was the belief that public 
health programmes implemented effectively would preserve or improve 
population health while reducing long-term costs of health care treatment. 
He also argued that modelling and analysis of health and personal social 
services costs should be integrated and supported the role of NICE to 
assess the cost-effectiveness of health care interventions. However, there 
was no critical appraisal of its methods and no solutions offered for the 
further complexities generated when assessing public health interventions. 
In his update, Wanless10 identified the lack of funding for public health 
research; technical difficulties of generating evidence for public health; lack 
of depth and expertise in core disciplines; and the slow acceptance of 
economic perspectives within public health, as factors contributing to the 
lack of evidence for cost-effectiveness. 
The NICE approach 
NICE utilises a Cost/QALY (Cost per Quality- Adjusted-Life-Year) analytic 
framework to facilitate consistent funding decisions across different 
technologies and disease areas. Since there is seldom evidence that one 
clinical strategy dominates the alternatives (i.e. it is both more effective and 
less costly), the approach to synthesising evidence used by NICE generally 
rests on the estimating an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) for 
the introduction of a new technology, with best guess estimates of ICERs 
between £20,000/QALY and £30,000/QALY. However, there are difficulties 
in applying this method to public health. In a briefing document on public 
health economic evaluation, Kelly et al.133 acknowledged that ‘the economic 
appraisal of public health interventions is both underdeveloped and 
intrinsically difficult’ and had focused on downstream interventions. 
Upstream interventions which improve the circumstances in which people 
live may have a range of beneficial outcomes but only register weakly in 
specific public health targets such as smoking. Thus they may be hard to 
evaluate and justify as value for money. 
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Moreover interventions are often complex and may have public (non-
exclusive) as well as individual benefits. Behavioral changes observed in 
public health interventions normally need to be modelled to estimate their 
long-term benefits making them necessarily tentative: an example is the 
uncertain relationship between one-month self reported smoking cessation 
rates and long-term changes in the incidence and costs of lung cancer. The 
time scales involved make it inevitable that process outcomes must be used 
as proxies for health outcomes but the attribution of genuine health gains 
becomes more circumspect. 
Public health interventions also tend to be multi-faceted which means it is 
difficult or impossible to determine which facets of an intervention are 
causing change. These interventions may interact to a greater of lesser 
extent with their social context and setting and the synergies may be 
influential or essential in achieving change. Evaluation to assess the 
importance of discrete interventions (such as the randomised controlled trial 
(RCT)) may not provide generalisable or meaningful results. Cost-
effectiveness analysis, designed to evaluate health outcomes utilising the 
narrow variances of clinical experiments with high internal validity but 
limited generalisability, is not well suited to address the large variances and 
cross-sectoral outcomes from public health interventions. 
As mentioned above, the common outcome measure used by NICE is the 
quality-adjusted life-year (QALY), and this has been used to evaluate more 
clinically oriented public health interventions, such as smoking cessation 
services. Although public health interventions often appear to compare well 
against clinical interventions using a cost/QALY metric it is unclear whether 
this is just an artifact of the greater modelling assumptions necessary to 
assess public health interventions. Public health interventions also push an 
assumption inherent in the NICE cost/QALY approach to the limit, a QALY is 
a QALY no matter to whom it accrues. Three months improvement in 
quality-of-life from 0 to 0.1 is worth the same as from 0.9 to 1.0. Similarly 
three months additional survival is worth the same (bar the effect of time 
preference) whether it occurs now or in five years time. These values do not 
appear to resonate with society which seems to value rescuing those at the 
end-of-life far above the simple QALY estimate. Public health models 
forecast benefits which are often many years removed from intervention 
and thus the ‘one QALY fits all’ assumption seems questionable. 
Options for the economic evaluation of public health 
Whatever system of economic analysis is adopted should provide an 
unambiguous use of evidence and provide a decision rule that can be 
applied consistently across the field of public health. The three contenders 
currently offered are cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA using health gain as 
the outcome, traditionally referred to as cost-utility analysis or CUA), cost- 
benefit analysis (CBA) where costs and benefits are valued in monetary 
terms and cost-consequence analysis (CCA), which is not theoretically 
founded and allows for a profile of changes in costs and consequences 
within each sector. 
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If a generic well being measure was developed, it could be implemented in 
all public sectors together with a common public sector threshold and 
decision rule. Permitting different thresholds in different sectors would lead 
to more complex decision rules. Where monetary valuations of benefits are 
too difficult a CCA permits estimation of the costs accrued to different 
sectors as well as benefits described physically which can be assessed 
against the objectives of those sectors. Recognising the multi-attribute 
nature of outcomes no attempt is made to derive a summary cost-
effectiveness ratio from the profile of costs and consequences, and it 
becomes a political and multi-sectoral decision whether investment is worth 
the returns. This framework may be most appropriate and informative in 
the context of discussions within commissioning partnerships. The extent of 
inter-sectoral agreement required for implementation would depend upon 
the rights and responsibilities of each sector represented. 
NICE recognises a cost-consequence approach may be necessary to allow 
for the multi-attribute nature of public health interventions: public health 
guidance can consider non-health and intangible outcomes (such as the 
benefits of information) as well as issues of equity and distribution. Thus it 
is not clear that there is an unambiguous decision rule for public health, and 
pragmatism may be used to some extent to manage each intervention on a 
case-by-case basis. 
How good is the evidence for public health interventions? 
An extensive review of economic evaluations of public health interventions 
134,135 also reviewing previous attempts at this topic 136, 137 showed that 
studies seldom considered non-health sector costs and consequences. There 
was a tendency towards shorter term or process outcomes rather than 
longer term generic health outcomes. Equity considerations were seldom 
considered and not addressed formally. The review of methodology 
identified a number of challenges including: 
• The need for a debate about the theoretical and societal basis of current 
forms of economic evaluation. In common with others they recommend 
that the inter-sectoral impact of interventions should be quantified using 
cost-consequences analysis. Thus the scale and practicality of inter-
sectoral compensation could be tested. 
• Further research into a generic measure of well being that could be 
applied across public sector interventions. Additionally sector-specific 
generic measures of outcome would allow the shadow price of the 
investment (the additional output per additional unit of resource) within 
the budgets of each sector to be determined. 
Claxton and colleagues 138 discuss some of the issues that arise in trying to 
generalise health economic methods into public health, in a context of 
different sectors with differing objectives and constraints. They favour a 
compensation test for public health interventions with multiple outcomes 
and inter-sectoral effects. However, compensations leading to an optimal 
allocation between sectors can only be made when these shadow prices are 
well understood. 
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In summary, therefore, because of limitations in more theoretically 
grounded approaches, inter-sectoral CCA approaches are likely to be most 
helpful to decision-makers identifying and evaluating initiatives undertaken 
in their locality or assessing the generalisability of initiatives evaluated 
elsewhere. When assessing public health interventions, there are no clear 
theoretical grounds to suppose the attribution of outcomes from RCTs will 
exceed that of the best quasi-experimental designs - it is more a case of 
which biases are most critical to manage, when external validity becomes 
paramount. In fact, quasi-experimental designs may offer distinct 
methodological advantages when interventions are designed to target 
inequalities. 
The extent of modelling assumptions is, by necessity, greater for public 
health evaluations which place greater reliance on intermediate outcomes. 
Additionally these benefits are often predicted to occur many years after 
intervention. It is becoming apparent that the public may not value QALYs 
equally regardless of to whom they occur. For these two reasons 
comparison of public health QALYs and medical QALYs may stretch the 
modeling assumptions beyond reason. 
Views of the evidence base 
Interviewees reflected concerns over the evidence base for public health 
interventions, particularly in light of the importance of presenting a business 
case for longer term investment for health and well being. Although there 
was a limited evidence base on the effectiveness of public health 
interventions, interviewees considered there was insufficient evidence on 
cost-effectiveness or on return on investment over the longer term. The 
public health evidence base was currently underdeveloped and the lack of 
clear relationships between inputs and outcomes made it difficult to gain 
Board approval for proposals. Interviewees commented on the difficulties of 
prioritising longer term benefits over immediate demands on resources and 
that economic arguments for public health investment needed research and 
development if public health was to compete against arguments for 
increased resources from health care providers: 
‘And so I think that the economic argument for the public health investment needs a lot more 
research and development and a lot more strengthening because it's stacked up against an 
economic argument that’s compelling from the health care providers.’ (NED, Phase 1) 
There were also difficulties in demonstrating return on investment across 
different preventive initiatives: 
‘You know, should we put all of our money and spend £5m and get people to go to Weight 
Watchers and lose weight or should we spend £5m on people giving up smoking or a 
combination of what?’ (DPH, Phase 1) 
The view was also expressed that far greater sums were being invested in 
areas of acute care where the evidence base was also weak. The emphasis 
on the public health evidence base was disproportionate with different rules 
being applied. The requirement to implement NICE guidance had the effect 
of promoting a drift towards specialised services. 
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Despite these concerns, differences emerged across sites in approaches 
adopted towards longer term investment for health gain. In two sites there 
was confidence that return on investment could be demonstrated: 
‘There’s an evidence base for what works but there’s not always an evidence base to show 
what the return on the investment is. …That’s what I mean about challenging public health to 
not sit back and go ‘you’ve got to ring fence funds for us because we’re the Cinderella here’… 
If you don’t want to be slashed, prove you don’t want to be slashed, do the return on 
investment work, and when you do it, you can prove there’s a business case in there.’ (DS, 
Phase 2) 
Interviewees commented on the skills required for prioritising investment 
and for disinvestment. In particular, economic evaluation and economic 
modelling could inform decision-making and estimate return on investment. 
In one site, health economic modelling had provided a useful resource 
demonstrating the benefits of intervening in the prevention and primary 
care element of the care pathway and providing ‘ammunition’ for prioritising 
public health services. It was argued that public health had recently 
developed ‘more of a public health economic outlook’ - a focus described as 
lacking in the past. However, it was recognised that many of the required 
skills were lacking in PCTs and tools for modelling health impact needed 
further development: 
‘But the economic analysis has been not sophisticated in any sense at all, and it’s one area 
where we feel, I think, and I don’t think we’re alone in this, we feel quite vulnerable in terms 
of our capacity to do that kind of analysis.’ (DPH, Phase 1) 
The economic crisis was also described as provoking a radical approach to 
overall spend where the emphasis would be on prevention to save costs and 
on assessing the effectiveness of all spend, rather than the ‘two per cent on 
the margin’. However, in focusing on prioritisation of investment within a 
PCT there was a danger of missing possibilities for partnership working on 
the health and well being agenda. In recognition of this, joint modelling with 
local authorities was also being developed. 
9.4.2 Preventative health spend 
There are difficulties in establishing the resources allocated to preventive 
services within the NHS. In Our Health Our Care Our Say 6 it was noted 
that: 
‘At present, the definition and measurement of spend on prevention are not easy to apply. 
Spend on prevention and spend on public health should be separated more clearly. 
International and UK definitions of preventative and public health spend are not aligned, and 
issues like service quality are not adequately captured’. (para. 6.34) 
Under the aegis of the national reference group for health and well being 
‘Health England’, an expert advisory panel on PHS reported on ‘definitions 
and measures of preventative health spending’ in the context of developing 
‘a 10-year ambition for preventative spending, based on a comparison with 
other OECD countries’ (Further information available at: 
http://www.healthengland.org/). A preliminary report 139 identified 
resources currently directed at both preventive services and public health 
within PCTs, with a view to being able to assess commitments to spending 
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on prevention. It shows, for example, that there was wide variation in PCT 
spend on the Healthy Individuals Programme Budget category (2005/6) as 
a percentage of the total PCT allocation. The report distinguished between 
‘preventative interventions’ and the narrower ‘preventative health spending’ 
which was limited by what could be reliably measured, costed and used for 
comparative purposes, both nationally and internationally. This included 
primary and secondary prevention, health promotion, family planning, 
school health services, national screening programmes, public health 
programmes for communicable and non communicable diseases and public 
health administration. The panel argued that, for comparison across PCTs, 
an enhancement of the national Programme Budget system should be 
developed and that for PCT comparison, spend on prevention as a 
percentage of total health spend should be used. Importantly, they argue 
that the spend in a country or locality should be related to levels of 
morbidity or mortality and that any new NSFs should include plans for 
monitoring spend and the effectiveness of preventative actions. However, 
difficulties remain over the breadth of the public health agenda and 
therefore what should be included and measured as part of public health 
spend. 
Health England’s key recommendations were that the OECD System of 
Health Accounts should be used for international comparisons of 
preventative health spend, and that programme budgeting should be 
developed to enable comparisons between PCTs. Health England’s 2009 
report 123 applied the OECD system to English data and found that total 
expenditure on prevention and public health services was £3.4bn in 2006/7 
(£4.7bn if preventative expenditure on drugs was included). This amounts 
to around 3.5 per cent of total health care expenditure. However, the Audit 
Commission pointed out15 that centrally set contracts (such as for dental 
check ups and sight tests and payments under the QOF), centrally 
determined immunisation and vaccination programmes, and maternity and 
contraceptive services accounted for the bulk so that 
 ‘in fact, very little of the £3.7 billion was spent on direct public health interventions where 
there could be local flexibility. The largest sums were £159 million spent on the school health 
service and £172 million spent on lifestyle issues and smoking cessation services’. 
The Health England 2007 report 139 recommended that spend should be 
expressed using a range of different units of analysis. These included cost- 
minimisation measures, cost-effectiveness measures and cost-utility 
measures. For cost-minimisation measures, total spend was the 
recommended unit of analysis. For cost-effectiveness measures, the rate of 
change in Years of Life Lost before 75 years was recommended. For cost-
utility measures, the relevant units were Disability Adjusted Life Years 
(DALYs) or QALYs respectively.139 
Monitoring a shift in investment towards prevention requires identification of 
PHS as discussed above, although it was emphasised by PCT interviewees 
that PHS focused on measuring process rather than outcome. While 
programme budgeting and allocations through the primary care budget 
were indicative, PHS was often seen by interviewees as difficult, if not 
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impossible, to define and measure given the number of contexts in which 
preventive care was delivered. It was often categorised as growth money 
which had been allocated to addressing health inequalities or lifestyle 
interventions, or as spend which was under the control of the public health 
department or the health improvement team. 
There were exceptions and two case study sites had focused on identifying 
and tracking health spend. One interviewee explained: 
‘I mean each year we can say that we’re spending this extra money on prevention, but when 
we’ve done that baseline assessment, we went right down into well how much of the health 
visitors’ time is about prevention, … and we looked in quite some detail about all the different 
components that we could say was around health prevention … what we’d like to do is revisit 
that and say well, using that same criteria, what does it look like now.’ (FD, Phase 1) 
In this site, the concept of PHS was clearly aligned to shifting the balance of 
spend towards prevention through the use of programme budgeting data: 
‘We’ve had this ambition for a few years now to increase spend on preventative health year 
on year by half a per cent. We also have a similar one which is to decrease our spend on the 
acute sector by one per cent year on year. So this is about actually putting into reality 
financially can you see the impact of improving health and reducing inequalities in our 
strategic finance plan as well as our strategic plan.’ (Director of Strategy, Phase 2) 
In a further case study site, specific recurrent investment in health and well 
being over a three year period had been agreed and this would be met 
through plans for disinvestment in the acute sector. 
Although the limitations of the national ‘Healthy Individuals’ programme 
budgeting category in reflecting PHS were recognised, this category could 
be repackaged locally to include other areas of prevention such as QOF 
payments. 
The national survey showed that around 55 per cent of PCTs said they were 
trying to calculate PHS, with programme budgeting being the most common 
method for achieving this. There was an even split between PCTs who said 
they tracked PHS (41 per cent) and those who did not (40 per cent). Forty 
five per cent of PCTs claimed they were using PHS as a strategy for 
increasing investment on health improvement and 35 per cent said they 
were not. Those who said they were using PHS explained they were doing it 
in a variety of ways. Several mentioned funding for targeted interventions 
for areas such as obesity, cardiovascular disease, diabetes and Choosing 
Health investments. Some noted the developmental status of PHS in their 
PCT. 
9.4.3 Prioritisation tools 
Commissioners want to ensure that each programme or intervention 
represents an efficient use of resources and that together these maximise 
total health benefits subject to budgetary and resource constraints. They 
are likely to have multiple objectives such as concern for the distribution of 
health benefits across the population (equity issues), representation of local 
user views, and balancing long and shorter term health gains. They 
therefore need different types of information, but decisions are also made 
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under uncertainty. Thus it is necessary to describe and quantify the 
uncertainty associated with decisions and the assumptions underlying them. 
In England, there is currently no formal process for prioritising investment. 
While NICE provides evidence-based guidance including for public health 
interventions there is no overt process for ranking interventions. The choice 
of approach is influenced by whether the aim is to rank or prioritise within 
an overall budget for preventive services, shift the balance towards 
prevention across a pathway of care or increase the proportion of resources 
for preventive services across the system taken as a whole. These decisions 
are influenced by national priorities and the extent to which they are 
reflected in local priorities, the balance between clinical and non-clinical 
interventions and joint approaches across the NHS and partner agencies. 
Tools/support for prioritising can be broadly classified as follows. 
• programme budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA) 
• tools to elicit preference for investment 
• epidemiological modelling tools 
• databases which include guides and costing tools. 
These tools incorporate information on costs and/or benefits, or could be 
used to provide this information. They can be categorised by (i) their 
readiness for use to meet WCC competencies, (ii) the methods used, based 
on those identified within competencies six and eleven (e.g. predictive 
modelling), (iii) whether they can/do follow the care pathway, (iv) whether 
they can/do include user involvement, (v) whether they can/do include 
stakeholder/clinician involvement, (vi) equity issues, (vii) feasibility and 
user-friendliness. Most tools can be applied at different levels and all are 
subject to uncertainty. A more detailed account of prioritisation tools is 
included in Appendix five. 
Prioritisation tools have different strengths and weaknesses. While inter- 
sectoral impacts, prevalence data and predictive modelling of costs and 
benefits over time are key criteria for considering shifting the gravity of 
spend towards prevention, these are not reflected in many of the most 
commonly used tools. Commissioners therefore need to consider biases 
built in to the choice of tools or the combination of tools which need to be 
considered in order to maximise health gain over time. The goals that 
commissioners identify prior to undertaking their assessments may help 
identify which tools are most relevant to them. Prioritisation tools may, to 
varying extents, focus on economic criteria, for example, whether or not 
health is maximised for the population served from the resources invested 
on the population’s behalf. For other criteria, such as a concern for equity 
issues, some tools offer a more transparent approach than others. 
The following sub-section summarises methods for prioritisation currently 
used in PCTs, views over their effectiveness (which are sometimes 
contradictory) and which approaches were considered most helpful. 
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9.4.4 Prioritisation in practice 
Interviewees described a range of methods for prioritisation, mainly 
programme budgeting and PBMA, but other approaches included prioritising 
interventions across the life course; prioritising in relation to different 
scenarios (not limited to financial scenarios but also including changes in 
demography and patterns of health and illness); and prioritising across 
scenarios developed in conjunction with local authorities. 
New proposals were often prioritised through locally developed approaches 
although these were often described as ‘just a spreadsheet’ and in the 
process of development. The process was similar across all case study sites: 
proposals were developed, scored against national targets, local targets and 
priorities in the commissioning and strategic plan, following which a 
business case was developed and the proposal further scrutinised and 
compared with other investments. Most PCTs used some kind of 
prioritisation matrix, gateway process or ethical framework to aid decision-
making. Tools included varying numbers of criteria which might or might 
not include longer term benefits. Processes were being refined and weighted 
criteria applied to initiatives, often as a result of stakeholder involvement. 
Many interviewees noted that local tools had been developed for this 
purpose, but it was recognised that further work was needed. One PCT 
commissioner noted: 
Ultimately we come down to what’s the total cost being put forward in this particular bid, 
what number of people will it benefit and therefore what’s the cost per beneficiary. What we 
haven't done is weight the level of benefit. Is it life saving? Is it a quality of life investment? 
And that, if you like, we haven't done that sort of weighting of the benefit really; it's quite 
crude, in other words. (DS, Phase 1) 
This was borne out by the national survey which showed use of 
prioritisation matrices, health inequality intervention tools, NICE costing 
tools and programme budgeting, with only a handful of respondents stating 
their PCT did not use these. Around 25 per cent of PCTs responding to the 
survey appeared to have developed their own tools, with most mentioning 
their own modified prioritisation tools, whilst other individual PCTs noted 
that they are using: JSNAs as an ‘evidence base’, ‘WCC processes’, 
‘QALY/Value for Money for prevention’, ‘a commissioning toolkit‘ , and tools 
designed to ‘calculate the impact of preventive interventions’. One site had 
developed a ‘clinical economic pathway process’ which segmented care 
pathways, identified current spend, analysed evidence of effectiveness and 
determined the impact of further investment on the whole pathway. 
A common approach was to use national programme budgeting data as a 
benchmarking tool in order to identify outlier areas, compared with the PCT 
cluster, as priorities for investigation and possible sources of savings. One 
interviewee described the process as follows: 
‘If you happen to be an outlier in terms of cost, but you’re getting really good outcomes too, 
then actually that’s not such a bad thing. But if you’re an outlier in cost and your outcomes 
are worse than maybe your cluster group, who are getting better outcomes for less money, 
then what is it that they’re doing that we’re not?’ (FD, Phase 2) 
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This process was useful where cost-effectiveness data were not available: 
investigating outliers could sharpen up the prioritisation process and could 
demonstrate areas where there could be a payback from preventive 
services and from primary care. 
Programme budgeting was also described as being helpful in considering 
investing upstream within each programme, although the point was also 
made that questions should be also raised about the balance of resources 
across programmes as well as within them. However, it was difficult to 
compare costs of preventive services as there were so many different 
models in use across England. 
As mentioned above, while the methodology was considered useful, the 
data were at least a year out of date and quality was variable as it 
depended on how trusts categorised spending. It was argued that the 
categories needed disaggregating if programme budgeting to was to be a 
truly useful commissioning tool. For example, data were categorised by age 
which caused difficulties for joint planning and integration of children’s 
services. One interviewee described it as follows: 
‘The local authority, they can't understand why we don’t know what we spend on children’s 
services. At one level we do but at one level we don't because obviously it's in every bit of our 
contracts. You have to cut it different ways, programme budgeting doesn't help us with that.’ 
(Director of Strategic Commissioning, Phase 2) 
There were also concerns raised amongst a number of interviewees that the 
way that programme budgeting was categorised nationally did not help 
locally in determining how resources were allocated across specific care 
pathways, for example, across prevention, primary and acute care for the 
cardiovascular care pathway. Some elements were ‘hidden’ in different 
programme areas. One interviewee commented: 
‘And so the only thing you can say about programme budgeting data is that it just kind of 
raises questions about the allocative efficiency, relative prioritisation of programme areas, but 
the data is so flawed that you couldn’t make changes with a great deal of confidence based 
on that data. … actually what you need is real live financial data, and you need to look at 
how your money’s going out in real time, you can’t use old data that’s slightly flawed to make 
big investment decisions.’ (Associate DPH, Phase 2) 
The national survey showed that despite the seemingly widespread use of 
PB, there was limited support or understanding of it as a tool in decision-
making for health. It was considered still in its infancy, it lacked accuracy 
and was a crude tool, failing to drill down sufficiently into different services. 
Some mentioned they had never had the time or opportunity to explore PB. 
For those who were supportive of PB, there were a small number of 
examples of it being used to identify under-funding in key areas of health 
and well being, but positive responses tended to be because it ‘shows 
promise’ and raised questions for further investigation. 
A related area is PBMA. PCT interviewees demonstrated varying degrees of 
knowledge on this subject, as demonstrated below. One interviewee 
commented: 
‘It’s been fantastic for us and it’s the basis of our strategy, we’ve used it a lot.’ (Director of 
Strategy, Phase 2) 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      124 
 Project 08/1716/208 
Another commented that PBMA was useful in looking at resource allocation 
in relation to outcomes across a care pathway and the balance to be 
achieved. Some were beginning to use the tool and its importance in the 
context of WCC was recognised. Stakeholders, including practice-based 
commissioners, described how the cost-effectiveness of each initiative was 
assessed in relation to the effect on morbidity and mortality, possibly 
segmented by different groups and including some consultation with the 
community. However, there were others who considered that PBMA was 
difficult to implement: 
‘No, no one uses programme budgeting and marginal analysis and they should do …we all 
know the theory, doing it is difficult… where (are) the 50 people that have got really good 
experience of putting it into practice locally that could come along… and show you how to do 
this, and we’re going to use practical methods and routine data and we’ll make a difference 
for you.’ (DPH, Phase 2) 
9.4.5 9.4.5 No easy answers 
In general, technical issues of measurement or choice of criteria were 
discussed rather than underpinning values and ethical issues. Some 
interviewees expressed scepticism about the process as a whole: skills for 
using prioritisation tools were in short supply; weighting within prioritisation 
tools was difficult to agree (but could for example, reflect national targets or 
the size of population affected); and there was a lack of transparency and 
systematic rigour in the prioritisation process: 
‘So I think having tried to create a rational and straightforward and transparent process, 
when it actually came down to it, it was largely the kind of gut feelings of four executive 
directors late on a Friday afternoon about what was a good thing to do and what was not a 
good thing to do.’ (DPH, Phase 1) 
One interviewee emphasised that the process could not be reduced to a 
technocratic exercise: 
‘We’ve all agreed there’s no science to it. There’s no magical tool that’s going to give you the 
answer …. You know, there are a range of factors that you’re going to have to take into 
account from needs and the financial situation and the political situation and where the public 
is coming from. …It’s health inequalities, impact assessment, equality impact assessment, 
working with the local authority, looking at a sort of integrated impact assessment tool, where 
you take all these parameters in.’ (DPH, Phase 2) 
The variety of local approaches being adopted by PCTs was puzzling to 
some, especially given the wealth of research on prioritisation and the fact 
that all PCTs were trying to address similar issues. One interviewee noted: 
‘I find (it) … bizarre that the NHS isn’t signed up to a set of, isn’t explicitly signed up to a set of 
ethical commissioning principles.’ (Associate DPH, Phase 2) 
There were examples of PCTs liaising over how to develop ethical 
frameworks in order to be able to score proposals and to provide 
transparency in decision-making. Many commented on difficulties in 
reaching agreement over prioritisation and, in practice, there was little time 
for PCTs to consider ethical issues around prioritisation in any depth. 
This chapter demonstrates that prioritisation processes in PCTs are complex 
and linked to strategic development and organisational values as well as the 
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use of specific tools. Tools for prioritising health and well being are poorly 
developed and the evidence base for prioritising health and well being was 
considered inadequate. A new evidence base will not be fit for purpose 
unless it addresses the methodological challenges of evaluating public 
health interventions, rather than attempting to ‘force a fit’ of inappropriate 
clinical trial methods. This needs to be taken account of by commissioners 
as they assess the evidence base for public health interventions and return 
on investment. 
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10 Conclusions and recommendations 
This report explores the impact of governance structures and incentive 
arrangements on commissioning for health and well being. The study took 
place at a time of rapid change, as PCTs developed their role as 
commissioning organisations. It was completed just before a new coalition 
government signalled substantial changes to commissioning in the NHS, 
including the eventual abolition of PCTs. Although the commissioning 
context is changing, the study raises generic issues related to 
commissioning for health and well being and explores the complexity of 
governance of public health, which goes beyond the governance 
arrangements of any single organisation. 
This chapter begins by highlighting the complexity of governance of public 
health and the links between governance and incentives. WCC has acted as 
an additional performance management framework for PCTs, contributing to 
a strategic approach to improving health outcomes, but partnership 
governance has been relatively neglected. This chapter illustrates how a 
public health model of commissioning has been reflected in commissioning 
practice through comparing case study sites and identifies commissioning 
paradoxes arising from analysis of the main themes. 
10.1 Governance of public health 
Interpretations of the term ‘governance’ are proliferating. Descriptions of 
arrangements that entities make for their functioning have been extended 
to include notions of ‘good governance’ and a range of models (such as 
corporate governance and system governance) in which different modes of 
governance – typically categorised as hierarchies, networks and markets - 
co-exist. For example, while there are elements of a market mode of 
governance in the NHS, commissioners, acting as agents, also operate 
within a framework of national standards and regulatory arrangements. 
Governance of public health raises questions over the extent to which such 
arrangements promote health and well being and how public health values 
inform not only the governance processes associated with each aspect of 
the commissioning cycle but also governance across a local health system. 
It also raises questions over the relative emphasis accorded to the 
governance of local partnerships and involvement of the public. These areas 
are associated with additional governance tensions arising from a 
combination of horizontal with organisational accountability in the former, a 
patchwork of participatory approaches in the latter, and the co-existence of 
each with accountability through local democracy. 
Governance structures and incentive arrangements are closely linked: not 
only do modes of governance influence the choice of incentives but 
governance arrangements can also act as incentives (or disincentives) in 
their own right. For example, performance management systems form part 
of governance arrangements for PCTs but can also act as incentives for 
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improved performance. On the other hand, the emphasis in governance 
arrangements on single organisational success can act as a disincentive for 
partnership working. While incentive arrangements can refer to 
commissioners’ use of specific incentives to promote the delivery of 
preventive services, this occurs within the context of a health care system 
layered with incentives which may conflict with each other and which foster 
increased health care activity rather than longer term health gain. 
Governance structures are intended to promote effective decision-making in 
line with the values and purpose of an organisation. However, performance 
management regimes which influence governance arrangements and 
commissioning practice within PCTs do not prioritise health and well being, 
given a hierarchy of targets in practice, and a focus on easily quantifiable, 
process-related targets. The introduction of WCC at the end of 2007 created 
an additional performance management framework which combined an 
outcomes-based approach with a systematic process, underpinned by 
commissioning competencies. This was considered to have promoted an 
emphasis on achieving improved health outcomes for the local population. 
WCC also led to changes in PCT organisational and governance structures so 
that they were better aligned with commissioning responsibilities. However, 
there was a potential lack of integration across the outcomes-based WCC 
assurance framework and other performance management approaches. 
Governance within organisations forms only part of the picture for 
governance of public health, which involves working through partnerships 
and with local populations. Partnership governance was considered less well 
developed than intra-organisational governance. Most of the DsPH in the 
study were jointly appointed across the PCT and the local authority, but 
typically continued to work within, and remained accountable to the local 
PCT. The breadth of the health and well being agenda created further 
governance tensions: themed sub-groups of LSPs tended to fragment the 
health and well being agenda, with health often seen as the province of the 
PCT. This fragmentation was reflected in Health Scrutiny committees which 
often focused on health care rather than on partnership arrangements or on 
threats to health over the longer term, although there were some 
exceptions. 
Given this degree of complexity it is not surprising that leadership, Board 
values and support of senior executives were considered the most important 
enablers to commissioning for health and well being for PCTs. The extent to 
which governance arrangements promoted heath and well being was 
influenced by the extent to which decision-making was underpinned by 
public health values, and interpretations of the PCT’s role in stewardship of 
the health of the local population. For example, where a stewardship role 
was narrowly defined, then public health priorities might not be adequately 
reflected in decision-making processes; where the focus was on governance 
arrangements within the NHS then the wider concept of stewardship across 
the wider health system could be lost. 
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10.2 Commissioning for health and well being in 
case study sites 
A commitment to health and well being is reflected in the extent to which 
commissioning is public health-led, and indicated in the deployment of 
incentives for preventive services, the use of contractual flexibilities, 
attempts to shift the balance of investment through identifying and tracking 
preventative health spend and in the ways in which prioritisation tools are 
used for decision-making. It is also reflected in the involvement of public 
health teams with PBC and the success of partnership working. Analysis by 
case study site demonstrated many similarities across sites. There was a 
recognition of the contribution of WCC to an increased focus on health 
outcomes; the importance of partnerships for the longer term health and 
well being agenda; and the importance of Board values and leadership. 
However, most commissioners cited problems with the content and 
alignment of existing performance management structures; difficulties in 
performance management of primary care; and the complexities of 
governance of PBC given potential conflicts of interest in combining provider 
and commissioner roles. The historic importance of growth funds for the 
health and well being agenda and the consequent challenges of financial 
stringency were increasingly apparent as the study progressed. The 
majority of PCT interviewees were sceptical about maintaining a preventive 
focus in an economic downturn, but some were confident that return on 
investment for preventive services could be demonstrated. 
Despite examples of commitment to the health and well being agenda at an 
individual or practice level, practice-based commissioners were largely 
concerned with demand management and pathway redesign, and there was 
little evidence of involvement in the health and well being agenda. Few 
were involved in the JSNA or local partnerships, for example, and 
integration with WCC competencies and processes was patchy. 
However, case study sites differed both in the emphasis accorded to 
individual aspects of commissioning for health and well being and in the 
extent to which different activities were clustered. For example, there were 
differences in the extent to which LESs were exploited to incentivise 
preventive activity, address inequalities or encourage public involvement. 
While interviewees often described a public-health led approach to 
commissioning, this could be gauged through the extent to which public 
health was embedded in each aspect of the commissioning cycle; the 
success of partnership working and joint funding in relation to a health and 
well being agenda; the involvement of public health teams in PBC; or the 
development of a locality-based approach with community involvement. It 
was also evident in the extent to which longer term health gain was seen as 
an investment priority and associated with identifying and monitoring 
preventative health spend. There were differences in the extent of public 
involvement at Board level, in PBC and in the decision-making activities of 
commissioners as well as in VCS or community involvement in the JSNA. 
There were sites which reflected most of these attributes and all included 
some. For example, one site showed extensive partnership working, a 
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locality approach and the use of numerous LESs for preventive services; 
another had used innovative methods for shifting investment and five sites 
were developing locality commissioning. Some differences between sites 
were contextual or depended on local leadership: reorganisations and 
changes in personnel could set back partnership working, as could lack of 
co-terminosity. In other cases, the preventive agenda had suffered when 
PCTs were in financial difficulties. 
10.3 Commissioning paradoxes 
The study illustrates a number of paradoxes in commissioning for health 
and well being related to: (i) the use of incentives in the NHS; (ii) public 
involvement in commissioning; (iii) the use of prioritisation tools; and (iv) 
the impact on commissioning practice of underlying values. These are 
briefly discussed in turn. 
(i) Incentives for prevention services were optional and specific incentives 
were implemented in a context of system-wide incentives such as PbR, 
which were considered to promote activity rather than a longer term 
preventive agenda. There were few incentives for partnership working 
reflecting the emphasis on single organisational success. 
There had been an overall increase in the use of LESs as the main route for 
incentivising health and well being services in primary care. Although 
effective, these were also described as fragmented and piecemeal. As 
optional services, they were vulnerable in times of economic downturn and 
had the potential to increase inequalities. Some rewards or incentives which 
fell outside contracts, such as additional resources associated with 
Spearhead status or Freed up Resources, seemed to have had little effect 
on commissioning health and well being services. Redefining core contracts, 
bundling targets into contracts across practices or devising local budgets 
which would incentivise outcomes rather than activity were all being 
discussed as ways forward. The use of incentives by commissioners was 
often carried out through trial and error and without reference to economic 
theories related to ‘nudge’ economics or optimal incentive contracts. 
(ii) Greater involvement of the public in commissioning could reduce the 
emphasis on health and well being as public concern was largely focused on 
health care. 
Public accountability is a key principle of governance. While there were 
many routes for engaging with the public, the use of LINks by PCTs was 
variable, and there were different expectations from engagement by the 
PCT and by the VCS. Local involvement in commissioning for health and 
well being, whether at PBC or PCT level, was minimal, with little influence 
on decision-making. With some notable exceptions, the contribution of 
LINks was under-exploited by PCTs. A further tension was the potential 
difficulty of achieving a balance across local responsiveness and the 
economies of scale required for effective commissioning. 
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(iii) An assessment of the relevance of prioritisation tools for meeting 
commissioning competencies related to prioritising investment, efficiency 
and effectiveness suggests that further assessment of their applicability for 
investing in longer term health gain is needed. Skills in using tools for 
prioritisation were generally poorly developed, as were methods for tracking 
and shifting the gravity of spend. 
(iv) Commissioning for health and well being was often viewed as spanning 
the spectrum from prevention to acute care, with prevention seen as an 
‘earned agenda’ dependent on release of funds from the acute sector. 
WCC was still developing at the time of the study and was largely welcomed 
as providing an integrated and systematic approach focused on health 
outcomes. However, there was potential to focus on some aspects of the 
commissioning cycle at the expense of others, as reflected in the emphasis 
of PBC on demand management. Both the national survey and the case 
study data showed that most PCT interviewees were sceptical about 
maintaining a focus on commissioning for preventive service and 
investment for longer term health and well being in the context of an 
economic downturn. 
These paradoxes will need to be addressed if commissioners are to fully 
address the health and well being agenda. 
10.4 Recommendations 
There are nine key recommendations followed by more detailed 
recommendations which flow from them. 
1. Commissioning organisations should ensure that the underlying 
principle of stewardship of the health of the population informs 
governance structures and decision-making processes and is 
integrated into each aspect of the commissioning cycle. Our evidence 
shows variation in commissioning practice in relation to health and 
well being across almost every topic area studied. 
2. Governance structures are associated with different approaches to 
incentives. They also influence decision-making and priority-setting. 
Governance structures can therefore be considered as an area for 
separate assessment and our evidence suggests that governance 
arrangements locally should be assessed by commissioning 
organisations for their potential to promote effective decision-making 
in relation to health and well being. 
3. More attention should be directed by commissioners, working in 
partnership, to developing governance arrangements across a local 
public health system. Our evidence shows that governance processes 
within organisations predominate, despite new and more joined up 
regulatory arrangements which assess partnership in relation to 
outcomes across a local area. Arrangements for partnership 
governance could be assessed locally and more attention paid to 
monitoring of joint public health initiatives by PCTs, LSPs and SHAs. 
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4. PBC was largely focused on demand management with limited 
involvement in the JSNA, health and well being partnerships or 
assurance for WCC. PBC will require further development if it is to 
reflect all aspects of the commissioning cycle. This could build on 
ways in which public health teams and PBC consortia have worked 
together. 
5. The use of financial incentives for preventive services through LESs is 
widespread in PCTs but they are optional, piecemeal, and could 
increase health inequalities. A more strategic approach to the use of 
incentives should build on evidence of pitfalls and potential areas of 
benefit, principles for optimal incentive contracts and developments 
such as ‘nudge economics’. They should also take account of the 
interplay of incentives across a health care system. 
6. Further research is needed on the use of prioritisation tools and their 
applicability for prioritising investment in health and well being over 
the longer term and across all spend, as opposed to between specific 
interventions or within a specific programme. This should include an 
analysis of the skills and capacity required to apply prioritisation tools 
and a clear indication of which aspects should be carried out at local, 
regional or national levels and any ethical questions which arise. 
7. VCS involvement in commissioning strategies should be developed by 
local commissioners and ways of increasing public involvement in a 
preventive agenda explored. PCTs, PBC and local authorities should 
clarify the role LINks are to play in influencing commissioning 
decisions. 
8. There is increasing emphasis on developing the business case for 
prevention and public health interventions. Further research is 
needed on cost-effectiveness over the longer term in order to 
strengthen the rationale for public health investment. Commissioners 
will need to take account of the methodological challenges inherent in 
evaluating public health evaluations as they assess the evidence base 
for public health interventions and return on investment. 
9. In each of the topic areas studied, we found examples of innovative 
practice. We also found PCTs working independently on key topics, 
such as criteria for prioritisation, which would benefit from 
collaboration. We therefore suggest that methods for knowledge 
exchange in relation to the preventive agenda are given more priority 
by policy makers and researchers and that knowledge exchange 
spans the range of organisations involved in the health and well being 
agenda. 
Detailed recommendations: 
10. Commissioning organisations should clarify the ‘commissioning 
balance’ across the immediate demands of health care and a longer 
term agenda for health and well being and make explicit the trade 
offs required. 
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11. A preventive agenda is enabled through a public health-led model of 
commissioning reflected in organisational arrangements, care 
pathway redesign, prioritisation processes and practice-based 
commissioning. Our case studies included examples where public 
health values were embedded in the commissioning process and 
others where public health teams played an advisory or advocacy 
role. The role and impact of public health teams on commissioning 
decisions could benefit from further research. 
12. Preventive aspects of pathway redesign required development in 
collaboration with social services and others. This was highlighted by 
a number of interviewees and there were examples where this had 
already been developed. Good practice in cross-agency involvement 
in pathway redesign could be identified and disseminated. 
13. More clarity is needed over how commissioners are to identify 
preventative health spend, given interviewee accounts of the 
anomalies in programme budgeting data. 
14. Practice-based commissioning for the health and well being agenda 
was generally perceived to need further development. It is difficult 
for practices to achieve freed up resources through preventive 
services which means that effort is directed to demand management. 
Encouragement of collaborative approaches across practices may 
help to address this. 
15. Our research showed that performance management regimes reflect 
a hierarchy of importance focused on selected national priorities and 
targets. A focus on longer term health gain would be encouraged 
through integrated approaches to performance management across 
SHAs and Government Offices and better integration of the 
outcomes- focused WCC with existing performance management 
regimes. 
16. The effects of financial incentives included as part of baseline 
funding, such as Spearhead funding, were not monitored and their 
impact was unclear. This has implications for how action to improve 
health and address health inequalities is incentivised. 
17. Further research is needed to link research on incentives with 
concerns of commissioners and the complex governance contexts in 
which they operate. 
18. Overview and Scrutiny Committees for Health in our study often 
focused on health care issues, reflecting public concerns. Scrutiny 
committees could consider the balance to be achieved across scrutiny 
of health care issues, of health-related partnership working and 
action related to longer term investment for health. 
19. Health and well being requires joint working and collaboration across 
a local public health system. Our evidence suggests that better 
integration across WCC outcomes and LAAs is required. Working in 
partnership, local agencies could carry out modelling and scenario 
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planning which is sensitive to changing population needs and 
resource constraints. More clarity is needed over the accountability 
arrangements of joint DsPH and the extent of their managerial 
responsibility in local authorities. 
20. Commissioners working in partnerships could direct attention to the 
ways in which governance structures, such as those under the 
umbrella of the LSP, could be better integrated to address cross-
cutting health and well being issues. 
21. The JSNA is an important route for identifying health and well being 
needs of a local population. Our evidence shows that input of 
practice-based commissioners requires development as does data 
sharing, joint performance management of areas of shared interest 
and alignment of performance management frameworks for 
commissioning. 
22. A systematic approach for involving the VCS in JSNAs was lacking in 
some of our case study sites and this may be an area for knowledge 
exchange across PCTs. We also found evidence of concern over 
conflicts of interest for PBC and the VCS in terms of health needs 
assessment, commissioning and the provision of services. 
23. Performance management of primary care contracts was an area of 
common concern among PCTs and we recommend a review of 
developments, including the use of contractual levers, networked 
approaches and the changing balance between financial incentives 
and core contract specifications. This could reflect different 
perspectives on this issue, good practice locally and the advantages 
and disadvantages of transaction-based approaches. 
24. Some PCTs were considering financial incentives for health outcomes 
(rather than for increased activity) through contracts based on 
collaborative arrangements or for care across care pathways. There is 
scope for comparative evaluation of new contractual arrangements of 
this kind. 
25. PCTs, PBC and local authorities could consider the formal role to be 
played by LINks in influencing commissioning decisions. 
26. Leadership in public health requires negotiation of different forms 
and approaches to governance and an understanding of the tensions 
that arise. This could form part of leadership training. 
The notion of ‘public health governance’ draws together issues arising in the 
governance of public health including how far a focus on health and well 
being is reflected throughout the commissioning cycle, in priorities for 
investment, performance management and the use of incentives and 
contractual arrangements. It is closely associated with the stewardship role, 
and as such, with values which should inform the wide range of governance 
arrangements that currently co-exist. As new governance arrangements 
take shape, it is important that the commissioning cycle is not fragmented 
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and that an emphasis on strategic commissioning for health and well being, 
based on joint assessments of health needs of a local population, is not lost. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      135 
 Project 08/1716/208 
 
11 References 
1. Department of Health. Commissioning a patient-led NHS Cm 6268. 
London: Department of Health; 2005. 
2. Department of Health. World class commissioning: Vision. London: 
Department of Health; 2007. 
3. Department of Health. World class commissioning: Competencies. 
London: Department of Health; 2007. 
4. Department of Health. Commissioning assurance handbook. London: 
Department of Health; 2008. 
5. Department of Health. World class commissioning assurance handbook 
Year 2, London: Department of Health; 2009. 
6. Department of Health. Our health, our care, our say. A new direction for 
community services Cm 6737. London: The Stationery Office; 2006. 
7. Department of Health. Commissioning framework for health and well 
being. London: Department of Health; 2007. 
8. Department of Health. NHS 2010 – 2015: from good to great. Preventive, 
people-centred productive Cm 7775. London: The Stationery Office; 2009. 
9. Wanless D. Securing our future health: taking a long-term view. Final 
report. London: HM Treasury; 2002. 
10. Wanless D. Securing good health for the whole population: Final report. 
London: HM Treasury; 2004. 
11. Wanless D, Appleby J, Harrison T, Patel D. Our future health secured? A 
review of NHS funding and performance. London: King’s Fund; 2007. 
12. House of Commons Health Committee. Health inequalities. Third Report 
of Session 2008–09, Vol I. HC 296-1. London: The Stationery Office; 2009. 
13. Healthcare Commission and Audit Commission. Are we choosing health? 
The impact of policy on health improvement programmes and services. 
London: Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection; 2008. 
14. The Marmot Review. Fair society, healthy lives: strategic review of 
health inequalities in England post-2010. London: The Marmot Review; 
2010. 
15. Audit Commission. Healthy balance. A review of public health 
performance and spending. Health Briefing March 2010. London: Audit 
Commission; 2010. 
16. Department of Health, Health Inequalities Unit. Tackling health 
inequalities 2005-7. Policy and data update for the 2010 national target. 
London: Department of Health; 2008. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      136 
 Project 08/1716/208 
17. Department of Health. Tackling health inequalities: a programme for 
action Cm 6374. London: Department of Health; 2003. 
18. Department of Health. Transforming community services: enabling new 
patterns of provision. London: Department of Health; 2009. 
19. Secretary of State for Health. High quality care for all: NHS next stage 
review final report Cm 7432. London: The Stationery Office; 2008. 
20. Audit Commission, Care Quality Commission, HM Inspectorate of 
Constabulary, HM Inspectorate of Prisons, HM Inspectorate of Probation and 
Ofsted. Comprehensive area assessment framework document. London: 
Audit Commission; 2009. 
21. DH/NHS Finance Performance and Operations. Operational Plans 
2008/09 - 2010/11. National planning guidance and “Vital Signs”. London: 
Department of Health; 2008. 
22. Department of Health/NHS Finance Performance and Operations. The 
operating framework for 2010/11 for the NHS in England. London: 
Department of Health; 2009. 
23. Department of Health. Implementing the Next Stage Review visions: 
the quality and productivity challenge. Available at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Lettersandcirculars/Dear
colleagueletters/DH_104239 
24. Crump H. World Class Commissioning Table: PCTs exceed expectations 
in year one. Health Service Journal, 5 March 2009. Available at: 
http://www.hsj.co.uk/pcts-exceed-expectations-in-year-
one/2001726.article 
25. Department of Health. Equity and excellence: liberating the NHS Cm 
7881. London: The Stationery Office; 2010. 
26. Davies C, Anand P, Artigas L, Holloway J, McConway K, Newman J et al. 
Links between governance, incentives and outcomes: a review of the 
literature. London: National Co-ordinating Centre for NHS Service Delivery 
and Organisation R&D (NCCSDO); 2005. 
27. Marks L, Cave S, Hunter DJ. Public health governance: views of key 
stakeholders. Public Health 2010; 124: 55-59. 
28. Department of Health. National standards, local action. Health and 
social care standards and planning framework 2005/06 – 2007/8. London: 
Department of Health; 2004. 
29. NHS National Leadership Council. The healthy NHS board. Principles for 
good governance 2010. Available at: 
http://nhsleadership.rroom.net/boarddevelopment/docs/bd_principles_docu
ment_11.pdf 
30. The Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Inquiry. Robert Francis 
Inquiry report into Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust. London: The 
Stationery Office; 2010. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      137 
 Project 08/1716/208 
31. The World Wide Indicators Governance Project. Available at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
32. Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services. The 
good governance standard for public services. London: Office for Public 
Management, Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountability; 
2004. 
33. Audit Commission. Corporate governance: improvement and trust in 
local public services. London: Audit Commission; 2003. 
34. Gash T, Hallsworth M, Ismail S, Paun A. Performance Art: enabling 
better management in the public services. London: Institute for 
Government; 2008. 
35. Blackman T, Elliott E, Greene A, Harrington B, Hunter DJ, Marks L et al. 
(2006) Performance assessment and wicked problems: the case of health 
inequalities, Public Policy and Administration 2006; 21(2): 66-80. 
36. Butland B, Jebb S, Kopelman P, McPherson K, Thomas S, Mardell J et al. 
Tackling obesities: future choices. Project report. Government Office for 
Science. London: Department of Innovation Universities and Skills; 2007. 
37. Courpasson D. Managerial strategies of domination: power in soft 
bureaucracies. Organization Studies 2000; 21(1): 141-61. 
38. Flynn R. ‘Soft bureaucracy’, governmentality and clinical governance; 
theoretical approaches to emergent policy. In Gray A, Harrison S. (eds.) 
Governing medicine. theory and practice. Open University Press: 2004. pp. 
11-27. 
39. Treib O, Bahr H, Falkner G. Modes of governance: a note towards 
conceptual clarification. European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) No N-05-
02: 2005. Available at: http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-
newgov-N-05-02.pdf 
40. Exworthy M, Powell M, Kohan J. The NHS: quasi-market, quasi-
hierarchy and quasi-network? Public Money and Management 1999; 
19(4):15-22. 
41. Greener I, Powell M. The changing governance of the NHS: Reform in 
post-Keynsian health service. Human Relations 2008; 61: 617- 635. 
42. Hooghe L, Marks G. Types of multi-level governance. European 
Integration on-line Papers 2001; 5 (11). Available at: 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-011a.htm 
43. Townsend A. Multi-level governance, with particular reference to 
integration between levels. ODPM; 2005. Available at: 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/corporate/pdf/146784.pdf  
44. Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. Strong and 
prosperous communities. The Local Government White Paper Cm 6939-ll. 
London: The Stationery Office; 2006. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      138 
 Project 08/1716/208 
45.  Audit Commission. A prescription for partnership. Engaging clinicians in 
financial management. London: The Audit Commission; 2007. 
46. Bullivant J, Deighan M, Stoten, B, Corbett-Nolan A. Integrated 
governance II: Governance between organisations. Institute of Healthcare 
Management and Bradford and Airedale Teaching Primary Care Trust. 2008 
Available at: 
http://www.wales.nhs.uk/sitesplus/documents/829/Integrated%20Governa
nce%20II%20%20Governance%20Between%20Organisations%20Bullivant
%20et%20al.pdf 
47. Tuohy AH. Agency, contract, and governance: shifting shapes of 
accountability in the health care arena, Journal of Health Policy, Politics and 
Law 2003; 28 (2-3): 195-215. 
48. Barnes M, Skelcher C, Beirens H, Dalziel R, Jeffares S, Wilson L. 
Designing citizen centred governance. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation; 
2008. 
49. Department of Health, Patient and Public Involvement Team. A stronger 
local voice: A framework for creating a stronger local voice in the 
development of health and social care services. London: Department of 
Health; 2006. 
50. Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. Communities 
in control: real people, real power Cm 7427. London: The Stationery Office; 
2008. 
51. Department of Health, Commissioning and System Management. Real 
involvement: working with people to improve services. Guidance for NHS 
organisations on section 242(1B) of the NHS Act 2006, the duty to involve 
and good involvement practice. London: Department of Health; 2008. 
52. Jochum V, Pratten B, Wilding K. Civil renewal and active citizenship. A 
guide to the debate. London: NCVO; 2005. 
53.  Department of Health. Overview and scrutiny of health – Guidance. 
Department of Health 2003. Available at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en
/documents/digitalasset/dh_4066238.pdf 
54. Hunter DJ, Marks L. Managing for health: what incentives exist for NHS 
managers to focus on wider health issues? London: King’s Fund; 2005. 
55. World Health Organisation. World Health Report 2000. Geneva: World 
Health Organisation; 2000. 
56. Bennett B, Gostin L, Magnusson R, and Martin R. Health governance: 
law, regulation and policy. Public Health 2009; 123: 207-12. 
57. Nuffield Council on Bioethics. Public health: ethical issues. London: 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics; 2007. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      139 
 Project 08/1716/208 
58. Commission on Social Determinants of Health. Closing the gap in a 
generation: health equity through action on the social determinants of 
health, Geneva: World Health Organisation; 2008. 
59. Hunter DJ, Marks L, Smith K. The public health system in England. 
Bristol: Policy Press; 2010. 
60. Gostin LO. Public health law: power, duty, restraint (2nd ed.) University 
of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles: 2008. 
61. Kass NE. Public health ethics; from foundations and frameworks to 
justice and global public health. Journal of Law Medicine and Ethics 2004; 
32: 232-242. 
62. Dawson A, Verweij M. The meaning of 'public' in 'public health’ cpt. 2 in 
Dawson A, Verweij M. (eds.) Ethics, prevention and public health. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; 2007. pp.13-29. 
63. Peckham S, Hann A. (eds.) Public health ethics and practice. Bristol: 
Policy Press; 2009. 
64. Holland S. Public health ethics; what it is and how to do it. In Peckham 
S, Hann A. (eds.) Public health ethics and practice. Bristol: Policy Press; 
2009. pp.33-48. 
65. Jochelson K. Nanny or steward? The role of local government in public 
health. London: King’s Fund; 2005. 
66. Gostin LO, Stone L. Health of the people: the highest law? In Dawson A, 
Verweij M. (eds.) Ethics, prevention and public health. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; 2007. pp. 59-77. 
67. Wikler D, Brock DW. Population bioethics. mapping a new agenda. In 
Dawson A, Verweij M. (eds.) Ethics, prevention and public health. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; 2007. pp.78-94. 
68.  Cribb A. Why ethics? What kind of ethics for public health? In Peckham 
S, Hann A. (eds.) Public health ethics and practice. Bristol: Policy Press; 
2009. pp.17- 31. 
69. Department of Health. PCT and SHA functions and roles 2006. Available 
at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/Publications
PolicyAndGuidance/DH_4134649 
70. NHS Confederation. The development of integrated governance. NHS 
Confederation Viewpoint. London: NHS Confederation; 2004. 
71. Scally G, Donaldson LJ. Looking forward: clinical governance and the 
drive for quality improvement in the new NHS in England. BMJ 1998; 317: 
61–65. 
72. Storey J, Bate P, Buchanan D, Green R, Salaman G, Winchester N. New 
governance arrangements in the NHS: emergent implications. NHS/SDO 
Working Paper No 3/2008. Available at: 
http://www7.open.ac.uk/oubs/research/pdf/SDO_Project_08_3.pdf 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      140 
 Project 08/1716/208 
73. Abbot S, Smith R, Proctor S, Iacovou N. Primary Care Trusts. What is 
the role of Boards? Public Policy and Administration 2008; 23: 43- 59. 
74. Rhodes RAW. The new governance: governing without government. 
Political Studies 1996; xliv: 652-667. 
75. Department of Health. The new NHS: modern, dependable Cm 3807. 
London: Department of Health; 1997. 
76. Department of Health. Healthy weight, healthy lives. A cross 
government strategy for England. London: Department of Health; 2008. 
77. Kelly M, Stewart E, Morgan A, Killoran A, Fischer A, Threlfall A et al. A 
conceptual framework for public health: NICE’s emerging approach. Public 
Health 2009; 123 (1): e14-e20. 
78. Health care Commission. No ifs, no buts: Improving services for tobacco 
control. London: Health care Commission; 2007. 
79. Healthcare Commission. Performing better: A focus on sexual health 
services in England. London: Healthcare Commission; 2007. 
80. Healthcare Commission. Managing diabetes: Improving services for 
people with diabetes. London: Healthcare Commission; 2007. 
81. Institute for Government. PSA Indicators. Available 
at:http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/content/19/psa-indicators 
82. Department for Communities and Local Government. The New 
Performance Framework for Local Authorities & Local Authority 
Partnerships: Single Set of National Indicators 2007. Available at: 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/localgovernment/pdf/505713.p
df 
83. HM Treasury. 2007 Pre-Budget Report and Comprehensive Spending 
Review. London: The Stationery Office; 2007. 
84. Secretary of State for Health. Choosing health: making healthy choices 
easier Cm 6374. London: The Stationery Office; 2004. 
85. Care Quality Commission. Reviews in 2009/10. Assessing and rating 
health and adult social care organisations. Available at: 
http://www.cqc.org.uk/_db/_documents/cqc_reviews_0910.pdf. Accessed 
March 2010. 
86. Audit Commission. Working better together? Managing local strategic 
partnerships. London: Audit Commission; 2009. 
87. HM Treasury and Department of Communities and Local Government. 
Total Place: A whole area approach to public services. London: HM 
Treasury; 2010. 
88. Bernstein H, Cosford P, Williams A. Enabling effective delivery of health 
and wellbeing. An independent report. 2010. Available at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicatinsP
olicyAndGuidance/DH_111692 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      141 
 Project 08/1716/208 
89. Marks L. Fault lines between policy and practice in local partnerships. 
Journal of Health Organization and Management 2007; 21(2): 136-148. 
90. Johnson C, Osborne SP. Local Strategic Partnerships, neighbourhood 
renewal and the limits to co-governance. Public Money and Management 
2003; July: 147-154. 
91. Hunter DJ (ed.) Perspectives on joint Director of Public Health 
appointments. Durham: Durham University; 2008. 
92. The Centre for Public Scrutiny. Commissioning for health – a guide for 
overview and scrutiny committees on NHS commissioning and the world 
class commissioning programme 2010. Available at: 
http://www.cfps.org.uk/what-we-do/publications/cfps-health/?id=120 
93. Culyer AJ. Dictionary of health economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd.; 2005. 
94. Le Grand J, Titmuss R, Srivastava D. Incentives for prevention. Health 
England Report No 3. 2009. Available at:  
http://www.healthengland.org/publications/HealthEnglandReportNo3.pdf 
95. Mannion R, Davies HTO. Incentives in health systems; developing 
theory, investigating practice, Journal of Health Organization and 
Management 2008; 22 (1): 5-10. 
96. Williamson OE. Markets and hierarchies: some elementary 
considerations. American Economic Review 1973; 63:316-25. 
97. Le Grand J. Motivation, agency, and public policy: of knights and 
knaves, pawns and queens. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2006. 
98. Williamson OE. The theory of the firm as governance structure: from 
choice to contract. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2002; 16:171-95. 
99. Marini G, Street A. A transaction costs analysis of changing contractual 
relations in the English NHS. Health Policy 2007; 83:17-26. 
100. Thaler RH. Quasi rational economics. New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation; 1994. 
101. Milgrom P, Roberts J. Economics, organization and management. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall; 1992. 
102.  NHS Employers. QOF changes and new indicators for 2009/10. 
London: NHS Employers; 2009. 
103. Steel NMS, Clark A, Fleetcroft R, Howe A. Quality of clinical primary 
care and targeted incentive payments: an observational study. British 
Journal of General Practice 2007; 57: 449-454. 
104. Hadley-Brown M. The QOF: quality outcomes or just framework?" 
Diabetes and Primary Care 2005; 7(2): 52-60. 
105. Millett C. et al. Impact of a pay-for-performance incentive on support 
for smoking cessation and on smoking prevalence among people with 
diabetes. Canadian Medical Association Journal 2007; 176: 1705-10. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      142 
 Project 08/1716/208 
106. Doran T, Fullwood C, Kontopantelis E, Reeves D. Effect of financial 
incentives on inequalities in the delivery of primary clinical care in England: 
analysis of clinical activity indicators for the quality and outcomes 
framework. Lancet 2008; 372:728-36. 
107. Sigfrid LA, Turner C, Crook D, Ray S. Using the UK primary care 
Quality and Outcomes Framework to audit health care equity: preliminary 
data on diabetes management. Journal of Public Health 2006; 28:221-5. 
108. Campbell SM, Reeves D, Kontopantelis E, Sibbald B, Roland M. Effects 
of pay for performance on the quality of primary care in England. New 
England Journal of Medicine 2009; 361:368-78. 
109. Petersen LA, Woodard LD, Urech T, Daw C, Sookanan S. Does pay-for-
performance improve the quality of health care? Annals of Internal Medicine 
2006; 145:265-72. 
110. Pearson SD, Schneider EC, Kleinman KP, Coltin KL, Singer JA. The 
impact of pay-for-performance on health care quality in Massachusetts, 
2001-2003. Health Aff (Millwood) 2008; 27:1167-76. 
111. Information Centre for Health and Social Care. Spend on new clinical 
DESs in England, 2008/09 and forecast for 2009/10. Available at: 
http://www.ic.nhs.uk/webfiles/publications/TSC/Spend_on_New_Clinical_D
ESs_in_England_2008_09_and_forecast_for_2009_10.pdf 
112. Audit Commission. Payment by Results data assurance framework 
2008/09: Key messages from Year 2 of the national clinical coding audit 
programme. London: Audit Commission; 2009. 
113. Farrar S, Sussex J, Yi D, Sutton M, Chalkley M, Scott A et al. National 
evaluation of payment by results. Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen; 2007. 
114. Farrar S, Yi D, Sutton M, Chalkley M, Sussex J, Scott A. Has payment 
by results affected the way that English hospitals provide care? Difference-
in-differences analysis. BMJ 2009; 339:b3047. 
115. Department of Health. Options for the future of payment by results: 
2008/09 to 2010/11. Leeds: Department of Health; 2007. 
116. Wyatt S. Investing for Health Project 1. The rationale and potential 
risks of introducing tariffs for lifestyle risk management services. Reference 
Group 1 paper. Birmingham: NHS West Midlands; 2008. 
117. Wyatt S. Investing for Health Project 1. Tariff levels for smoking 
cessation services. Reference Group Paper 3. Birmingham: NHS West 
Midlands; 2008. 
118. Department of Health. The NHS in England: the operating framework 
for 2009/10. London: Department of Health; 2008. 
119. Curry N, Goodwin N, Naylor C, Robertson R. Practice-based 
commissioning. Reinvigorate, replace or abandon? London: King’s Fund; 
2008. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      143 
 Project 08/1716/208 
120. Thaler RH. Quasi rational economics. New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation; 1994. 
121. Thaler RH, Sunstein CR. Nudge: improving decisions about health, 
wealth, and happiness. New Haven and London: Yale University Press; 
2008. 
122. Draper P, Griffiths J, Dennis J, Popay J. Three types of health 
education. BMJ 1980; 281(6238): 493–495. 
123. Health England (Expert Advisory Panel on Preventative Health 
Spending). Prevention and preventative spending. Oxford: Health England, 
2009. 
124. Leary S, Palmer M. A healthy option. Healthcare Finance 2009; 29: 31-
2. 
125. Kane RL, Johnson PE, Town RJ, Butler M. Economic incentives for 
preventive care. Evidence Report. Technology Assessment 2004:1-141. 
126. Oliver A. Can financial incentives improve health equity?[comment]. 
BMJ 2009; 339:b3847. 
127. Pearson SD, Lieber SR. Financial penalties for the unhealthy? Ethical 
guidelines for holding employees responsible for their health. Health Aff 
(Millwood) 2009; 28:845-52. 
128. Newman J. Modernising governance: New Labour policy and society. 
London: Sage; 2001. 
129. Improvement and Development Agency. Valuing health: developing a 
business case for health improvement. London: Improvement and 
Development Agency; 2009. 
130. Austin D. Priority-setting: strategic planning. London: NHS 
Confederation; 2008. 
131. World Health Organisation. The World Health Report: reducing risks, 
promoting healthy life. Geneva: World Health Organisation; 2002. 
132. NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement. What is the scenario 
generator? Available at: 
http://www.institute.nhs.uk/scenariogenerator/general/what_is_the_scenari
o_generator.html 
133. Kelly MP, McDaid D, Ludbrook A, Powell J. Economic appraisal of public 
health interventions. London: National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence; 2005. 
134. Drummond M, Weatherly H, Claxton K, Cookson R, Ferguson B, 
Godfrey C, Rice N, Sculpher M, Sowden A. Assessing the challenges of 
applying standard methods of economic evaluation. York: Public Health 
Research Consortium; 2007. 
135. Drummond M, Weatherly H, Ferguson B. Economic evaluation of health 
interventions. BMJ 2008; 337:a1204. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      144 
 Project 08/1716/208 
136. West P, Sanderson D, Redmond S, Taylor M, Duffy S. A critique of the 
application of cost-effectiveness analysis to public health. York: York Health 
Economics Consortium; 2003. 
137. McDaid D, Needle J. Economic evaluation and public health: Mapping 
the literature. Cardiff: Health Promotion Division, Welsh Assembly 
Government; 2006. 
138. Claxton K, Sculpher M, Culyer T. Mark versus Luke? Appropriate 
methods for the evaluation of public health interventions. CHE research 
paper 31. York: Centre for Health Economics, University of York; 2007. 
139. Health England (Expert Advisory Panel on Preventative Health 
Spending). Definitions and measures of preventative health spending. 
Report no 1 Oxford: Health England; 2007. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      145 
 Project 08/1716/208 
Appendix 1 Focus group guide 
Public health governance and primary care delivery 
Regional focus group 
Purpose of focus group 
• To scope dimensions of ‘public health governance’ 
• To inform development of the research project, ‘Public Health Governance 
and Primary Care Delivery’, funded as part of the NIHR Service Delivery 
and Organisation public health research programme 
Focus group objectives 
• To explore dimensions of governance of relevance to population health 
(public health governance) 
• To identify similarities and differences with other forms of governance, 
such as clinical governance 
• To identify changes associated with implementing systems for public 
health governance at SHA and local levels 
• Current barriers to commissioning for health and well being 
• Levers for more effective commissioning for health and well being. 
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Appendix 2 Interview schedules: examples 
from phase one and phase two 
First phase interview schedules were informed by the following: mapping and 
scoping exercises carried out as part of the exploratory phase of the study; the 
findings of one national and two regional focus groups; and interviews (four) with 
national stakeholders. The mapping exercise (SC) clarified the configuration of 
incentives and regulatory arrangements for health improvement and the 
reduction of health inequalities; the scoping exercise identified dimensions of 
governance related to health improvement; the focus groups debated dimensions 
of governance and governance challenges; the four additional interviews with 
national stakeholders followed the themes of the focus groups. Draft interview 
schedules were piloted with two interviewees (a member of the project advisory 
group and a national stakeholder from the VCS and modified accordingly. There 
was a wide range of interviewees, spanning PCT Chief Executives and Executive 
Directors, PCT Chairs and NEDs, PBC leads, members of the VCS with a role in 
the health sub-group of the LSP, the Chair of the Overview and Scrutiny Panel 
for Health and the Chair of the LINk. Interview schedules were modified to reflect 
differences in roles. The schedules were also modified for the second phase 
interviews which took place late in 2009, to reflect changes in policy and also to 
follow up on themes identified in the first phase of interviews. Interviews took 
one hour to complete. 
Two schedules are reproduced below, one for PCT interviewees (phase one) and 
a second for practice-based commissioners (phase two). 
1. Interview schedule for phase one PCT interviewees 
A. Background 
A.1 First of all, could you describe your current role? 
A.2 Could you describe how your PCT carries out its commissioning 
responsibilities? 
• PCT with sole responsibility for commissioning? 
• Commissioning arrangements across (which) PCTs? 
• External commissioners (which ones)? 
• Joint commissioning arrangements and extent of joint 
commissioning for the health and well being agenda? 
A.3 What is your current involvement in commissioning? 
B. The second section looks at arrangements for commissioning health 
and well being and addressing health inequalities in more detail. 
B.1  There has been a great deal of policy emphasis on commissioning 
for health and well being. How far has your organisation been able 
to reflect this emphasis in its commissioning priorities? 
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• Response to the Commissioning Framework for Health and Well 
Being? 
• Response to Vision for World Class Commissioning? 
• Examples of success? 
B.2 Is the emphasis on health and well being about right in your 
organisation? 
If not, what are the current barriers to achieving change in the 
balance of investment? 
• Trade offs across short and longer term investment? 
• Clinical versus public health focus? 
• Current pattern of regulatory and incentive arrangements? 
• Skills and competencies? 
• Partnership issues? 
• Board priorities? 
B.3 What would you consider as the most effective levers for change in 
this area? 
B.4  To what extent is the commissioning process driven by public health 
priorities? 
• Involvement of the public health team in the commissioning 
process and in deciding commissioning priorities? 
• The extent to which the Director of Public Health annual report is 
reflected in commissioning intentions? 
B.5 Are there barriers to public health teams exerting more influence? 
B.6  Are you able to comment on the extent to which strategies for 
health improvement, commissioning priorities and financial 
strategies are currently aligned with each other? 
• If aligned, how has this been achieved? 
• If not, then what have been the barriers to achieving this? 
B.7 How are the public currently involved in commissioning decisions? 
• Involvement in health and well being as opposed to health care? 
• Potential role of LINks and how they will be integrated into PCT 
decision-making structures? 
B.8 How would you describe progress with the JSNA in your area? 
• If in place, how is it being used to identify future service needs 
and inform commissioning decisions? 
B.9 In your view, to what extent are JSNAs likely to influence PCT 
commissioning intentions over time? 
• Barriers? 
• Link with LAAs? 
B.10 What impact to you think the recent Darzi review will have on 
commissioning for health and wellbeing? 
B.11 Moving on to practice-based commissioning, how would you 
describe progress on PBC in your PCT? 
• Supporting strategic goals of the PCT? 
• Involvement in setting commissioning intentions? 
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• Number of business plans? 
• Involvement in committees? 
• Influence on PCT decision-making?  
B.12 To what extent are practice-based commissioners currently involved 
in the health and well being agenda? 
• Influence on the commissioning intentions in the AOP? 
• Involvement in the JSNA process? 
• Input into the development of LAAs? 
• Involvement in the implementation of LAAs? 
• Broader strategies and targets for health improvement? 
• Examples of local successes and how these have been achieved? 
B.13 What incentives are there, if any, for them to engage in 
commissioning for health and well being? 
• Any support and incentives from the PCT? 
• Access to freed up resources/savings as a result of PBC 
activities? 
B.14 What, in your view could make them more likely to engage in 
commissioning health improvement services? 
B.15 What role could the PCT play in incentivising practice-based 
commissioners to commission health improvement services? 
B.16 Are there any general points on barriers and enabling factors to 
engaging PBC in this area that you would like to add? 
C. The third section looks at performance management systems, 
regulatory arrangements and standards and their impact on 
commissioning for health and well being. 
C.1  To what extent do you think the current system of performance 
management for PCTs supports a shift in emphasis towards health 
and wellbeing in practice? 
• Impact of Annual Health Check? 
• Impact of Vital Signs and the Annual Operating Framework? 
• Impact of the PSA targets? 
• Impact of target-setting through Local Area Agreements? 
• Role of the SHA in performance managing this area? 
• Commissioning assurance procedures? 
• Impact of NICE guidance? 
• Impact of NSFs? 
C.2. In practice, which areas of performance management predominate 
for the PCT? 
C.3 Do you expect this to change over the next few years? 
C.4  In relation to the joint agenda with local authorities, has 
commissioning for health and well being raised any specific issues of 
governance in your PCT? 
• Alignment of performance management across different 
organisations? 
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• Performance management in relation to the Government Office 
and the SHA? 
• Extent to which the LAA is included within the AOP? 
• Incentives to partnership working? 
C.5 Are there issues of governance related to health protection? 
C.6  What impact do you think the new regulatory arrangements will 
have on commissioning for health and well being? 
• The impact of the Care Quality Commission on assessing 
commissioning arrangements for health and well being? 
• The new national indicator set 
• Comprehensive Area Assessment and the impact of joined-up 
regulation? 
D.  The fourth section looks in more detail at incentives for 
commissioning for health and well being. 
D.1  The Commissioning Framework for Health and Well Being, (DH 
2007) noted that incentives did not yet ‘fully support the delivery of 
better health and well being’. Do you agree with this? 
• Impact of specific incentives? 
• Balance of incentives? 
D.2-5 (For Spearhead PCTs). We would like to identify the any impact 
Spearhead status may have had on commissioning decisions and 
health outcomes. 
D.2 How much extra funding have you received as a Spearhead PCT? 
D.3 How would you describe the impact of Spearhead status on 
commissioning for health and well being in your PCT? 
• Documentation available? 
D.4 Have projects been mainstreamed? 
D.5 Is it possible to identify any impact on health outcomes? 
D.6 Has the PCT exploited its contractual flexibilities in order to 
commission services for health and well being? 
• Contracts with provider services that incorporate tariffs for 
health improvement services 
• Local Enhanced Service element of GMS contract (details) 
• APMS or PMS contracts 
• Services from the VCS 
• Social enterprises 
D.7 It has been argued that the current pattern of incentives works 
against a longer term approach to health and well being. Do you 
agree with this view? If so, what changes in the nature or balance of 
incentives would you like to see? 
D.8  What would be the best ways, in your view, to incentivise the 
development of health and well being services? 
• Through extension of PbR? 
• Extending choice to health promotion services? 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      150 
 Project 08/1716/208 
• More involvement of the public in commissioning? 
• Closer working with partners? 
D. 9 Are financial incentives the most important lever for change? 
Are other kinds of incentives important and if so, which ones? 
E. The fifth section focuses on decision-making and investment for 
health. 
E.1  What is the process for agreeing priorities for investment in health 
and well being in your PCT? 
• Specific priority-setting methods 
• Extent to which methods of economic evaluation are included? 
E.2 Is it possible to identify preventative health spend in your PCT? 
If yes, how is this defined, what issues emerge, and is 
documentation available? 
If no, are there plans to do this? 
E.3 What are your views over the feasibility of using preventative health 
spend as a measure? 
E.4 Is it possible to track how preventative spend is changing over 
time? 
E.5 Could you describe any plans to rebalance investment towards 
health improvement? 
• Enabling factors? 
• Barriers? 
E.6 How useful is the programme budgeting initiative in this respect? 
E.7 Which methods are being used/is it planned to use? 
• Modelling costs and investments over short medium and longer 
 terms? 
• Looking across pathways of care? 
• PBMA? 
• Disinvestment strategies? 
• Changing pattern of investment across acute and preventive 
 services? 
E.8 Which approaches do you think are likely to be most successful and 
why? 
F. The last section concerns the concept of public health 
governance 
F.1 How would you describe the stewardship role of the PCT with regard 
to its local population? 
F.2 How is this reflected in practice? 
• Board commitment to public health and monitoring of public 
health targets 
• Commissioning priorities? 
• Upstream/downstream approaches? 
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• Emerging public health hazards? 
• Health inequalities? 
• Patterns of investment? 
• Approaches to the wider public health system? 
• Public accountability? 
• Partnerships? 
F.3  What systems of governance do PCTs need to have in place if they 
are to demonstrate effective stewardship of the health of their 
populations? 
• Joint arrangements? 
• Integration into Board governance procedures? 
F.4 For PCTs in general, what would you see as examples of a failure in 
public health governance? 
F.5 How can governance failure in public health (in the sense of 
stewardship) be measured? 
F.6 For PCTs in general, what would you see as examples of governance 
success in public health? 
F.7 How can governance success be measured? 
F.8 What are the current barriers to an effective system of public health 
governance? 
• Leadership issues? 
• Ownership and accountability? 
• Dominance of clinical governance? 
• Board priorities? 
• Accountability to the public? 
Finally 
• Is there anything else you would like to add? 
• Are there any comments you would like to make on the interview 
and the interview process? 
Are there any documents or information you would like to 
recommend? 
2.  Interview schedule for practice-based commissioners (phase 
two) 
A. Background 
A.1 First of all, could you describe your current role (for new 
interviewees)/ have there been any changes in your role (for follow 
up interviews) since the last interview? 
A.2 How would you describe progress in PBC in general terms since the 
last interview? 
A.3 Could you describe how PBC is currently structured in your PCT? 
• Number of PBC groups/clusters in area? 
• Membership structures of clusters/groups? 
• GPs only/AHPs/practice managers/health trainers? 
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• Patients/public?/LINks?/shadow boards?/other? 
• Do you have any plans to change membership? 
A.4 How would you describe the emphasis on health and well being 
services in strategies developed through PBC in your area? 
• About right? 
• Not enough emphasis? 
• Has it shifted in any way? 
A.5 Are there any plans further to develop health and well being 
services? 
A.6 How would you describe the emphasis on health and well being 
services in your PCT? 
• About right? 
• Not enough emphasis? 
B. The second section explores changes in commissioning 
arrangements since the first phase interviews and the impact of 
these changes on commissioning for preventive services and 
addressing health inequalities. It begins by looking at general issues 
of commissioning through PBC and then focuses on services for 
health and well being. 
B.1 Could you describe the processes through which your PBC group(s) 
currently: 
• Agree commissioning priorities across the cluster(s)? 
• Influence annual commissioning intentions in your PCT? 
• Influence longer term PCT commissioning strategies? 
• Involve the public/patients? 
B.2 How would you describe the role of PBC at present? 
• Influencing strategy? 
• Developing care pathways? 
• Helping to reconfigure services? 
• Commissioning services 
 From others? 
 Through general practice? 
B.3 How do you think the role will develop over the next year or so? 
B.4 Do you consider that current PBC and PCT commissioning strategies 
are well aligned? 
• If not, how could alignment be improved in your view? 
B.5 Have any governance tensions emerged through PBC acting as both 
commissioners and providers? 
• If yes, how have these tensions been resolved? 
B.6 Moving on to commissioning for health and well being, how would 
you describe the involvement of PBC in this area? 
Specifically: 
• Is there public health team support for practice-based 
commissioners in developing their strategies and plans? 
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• Have practice-based commissioners been involved in developing 
the JSNA or using it to inform their commissioning 
priorities/strategies? 
• Have practice-based commissioners been involved in choosing 
health outcomes and in setting local public health targets? 
• Are practice-based commissioners involved in joint 
commissioning with the local authority on services related to 
health and well being? 
• Is there any involvement of practice-based commissioners with 
LSPs? 
• Is there any involvement of practice-based commissioners in 
developing local area agreements? 
B.7 How would you summarise support to PBCs from your PCT in 
relation to developing the health and well being agenda? 
Examples? 
B.8 Have practice-based commissioners been involved in commissioning 
preventive services 
• From GP practices? Give examples 
• From other providers? Give examples 
B.9 What would make PBCs more likely to engage in commissioning 
health improvement services? 
 B.10 Could you describe the barriers? 
 B.11 Could you describe whether the QIPP initiative is likely to influence 
the ways in which commissioning will be carried out over the next 
year within PBC and, if so, in which ways? (QIPP – Quality, 
Innovation, Productivity and Prevention) 
B. The next section explores contractual arrangements and 
incentives related to health and well being 
C.1 Could you describe any changes in primary care contracting 
mechanisms? 
• Increased use of APMS/PMS? 
• Changes in performance management of primary care by the 
PCT? 
C.2 Is a preventive component included in 
• APMS contracts? 
• PMS contracts? 
C.3 Which incentives are in currently in place to encourage additional 
preventive services in primary care? 
• Local Enhanced Services element of the GMS and pharmacy 
contracts? Give examples? 
• Local QOF schemes? 
• PBC incentive schemes? 
• Use of freed up resources? How arranged? 
• Through CQUIN? (Commissioning for quality and innovation) 
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C.4 How would you see the balance between contractual and incentive- 
based approaches developing over time? 
C.5 What in your view would be the most effective ways of incentivising 
the commissioning and provision of preventive services? 
C.6 Are financial incentives the most important lever for change in PBC? 
• Are other kinds of incentives important and if so, which ones? 
D. The fourth section looks at performance management systems, 
regulatory arrangements and standards and their impact on 
commissioning for health and well being. 
D.1 It has been argued that performance management systems have 
not encouraged a shift in emphasis from acute services towards the 
health and well being agenda? Does this still apply? 
• Role of Care Quality Commission (CQC) in assessing health and 
well being? 
• Role of Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) in assessing 
health and well being across a local area? 
• Role of SHA in performance management of prevention/health 
promotion? 
• Vital signs? 
• LAAs? 
• Other? 
D.2 How engaged are PBCs in these performance management systems? 
• Monitoring public health targets? 
D.3 How would you describe the impact of WCC and WCC assurance 
processes on PBC over the last year or so? 
• Greater emphasis on preventive services? 
• Greater emphasis on partnerships? 
• Degree of integration of PBC with WCC assurance processes? 
D.4 In practice, which areas of performance management predominate 
for your PCT? 
E. The fifth section focuses in more detail on decision-making 
and investment for health. 
E.1 What is the process for agreeing priorities for investment within 
your PBC group or cluster? 
• Modelling costs and investments over short, medium and longer 
terms? 
• Looking across pathways of care? 
• PBMA? 
• Disinvestment strategies? 
• Changing pattern of investment across acute and preventive 
services 
• Extent to which methods of economic evaluation are included? 
E.2 Which methods, if any, would it be useful for PBCs to adopt? 
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E.3 Are practice-based commissioners involved in deciding PCT 
commissioning priorities? 
E.4 Is it possible to identify preventative health spend within the 
indicative budget? 
• If yes, how is this defined, what issues emerge, and is 
 documentation available? 
• If no, are there plans to do this? 
E.5 What are your views of the feasibility of using preventative health 
spend as a measure? 
E.6 How much flexibility is there in budgets to shift the emphasis 
towards health and wellbeing? 
For example, how are decisions made over reinvestment of freed up 
resources? 
E.7 Could you describe any plans to rebalance investment towards 
health improvement? 
E.8 How could PBCs be encouraged/ what would enable PBCs to shift 
their spend into longer term health and wellbeing outcomes? 
• Barriers? 
F. The final section looks at the stewardship role in relation to 
the health of the local population. 
F.1 Do practice-based commissioners have a stewardship role with 
regard to the local population in addition to the care of individual 
patients? 
F.1a What does this mean to them? 
F.2 How is this reflected in practice? 
• Through commitment to public health and monitoring of public 
health targets? 
• Through influencing PBC/PCT commissioning priorities? 
• Through balancing upstream/downstream approaches? 
• Through identifying emerging public health hazards? 
• Through acting on health inequalities? 
• Through shifting patterns of investment? 
• Working in partnerships? 
Finally 
• Is there anything else you would like to add? 
• Are there any comments you would like to make on the 
interview or the interview process? 
• Are there any documents or information you would like to 
recommend? 
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Appendix 3 Snapshots of case study sites 
The following brief descriptions of our ten case study sites draw on 
interview data from first phase (2008-9) and second phase (2009) 
interviews and documentary analysis. Many features were common to all 
case study sites, paralleling the performance-related demands of the WCC 
assurance process. This included financial and strategic alignment, 
addressing the eleven commissioning competencies and prioritising ten 
health outcomes, including the reduction of health inequalities. WCC had led 
to a more systematic approach and most sites were adapting their 
organisational structures to fit demands of WCC and the commissioning 
cycle. All sites had joint and specialised commissioning arrangements in 
addition to lead commissioning responsibilities. 
Data from the Healthcare Commission is drawn from the 2006/7 Annual 
Health Check and WCC scores are based on the 2009 assurance process. In 
order to preserve anonymity some post titles have been changed and some 
details omitted where this could serve to identify the location of sites. 
Site one 
Site one was an ethnically and culturally diverse non-Spearhead PCT with a 
population of over 250,000, located in outer London and co-terminous with 
the local authority. Life expectancy was better than the English average but 
rates of TB and diabetes were high, as was child poverty and homelessness. 
There was a high turnover of population. 
At the time of first phase interviews its public health rating was good but 
use of resources was weak. In the CQC assessments for 2008/9, quality of 
commissioning services was fair, financial management was now rated 
good, and ‘providing services’ (core standards) partly met. The PCT was 
located in the fourth quartile of the 2009 WCC assessments. 
The PCT had undergone rapid change, achieving financial turnaround within 
a year under a new PCT Board. The DPH was a joint appointment with the 
local authority and public health was well integrated into governance 
arrangements and strategic development. At the time of first phase 
interviews there were plans to realign the structure of the organisation 
around the requirements of WCC. 
The effects of financial stringency were still evident with the public health 
team described as understaffed. Resources for prevention, including those 
for smoking cessation, had been cut back during the period of financial 
instability but were now reinstated and included pharmacy involvement. 
However, some staff had been lost. 
Relationships with the local authority and with the voluntary sector had also 
suffered but partnerships were now on a better footing. Governance 
arrangements for joint commissioning were being reviewed and the 
integration of children’s services needed development. The LSP was 
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described as ‘vibrant’ but themed partnerships had only recently been 
developed. The CSP outlined areas where health and well being were jointly 
funded and noted that for the programme budgeting category ‘healthy 
individuals’, this PCT was in the bottom 10% of PCTs. 
The DPH report and the JSNA (2007/8) were published as a joint document 
and considered a success. The JSNA had been developed early, informing 
LAAs, the annual operational plan and the health and well being strategy. 
As it coincided with a period when PBC was still forming, there had been no 
input from practice-based commissioners. There was also limited 
involvement from the VCS. The report did not focus on commissioning 
objectives or on locality-based commissioning. AAACM was not included as 
a LAA target. 
The majority of GPs were in single or two-handed practices: primary care 
services were in need of development and there were plans to undertake 
QOF reviews to assess quality. APMS contracts were viewed favourably as a 
means of providing greater flexibility. While there were a number of LESs 
linked to the achievement of ‘Vital Signs’ targets, their use in incentivising 
preventive services was relatively limited. 
PBC had suffered in 2007/8 as a result of financial turnaround where 
incentive payments were not forthcoming, but over the previous year it had 
made progress, with good engagement from practices. There were five 
cluster groups, each with two representatives on an overarching Federation 
Board and there were additional incentives to commission for a population 
of over 50,000. There was also a PBC governance and approvals committee. 
The current emphasis was largely on managing demand and service 
redesign and, as in many other sites, investment in prevention was 
premised on managing demand for acute services. Health and well being 
was described as needing further development. There were mixed views on 
the alignment across PBC intentions and PCT strategy. The AOP and CSP 
made little reference to PBC in 2008/9. 
One impact of the financial turnaround had been the implementation of 
rigorous business plans and investment processes and public health benefit 
was considered as part of this. This was a formal process with an 
investment panel considering project briefs according to a structured pro- 
forma and then reporting to the PCT Board. Skills in using decision-making 
tools, such as PBMA, were considered in short supply. Making the business 
case for health and well being remained difficult, given problems in 
quantifying long-term benefit, compounded by the fact that a highly mobile 
population made modelling and identifying longer-term approaches more 
complicated. 
Patient and public involvement in the PCT was described as in need of 
development, although a public engagement strategy group had recently 
been established with representation from the local authority, voluntary 
organisations and others. There were cultural, educational and language 
barriers to public involvement and some interviewees described public 
involvement in decision-making as poor. It was also argued that local 
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priorities were inadequately reflected in nationally-driven performance 
management regimes. Social marketing was being developed to try and 
improve take up of preventive services. 
The VCS was described as relatively less well organised than in other 
London boroughs and this made it more difficult for their views to be 
represented. Moreover, as in many other sites, certain sectors from the VCS 
tended to monopolise decision-making. The period of flux through financial 
turnaround had also been destabilising for the VCS with closures and 
ambiguity over contracts. The Compact was described as not working well 
at present. While the VCS had been commissioned to provide services such 
as counselling and mental health initiatives in schools, it was argued that 
their potential to be equal partners with responsibility for delivering targets 
should be developed. However the smaller VCS organisations could find it 
difficult to compete for contracts. Nevertheless, there were examples of the 
VCS being commissioned to provide specific health and well being services. 
Given the high turn over in population there was often a delay in identifying 
community needs. Previous progress in community development as part of 
the former Health Action Zones appeared to have been lost yet this was 
seen as crucial for promoting health and well being in the area. 
The LINk was not established at the time of the interviews but a 
representative from the former PPI had a seat at the PCT Board. As in other 
sites, relationships between the OSC and the LSP were poorly developed, 
but the OSC had scrutinised the health and well being strategy and 
monitored LAA targets. 
In second phase interviews there had been further developments in the 
engagement of practice-based commissioners and the VCS in the JSNA and 
a new public and patient engagement strategy was in place. There were 
plans to incorporate preventative aspects in acute contracts and the QOF 
was now actively performance managed. There were also plans to reduce 
the use of LESs due to cost constraints. The LINk was involved at board and 
cluster levels but still developing its role. The importance of maintaining 
public health input in cross-PCT acute commissioning was emphasised, as 
was the importance of extending public health input into PBC. 
Site two 
Site two was a large PCT covering a rural county with a growing population 
of almost 700,000. The PCT was an amalgamation of three previous 
organisations and included one designated Spearhead area. While there 
were pockets of deprivation, the population as a whole experienced better 
outcomes than the England average. The PCT had recently moved into 
financial balance. At the time of first phase interviews, use of resources was 
weak, and achievement of new national targets was fair as was the quality 
of services. In the 2008/9 assessment, quality of services and financial 
management were both fair and the ‘providing services’ category was 
‘partly met’. It was located in the third quartile of the 2009 WCC league 
table. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      159 
 Project 08/1716/208 
The PCT spanned one county council and numerous district authorities, each 
with its own LSP, which created difficulties, including developing and 
agreeing priorities, negotiating across county and district priorities and 
providing the resources required to participate in a large number of LSPs. 
Public health input across such a large geographical area was inevitably 
complicated and had to be targeted on key decision-making activities. The 
organisation was established around the commissioning cycle, with public 
health input into the PCT planning board which also included the Director of 
Children’s Services and the Director of Adult Services. 
The PCT Board was recognised as committed to a health and well being 
agenda with a shift in focus towards health promotion and targeting 
inequalities. The DPH was regarded as highly proactive and the annual DPH 
report as influential. The post was not a joint appointment although there 
were a number of joint posts in existence. The DPH report considered 
commissioning issues, identifying priority areas, making commissioning 
recommendations and identifying services which had been commissioned, 
or should be in place, to address needs. The DPH report also discussed PBC 
in detail, including how the PCT worked with PBC clusters to identify 
variation in QOF scores. It also considered locality-based commissioning, 
presenting detailed locality profiles through which commissioning objectives 
were targeted, identifying the importance of relationships between PBCs 
and LSPs and ways in which the PCT, practice-based commissioners and 
local health partnerships could work together to achieve strategic aims. 
A county-wide approach had been taken to the production of the JSNA and 
this had been enabled through a well-established, county-wide data 
repository, funded through all the districts, the county, the PCT and the 
police. This provided the basis for a shared evidence base and had been in 
place since 2000. It was considered well-integrated into board decision-
making. Although there had been involvement of different partners in the 
JSNA it was acknowledged that further input was needed. There appeared 
to be alignment across LAAs, PCT plans and PBC plans and the effect of 
joint working on LAAs was described as having been beneficial to the 
development of local partnerships. The CSP demonstrated how LAA 
indicators or priorities were aligned to PCT Vital Signs indicators and it was 
possible to deduce how these aligned to WCC outcomes. AAACM was 
included in the LAA and the PCT and local health partnership board were 
lead partners 
In first phase interviews, there was a jointly-managed public health 
provider arm with a mixture of County Council and PCT employees. There 
were pooled budgets with the local authority in relation to health and well 
being with a substantial health and well being fund focused on deprived 
areas, managed through the local authority and funded by the PCT. There 
were also integrated structures across health and social care as well as 
across health and well being. 
Spearhead status was not considered to have exerted any influence on 
preventive services: indeed soon after Spearhead status was announced 
there had been cuts in public health services due to cost constraints. 
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However, it had acted as a catalyst for partnership working across the 
Spearhead area within the PCT. 
General practice was equally divided between PMS and GMS practices. The 
use of LESs to incentivise health and well being services was limited as such 
services, including smoking cessation services, were mainly arranged 
through partnership working with the local authority. There was, however, 
an example of a LES to address inequalities in access and outcomes for BME 
groups. The PCT had also provided rewards for innovative working, 
including recognition of a smoking cessation scheme run by midwives. 
Each cluster had an executive who was represented on the PEC and through 
the PEC to the PCT Board. There had been good progress in pathway 
development spread across the clusters. Each cluster had a representative 
from public health and informatics. Cluster-specific public health reports 
were produced to include data on premature mortality and areas of strength 
and weakness. Clusters had varied interests and there were also different 
approaches to cluster membership of other NHS professionals, or of local 
authority representatives. While involvement in health and well being was 
varied, there were examples in one PBC cluster of preventive services 
(related to obesity and physical activity) commissioned from the VCS and 
also the use of FUR for health and well being initiatives, such as prevention 
of teenage pregnancy, a health café and health trainers. The CSP described 
how a joint commissioning event ensured PBC plans were captured in PCT 
plans and were aligned to local authority plans. The role of PBC in working 
towards the 11 WCC outcomes was also identified. 
There had been a year-long and widely-publicised exercise to engage the 
public in the principles and criteria for investment in the health and well 
being agenda. This had involved thousands of people and involved a 
number of different consultation methods, including focus groups. Practice-
based commissioners had also started to hold public meetings over their 
plans. The PCT was considered proactive in engaging with the VCS, 
arranging for the delivery of projects clearly related to health and well being 
targets. Innovative approaches were being developed to reach young 
people, for example, through the use of You tube to publicise Chlamydia 
screening. 
Representation of the VCS on the various LSPs varied according to their 
presence in a particular locality as, given the large geographical area, 
relatively few VCS organisations worked county-wide. The VCS had been 
involved in setting LAA targets at district level but the system of County and 
districts raised issues of how far VCS decisions at district level were 
reflected at county level. While there was an overarching county-wide VCS 
group to provide a more concerted voice and a compact had been agreed 
across the county, the range and diversity of organisations made it difficult 
to liaise and reflect views. The view was expressed that the VCS ought to be 
more involved in decision-making and that public involvement was largely 
tokenistic. It was argued that the VCS could be better deployed in helping 
the PCT meet its targets, building on their current activities. In the previous 
year however, the VCS had become more involved in delivering PCT-funded 
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projects and initiatives. The LINk was described as still at an early stage 
and was not discussed in any detail. 
While programme budgeting was beginning to be used, the CSP 
acknowledged limitations of programme budgeting data. 
By the second phase, the joint provider arm had disappeared, there was still 
very limited awareness of the LINk and marked variation persisted across 
PBC clusters, which were seen as relatively isolated from each other with 
delays in getting plans off the ground. 
Site three 
Site three, a non-Spearhead area, had a population just under 230,000. The 
PCT was co-terminous with the unitary authority. The population was 
increasing (and historically undercounted) and with a younger profile than 
the national average. Health was similar to the England average but with 
significant inequalities within the PCT area, with relatively high smoking 
levels and a failure to meet smoking cessation targets at the time of first 
phase interviews. The PCT had not been reorganised in 2006, but there had 
been internal reorganisation. Use of resources was rated weak, public 
health developmental standards good and quality of services was rated fair 
in 2006/7. In the CQC assessment of 2008/9, quality of commissioning 
services was rated good, financial management was fair and ‘providing 
services’ partly met. It was located in the second quartile of the WCC league 
table. 
The PCT had moved from being overspent to being in financial stability 
which made it easier to shift patterns of investment. The skills learned 
through the period of financial pressure meant that tight budget 
management was in place. Commissioning for health and well being was 
described as core for the organisation and there was a public health-led 
approach to commissioning, developed over the previous year and following 
the appointment of new senior posts. The priority accorded to health and 
well being was reflected in strategic development, in methods for defining 
and tracking preventative health spend, in a commitment to increase 
preventative health spend by a certain percentage each year and in the use 
of LESs to incentivise preventive services in primary care. Growth monies 
had allowed for additional resources to be allocated to prevention and this 
was reflected in the strategic plan. 
There was a particular emphasis on innovation, motivation for improving 
health and well being throughout the organisation, strong leadership and on 
the key role played by joint appointments across the PCT and the local 
authority, including the DPH. There was a tradition of joint working and 
senior joint public health appointments. Clinicians were well represented 
amongst PCT Executive Directors. Public health was described as involved in 
commissioning rather than simply ‘advising commissioners’, developing 
strategy as well as carrying out health needs assessments. The CSP noted 
that PCT commissioning intentions aligned with LAA priorities and also with 
WCC outcomes. Health inequalities were included in the LAA, supported by 
three indicators: difference in life expectancy between most and least 
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deprived quintiles of the wards; number of 4 week smoking quitters; and 
number of smoking quitters in the 20 most deprived parishes. The PCT led 
on the AAACM target. Interviewees considered it important to focus on 
issues lying behind the targets rather than the targets per se. It was also 
argued that the alignment of targets achieved at a local level (and enabled 
by joint performance management posts) was less evident at SHA/GO 
levels. 
There was a focus on integration across health and social care reflected in 
the activities of a voluntary joint health and social care board and pooled 
budgets. There were joint activities related to health and well being, for 
example, working across education and health in relation to obesity. There 
were also a number of integrated services including those for older people. 
Both the PCT Chair and the CE sat on the LSP at the time of the interviews. 
However, the local authority was going through a period of instability with a 
large number of interim appointments and this had served to undermine the 
development of stable partnerships and joint commissioning. The LSP had 
only recently established its six thematic partnerships. 
The first JSNA had benefited from a history of joint working and joint data 
sharing through a shared observatory which brought together a wide range 
of data from health and social care and the police. It was developed with a 
local commissioning federation (which included patient representatives and 
the VCS). However the JSNA did not discuss the role of PBC in 
commissioning services to address health inequalities and health 
promotion/prevention or locality-based commissioning. The AOP had little 
discussion of PBC or on joint commissioning arrangements. There were 
plans to develop a more radical approach to the JSNA in subsequent years. 
Although it was considered that partnership governance required 
development there was a line of accountability leading through the JSNA, 
the sustainable community strategy, the LSP the LAA and the scrutiny 
function. 
Practices were evenly divided across GMS and PMS: many had previously 
been fund-holders and welcomed more involvement in decision-making. 
Roughly one quarter of practices had patient participation groups. LESs 
were being more widely used in general practice and in community 
pharmacy, and were intended to encourage a more proactive approach to 
promoting behaviour change in relation to smoking cessation or alcohol 
reduction. There were LESs for smoking cessation, Chlamydia screening, 
brief interventions and alcohol with many being modified for community 
pharmacies. As in other sites, it was considered that performance 
monitoring of primary care could be improved and there were also 
discussions over increased use of APMS contracts. 
PBC was considered well-developed with commissioning and provider 
aspects kept separate and a single collaborative in place which simplified 
prioritisation processes. Membership of the collaborative included practice 
managers, nurses and a patient representative. 
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There was evidence of practices becoming increasingly interested in 
commissioning rather than just in providing services, work on clinical 
pathways was in progress and some practices had set up services to which 
other practices could refer. PBC was considered an important route for 
communicating with general practice although clinical engagement still 
needed development. However, it had not yet proved a source of major 
changes in commissioning. An innovation fund had been used to stimulate 
development, for example, using practice websites as an interface between 
practices and the public. Practices had also been paid for carrying out audits 
to provide data not available from secondary care. However, there was 
some scepticism over how far PCT savings would result from PBC initiatives. 
PCT and PBC commissioning was described as integrated, with PBC 
proposals considered by the PEC, as were proposals from planning groups. 
Commissioning and provision were kept separate and practices making 
proposals would not necessarily be commissioned to provide those services. 
Patient involvement was described as well integrated into decision-making. 
Workshops on prioritisation for WCC had also been held. The LINk was 
considered as one, but not the only route into the VCS. There was active 
involvement of the LINk at PCT Board level, where the chair was a non-
voting member, and nominated LINk members were involved in working 
groups, tender panels, specifications and pathway redesign. Involvement of 
the LINk with the local authority was less well developed. Minutes of LINk 
meetings were shared with statutory organisations to keep channels of 
communication open. 
The LINk was one of the first to be established nationally and was an active 
presence in the PCT and closely involved with the scrutiny panel. An interim 
executive committee for the LINk had been established pending elections, 
and there was a support organisation and a website. Membership would be 
evenly divided between organisations registered with the LINk, individual 
LINk members and others. They had built on aspects of the former PPIF 
including a panel, now extended to encompass both health and social care 
with over 300 members, available for surveys, or to act as representatives. 
The panel had good representation from minority groups. The LINk also 
held an annual showcase of voluntary and statutory organisations. They 
were setting up a database of organisations and had negotiated training for 
lay members of committees. Governance arrangements were being 
developed which would include an annual citizens meeting and there were 
also plans to bring together patient participation groups based in GP 
practices to help coordinate views. There were, however, potential tensions 
between the LINk and the overarching VCS group. 
There were large numbers of small voluntary organisation staffed by 
volunteers which made representation difficult but their close links with 
different communities could be better exploited. Commissioning from the 
VCS was considered in need of development. 
The OSC health panels had scrutinised aspects of health and well being and 
emphasised direct communication with the public. However, the health 
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panel did not link with other OSC sub-groups or with the JSNA. As in other 
sites, relationships between the OSC and the LSP appeared underdeveloped 
(as were links between the LINk and the LSP) and there was little 
awareness of the role of the HPA locally. 
The business case for health and well being was made alongside other 
business cases and return on investment had to be demonstrated. 
Extensive use had been made of programme budgeting. Bids for each of the 
strategic priorities were coordinated and prioritised by leads who were 
public health consultants and then discussed by the PEC. There was a 
commitment to shift half of one per cent of the budget annually into 
preventative care (2008-12) and one per cent annually from secondary to 
primary care. 
Programme budgeting had been used in financial planning and to identify 
where spend was lower or higher than the national average, although, as 
elsewhere, limitations of the data were acknowledged. In the 09/10 AOP the 
PCT was identified as having a consistently higher spend on the ‘healthy 
individuals’ category than the national average. While plans suggested that 
the PCT was considering including health promotion and prevention in acute 
contracts, incentives to engage providers were largely focused on primary 
care. 
In second phase interviews the influence of the LINk was recognised, as 
was the success of LESs in achieving targets for smoking cessation. There 
were discussions over how contracts could be reconfigured to promote a 
focus on outcomes rather than activity across pathways of care. 
Site four 
Site four, a Spearhead site, resulted from the merger of two previous 
primary care organisations and had experienced many recent changes of 
personnel. It covered two separate local authorities, both Spearhead areas, 
and had a population of almost 300,000. Health was worse than the 
England average with high smoking rates, life expectancy amongst the 
worst in the country for one of the boroughs and high levels of inequalities 
in each. Use of resources was rated fair but quality of services and new 
national targets were rated good. In 2008/9 quality of commissioning was 
good, financial management fair and ‘providing services’ fully met. It was 
located in the second quartile of the 2009 WCC league table. 
Commissioning was complex due to the reorganised PCT spanning two 
separate boroughs and also acting as either lead or associate commissioner 
for different hospitals. The DPH was jointly appointed across both boroughs 
and the PCT and there were separate LSPs, health and well being 
partnerships of the LSP and two JSNAs. However alignment of LAA targets 
had been achieved. There were also wider partnership arrangements across 
local boroughs. Despite the importance of partnership working being 
recognised in the DPH report, there was little discussion of joint 
commissioning arrangements in the AOPs. However there were examples of 
preventive programmes in relation to ‘healthy weight’ initiatives 
commissioned across both boroughs. 
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A sound financial footing had made it possible to invest in health and well 
being and there were also jointly-funded health improvement initiatives 
across the boroughs and the PCT. Moreover, efficiency savings for 
substantial investment in health and well being had been identified for the 
subsequent four years, described as a ‘sizeable leap’ in investing beyond 
the health agenda into the well being agenda. As a pilot for the WCC 
assurance process the PCT had an early start in developing a systematic 
commissioning process. There was considered to be a strong and consistent 
commitment to health and well being at PCT Board level and strong clinical 
engagement in the development of strategic priorities. Addressing health 
inequalities was described as ‘centre stage’ with the Chair taking an active 
role in both of the health and well being partnerships. A public health-led 
model of commissioning was described, with the needs of the population as 
‘a driver with passion ‘ and reflected in the integration of strategic with 
public health roles. Performance management was not generally seen as the 
main driver for this work which was part of the PCT mission and ethos. 
However, some interviewees considered targets essential to shift the focus 
to health and well being. A stewardship role was seen as reflecting the 
needs of the population and also improving public involvement in 
commissioning. 
The JSNAs were seen as positive with both public and PBC support. There 
was extensive public involvement in their development with over 3000 
responses gained through a large consultative exercise, leaflet drop and 
media campaign, although, as for other sites, the timing of the introduction 
of the JSNAs did not allow for the effect on commissioning intentions to be 
evident in the first year. Documentary analysis demonstrated some 
differences between JSNAs, with one discussing commissioning for health 
needs to a greater extent making broad commissioning recommendations to 
address identified needs. Neither JSNA discussed the role of PBC in detail. 
Whilst both mentioned how the JSNA should broadly inform decision-
making, one considered this in more detail at a local level. The JSNAs were 
described as largely reflecting the direction of travel already underway. 
There were some issues over integration and sharing of health and local 
authority data. 
The DPH reports also identified commissioning objectives, including some 
areas where joint commissioning would occur. Both reports considered 
progress of existing services and the most recent report provided detailed 
information on partnership initiatives intended to improve health outcomes. 
These included getting people with long-term conditions back into work, 
health trainers and ‘fit for life’ campaigns. 
GPs in one of the boroughs were mainly on PMS contracts and on GMS 
contracts in the other. Four PBC consortia (two in each borough) were 
engaged in identifying strategic priorities and the PCT was widely viewed as 
supportive to PBC. The commissioning activities of the consortia were 
integrated with the PCT and governance systems were in place which held 
PBC consortia to account for delivering agreed priorities which were also 
linked with the LAAs. The alignment of PBC schemes with the PCT and LAA 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      166 
 Project 08/1716/208 
priorities had been achieved due to increased public health input into PBC 
consortia however there were no examples of health and wellbeing 
initiatives from PBC at the time of the interviews. As in most other sites, 
links between PBC and the development of the JSNA were not well 
developed although business plans developed through consortia had to 
relate to the JSNA. 
Public involvement was included as part of the PBC LES, which required 
patient groups in practices also to consider PBC consortia business; the PBC 
LESs also encouraged a more proactive approach to PBC. In considering 
PBC, the most recent DPH report considered their role, the need to 
integrate them into the public health agenda and the need for PBC to take 
the lead in new service developments to deliver improvements in priority 
areas. 
The compact with the voluntary sector in one of the boroughs had been 
updated to reflect procurement and tendering procedures. There was a 
directory of voluntary organisations highlighting areas where the VCS could 
contribute to strategic outcomes. The LINks were still being established and 
seemed largely modelled on the former PPIF. As in other sites, the VCS was 
keen to have stronger voice in decision-making. 
Priority-setting was under development as was the movement from ‘broker 
to commissioner’. It was considered difficult to identify preventative health 
spend as prevention could be included in many professional encounters. 
In second phase interviews additional funding had been directed towards 
LESs although it was envisaged that in the future changes in the contract 
would be needed and LESs reined back. A QOF plus scheme had also been 
implemented. 
Site five 
Site five was a deprived London inner-city borough with Spearhead status, 
co-terminous with the local authority and with a relatively small population 
of just over 200,000. Health was well below the average for England with 
high levels of obesity and of children living in poverty. Although much of the 
borough was amongst the most deprived areas in England, there were also 
extremes of wealth. Use of resources, quality of services and new national 
targets were all rated as good in 2006/7 but in 2008/9 quality of 
commissioning services was weak (related to waiting times in secondary 
care), while financial management was good and ‘providing services’ fully 
met. The PCT had moved into financial stability and was in the highest 
quartile of the 2009 WCC league tables. 
Leadership was consistently described as good or ‘inspirational’. The last 
three or four years had seen increased investment in partnership working 
and strategy development with the local authority and also with the VCS, 
partly spurred by new leadership, social commitment and encouraged by 
government policies. Commitment to partnership was evident throughout 
the organisation and reflected in an award-winning health and well being 
strategy developed in partnership with the local authority. There had been a 
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major shift in focus towards health and well being with a substantial 
investment in health improvement and tackling health inequalities, largely 
funded through growth monies. There was a particular emphasis on 
improving access and quality in primary care, gauging how primary care 
should be developed to meet the health needs of the PCT’s population. 
There was a well resourced and effective public health team, a joint DPH 
and good links with primary care. However, some of the difficulties inherent 
in joint posts were also discussed. Every provider team had a public health 
champion. The intention was further to integrate a public health perspective 
throughout the commissioning cycle. However the test would lie in the 
extent of implementation and the impact on outcomes and there was still 
need for more partnership working with the local authority on wider 
determinants of health. They were not pooling budgets but working with the 
LA as partners in commissioning within the healthy lifestyles agenda. 
An earlier detailed health needs assessment (2008) had largely been 
developed by the PCT rather than jointly. The latest JSNA had been 
developed with involvement from clinical leaders, PBC, PPIF members, the 
PEC, the local authority and the voluntary sector and was described as an 
important catalyst, highlighting areas without robust investment plans. As 
in other sites, there were differences in the ways that health needs 
assessment was understood across the local authority and the PCT and 
some debate about the extent to which the JSNA informed prioritisation 
processes in PBC. The CSP clarified areas which would be worked on in 
partnership as well as lead partners for each priority. The CSP also 
considered the role of PBC in care pathway development and service 
redesign. AAACM was included in the LAA with both the PCT and the LA as 
partners for delivery. The AOP (09/10) had additional information on areas 
which would be commissioned or provided in partnership. 
There were thirty six practices which were all engaged in a single 
commissioning consortium. The PBC executive consisted of eight elected 
GPs with representation from practice managers, practice nurses, allied 
health professionals, community nurses and patients. Executive Directors of 
the PCT attended meetings. The PBC executive fed into the PCT Board via 
the PEC (which also had wide membership) and was involved in the JSNA 
and in the commissioning process. The initial focus was on service redesign 
and a separate prioritisation process. An emphasis on collaboration across 
practices was reflected in PCT plans to develop federated networks which 
would aid cross-practice collaboration and sharing of skills, reflecting 
growing practice sub-specialisation. The networks would be aligned with the 
local partnerships and district nursing teams would also be aligned with the 
networks. 
Unusually, savings made through PBC were shared on a 50/50 basis, with 
50 per cent going to practices making the savings, 50 per cent pooled 
across practices for larger developments and nothing reverting to the PCT. 
Local public health initiatives were being developed through practice 
savings. However, the non-recurrent nature of FUR was considered an 
inevitable barrier to developing a longer-term approach to service 
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development and there was some debate over how far PBC and PCT 
commissioning priorities were aligned. 
PCT plans considered contractual levers, including improved contract 
management in primary care to deliver the strategy and improve health and 
reduce inequalities. The 09/10 AOP stated specific health 
promotion/prevention initiatives, such as smoking cessation, would be 
included in acute contracts. LESs appeared to be an important route for 
incentivising preventative care, and included a high risk CVD LES and 
diabetes LES both of which aimed to encourage GPs to identify those at risk, 
enter them on a register and manage their condition. 
Despite the use of large numbers of LESs to address health inequalities and 
health improvement, it was considered that only some had worked well and 
there was scepticism about their continued use. It was argued they should 
be more systematic and uniform, or focus on generic areas such as a 
consistent approach to motivating behaviour change as a common theme 
across areas such as self care and healthy lifestyles. They could also be 
developed to purchase a package of care across a network. Incentives were 
considered as only part of the picture and there were limits to achieving 
change through a purely contractual approach. Levers for change were 
considered inherent in commissioning plans and in targeted investment 
arising from them. 
The emphasis on partnerships and public involvement was also reflected in 
a locality focus with geographically-based local partnerships bringing 
together service providers, residents and councillors across populations of 
about 35,000 which fed into the sub-groups of a borough-wide partnership 
Board. Although slow to get established, the LINk had representation from 
residents, users of the VCS and VCS providers. There was also a LINk 
representative on the PCT board and an intention for them to get involved 
at each stage of the commissioning process. 
There was a large VCS, but no umbrella organisation at the time of the 
interviews. The VCS was widely used to identify local health needs, 
contribute to strategy development and to provide health improvement 
services such as smoking cessation, healthy lifestyle initiatives and health 
trainers. There was patient and public involvement in each of the major 
programme areas and in clinical service redesign. All practices had patient 
involvement groups. 
Programme budgeting was used to identify outliers in terms of spend and 
had been used to identify: spend per 100,000 weighted population for the 
PCT; the average spend per 100,000 weighted population for the PCT 
“cluster”; and the average spend per 100,000 weighted population for 
England. It appeared that spend on the healthy individuals category was 
higher than national and cluster averages. There was an intention to use 
PBMA in order to quantify the impact of commissioning changes with 
greater precision. However there was some scepticism expressed in the 
interviews over data quality. 
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Given the focus on health and well being, debates were largely focused on 
prioritisation across public health and primary care rather than across 
health and health care. However, as in other sites, the focus had been on 
growth money and not on methods for prioritising across total spend. 
Reductions due to changes in the allocation formula could also create 
difficulties. 
By second phase interviews joint working had improved, The LINk was 
involved in the JSNA and the GPs were informed (although not actively 
involved). PBC had become more locality-focused, with a more 
geographically balanced input across the borough. Each local area also had 
a network of practices – and there had been incentives to encourage GPs to 
work collaboratively in these networks. There was discussion over 
developing network contracts for areas of care, such as diabetes. Networks 
would also be co-terminous with the local authority localities and involve 
local authorities as well as other partners, although it was still unclear how 
this related to PBC structures or how the networks would fit into PBC 
commissioning strategy. However, interviewees saw potential for improved 
joint working at a local level on the health and well being agenda. 
Public health input into the networks and the localities had been 
strengthened through the appointment of Healthy Lifestyle Programme 
Managers, but PBC had not generally focused its attention on the health and 
well being agenda. The PEC had been restructured and had a wider 
membership. Public involvement continued to be taken seriously and health 
trainers, for example, had been recommissioned following public 
consultation. As in other sites, concern over the impact of financial 
stringency on the preventive agenda was more evident in the second phase 
interviews. 
Site six 
Site six was a Spearhead area, co-terminous with a metropolitan borough, 
with a population of around 300,000 and the result of the merger of four 
former PCTs. Health was generally worse than the average for England with 
marked health inequalities within the PCT area. The PCT was rated fair for 
use of resources, good for the quality of services and excellent for new 
national targets. In 2008/9 quality of commissioning services was good, 
financial management was fair and the category ‘providing services’ was 
almost met. It was located in the top quartile of the 2009 WCC league table. 
The PCT was in financial stability at the time of the interviews. 
PCT priorities were described as public health priorities with public health 
embedded throughout the commissioning process. There was strong public 
health leadership in the PCT and the public health team was described as 
involved in every aspect of the commissioning cycle. 
The DPH was a joint appointment across the PCT and the local authority and 
a member of the corporate management team at the local authority, but 
without line-management responsibilities. Strategy was orientated towards 
health and well being and PCT resource (funded through financial surplus) 
to the value of several millions was identified specifically for ‘health 
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turnaround’ projects mainly for preventive services. A number of these had 
been jointly commissioned with the VCS from the voluntary sector with 
details of projects available in the local delivery plan. The CSP also 
emphasised the importance of partnership working, identifying ‘spotlight’ 
initiatives which would be tackled by LSP subgroups. There had been funds 
for health inequalities programmes over the previous two years and funds 
had also been guaranteed for the following two years. 
The public health team had led on the JSNA which included community 
profiles for each of the communities in the PCT, with enhanced profiles for 
disadvantaged areas. The JSNA had encouraged data sharing and linked 
data sets across the PCT and local authority. 
There were no formal pooled budgets and joint commissioning had been 
slow to develop, but there was some joint commissioning with the local 
authority in health promotion in areas such as exercise on prescription and 
healthy school meals as well as joint posts in children’s services and mental 
health. There was also joint commissioning with the local Council for 
Voluntary Services for services delivered by through the voluntary sector. 
As in some other sites there was discussion about the parameters of the 
local role of the health protection agency and in this case, a health 
protection strategy had been produced for the city to identify gaps and 
inform engagement with the national health protection strategy. 
Strategic priorities were aligned with the LAA and the AAAAM indicator was 
included as part of the LAA. There was a performance management 
software tool shared with the local authority, used for joint monitoring of 
LAAs. 
There was one large PBC consortium covering the vast majority of practices 
and two much smaller consortia, but all practices in the PCT were involved. 
Membership of the main consortium was currently made up of GPs and PCT 
representatives, including public health, which provided practices with 
health profiles of their populations. There were agreed governance 
arrangements between the main consortium and the practices as well as 
between consortia and the PCT. 
There had been good progress at a corporate level in PBC over the previous 
year, described as genuine involvement, well integrated into the overall 
strategy and strategic priorities and with input into commissioning 
decisions, the annual contracting round with the acute sector and service 
redesign. A number of PBC business proposals had been implemented, 
including lifestyle initiatives. There was a willingness by practices to invest 
FUR in health and well being initiatives as long as effectiveness could be 
demonstrated: they were also contracted to address health inequalities. 
However, there appeared to be little involvement of PBC in developing the 
JSNA: governance tensions remained over PBC being both commissioners 
and providers and the extent to which PBC representatives represented 
individual practices or the consortia. There was little discussion in the CSP 
of PBC involvement in the health and well being agenda or of incentive 
schemes. The role of PBC was, however, considered in the DPH report: the 
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reduction of health inequalities was stated as a key principle of PBC 
commissioning plans and PBC care pathway work. Service redesign was also 
assessed for its potential to reduce health inequalities. 
LESs were considered the most effective means for providing additional 
preventative services in primary care and this was described as arranged 
under the umbrella of a generic health inequalities LES during the first 
phase interviews. 
Public involvement was encouraged through patient involvement on 
planning boards as well as through stakeholder events and community 
conferences where public health profiles of communities were shared and 
views sought over strategic priorities. There was also a policy of 
reimbursing members of the public for their involvement in PCT meetings. 
The PCT had also encouraged attendance through free transport for large 
public events hosted by the PCT demonstrating the benefits of lifestyle 
changes. However, involvement in strategic decision-making was described 
as relatively limited. 
The VCS had been involved in setting the LAA priorities and the borough 
strategy and there was a structured approach to representing VCS views 
and regular feedback from VCS participants at meetings. The VCS was 
widely used for providing health promotion services, especially to promote 
social inclusion. The LINk had only recently been established at the time of 
first phase interviews, but had set up a group to consider governance, a 
communications group and had held a public launch. There were no formal 
links with the LSP or with the development of the JSNA. It was considered 
by PCT interviewees as one but not the only route into public involvement. 
Proposals were assessed for value for money by a business development 
group. Programme budgeting was beginning to be used and was considered 
useful for reassessing relative investment across prevention, treatment and 
rehabilitation in relation to health gain. To date, public health priorities had 
largely been funded through growth money. 
The health scrutiny panel took an interest in the preventive agenda and was 
scrutinising policies to address health inequalities and diabetes care at the 
time of first phase interviews. Members of the health scrutiny panel also 
spent time going out to communities to discuss issues of concern and to 
promote public involvement. They also worked jointly with other scrutiny 
panels. 
In the second phase, there had been a number of shifts in the local 
authority which had adversely affected aspects of partnership working 
across the health and well being agenda. As in other sites, it was recognised 
that financial stringency posed a challenge but it was emphasised that this 
was a challenge for the organisation as a whole and not a ‘public health 
problem’. Everything would need to be funded through the main budget and 
separate monies for prevention would not be available. The JSNA was being 
developed along a life course model and also being used for forecasting. It 
was emphasised that commissioning needed to adopt a broader partnership 
perspective and not simply focus on the NHS. The three consortia had 
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reduced to two and the health inequalities LES had not been successful as it 
had turned out to be too complex to implement. As in other sites, there 
were attempts to rationalise the use of LESs. The LINk was still slow to 
develop and had little influence on decision-making at the time of the study. 
Site seven 
Site seven was an urban non-Spearhead PCT with a population of over half 
a million and the result of the merger of four previous PCTs. It was now co-
terminous with a City Council. Health had improved and was close to the 
English average although inequalities within the PCT persisted and a 
number of areas, including mental health, teenage pregnancy, alcohol 
misuse and physical inactivity remained worse than average. Healthcare 
Commission assessments were all weak in 2006/7 but there had been great 
improvements and the 2008/9 CQC ratings were good for quality of 
commissioning services and for financial management and ‘fully met’ for 
providing services (core standards). The PCT had successfully overcome a 
significant budget deficit and was located in the top quartile of the WCC 
league table in 2009. 
The organisation of the PCT reflected the commissioning cycle. Public health 
played an influential role and had developed innovative approaches to 
targeting disadvantaged communities through enhanced programmes. The 
DPH was a joint appointment with the Council and there was a commitment 
to partnership working as essential to addressing the broader determinants 
of health and well being. The Chief Executive was co-chair of the Health and 
Well Being Partnership and the DPH a member. However, as in other sites, 
shifting investment into public health was dependent on achieving financial 
balance, meeting national targets and then deploying efficiency savings 
from other parts of the health care system. 
The JSNA was built on a well-established history of health needs 
assessment and a key public health function. A joint DPH and JSNA report 
had been developed (2008) and an audit of its impact on commissioning 
decisions had been requested by the OSC. The DPH report discussed 
commissioning in detail and clear commissioning recommendations were 
made for both the PCT and PBC to address the health priorities in four 
disease areas, five lifestyle areas and seven population groups. Locality 
commissioning was also considered with enhanced public health 
programmes directed towards addressing health needs in the most 
disadvantaged areas. The 2009 DPH report built on that of the previous 
year with commissioning recommendations for each locality. Although the 
LAA targets were not discussed in detail these were included in the CSP. 
AAACM was included as a LAA priority. 
There had been a history of GP purchasing and PBC was described as 
making good progress with the emphasis largely on developing clinical 
pathways of care, rather than on developing business cases for new 
proposals. There were four consortia which included almost all practices, a 
confederation where the four consortia could come together, and a formally 
agreed PBC governance framework. The consortia also had named 
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pharmacy contacts, a named public health link and PCT non-executive 
directors were linked to the consortia. There were plans to include practice 
nurses but there was currently no structure for involving the public. PBC 
consortia were involved with the prioritisation process and there were also 
examples of the rapid spread of good practice across the consortia. 
LESs were generally considered an effective way of achieving results in 
general practice although some scepticism was expressed over their 
effectiveness, as well as over the use of individual incentives for behaviour 
change. 
Patient and public involvement was well developed in the PCT and there 
were examples of direct involvement in commissioning through assessing 
bids, for example. As well as the condition-specific planning and 
commissioning groups on which patients were involved, there was also an 
innovative patient advisory forum which had been established (with external 
support) to be representative of the population of the city. There was also a 
separate elders group, consulted by a range of organisations. Feedback on 
DPH reports was encouraged through the PCT website. There were a 
number of contracts with the VCS. 
The LINk had also made good progress and a governing board and 
membership had been established with membership focused on individuals 
rather than organisations. There was an advisory group which included PCTs 
and NHS Trusts. While there were close links with the OSC, there were few 
with PBC, the LSP or with the development of the JSNA. 
Prioritisation was carried out via a Board-approved process and, as in other 
sites, the importance of focusing on total spend was emphasised in order to 
get best value for money. Programme budgeting data was used for 
benchmarking and the financial plan summarised investment and 
disinvestment requirements for tackling priority areas. 
In second phase interviews it emerged that partnership with the local 
authority had made further progress, with the local authority setting up a 
new public health coordinating group and establishing a new health 
improvement post to work on a joint agenda. Further development was 
needed to connect up different sectors of the community including GPs, 
police and education. Greater rigour had been applied to the prioritisation 
process within the PCT and health economics modelling was now being 
carried out although it was recognised that there were no easy answers to 
the issues raised. It was considered too complex to identify preventative 
health spend and there was now little scope for new investment. PBC 
governance had been developed further with a clearer separation of 
commissioner and provider functions and some health and well being 
initiatives were also being developed through PBC. Consultation with the 
public had also been developed but the LINk was considered to have a 
‘diffused’ constituency and only one of a number of routes for engaging with 
the public. 
The JSNA would continue to be incorporated within the DPH report. It was 
emphasised that greater involvement of the VCS, the public and PBC was 
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required so that their areas of concern could be included. In the same way, 
better links were needed between practices and the multi-agency work 
being carried out in localities. A public health governance group was now 
meeting on an ad hoc basis only as it was recognised that public health was 
integral to the work of the entire organisation. 
Site eight 
Site eight was an urban Spearhead site and the result of a merger of two 
former PCTs, serving a population of over 350,000. It was not co-terminous 
with the City Council. Health was worse than the English average, especially 
in relation to life expectancy and infant mortality. Assessments by the 
Healthcare Commission in 2006/7 were positive with quality of services and 
the new national targets rated as excellent, while the use of resources was 
fair. In 2008/9, quality of commissioning services was assessed as fair, 
financial management was good and ‘providing services’ was fully met. This 
PCT was located in the top quartile of the WCC league table. 
There was a city-wide health and well being partnership but the DPH was 
not a joint appointment, although there were some joint roles. Public health 
was involved in commissioning health improvement services rather than 
being embedded throughout the commissioning cycle. Health and well being 
was given a high priority in the PCT with a particular emphasis on engaging 
with those already in the health care system through developing innovative 
and large scale approaches to the self management of long-term conditions. 
Engagement with local populations, linked with social marketing initiatives, 
was being informed through the development of detailed typologies building 
on geo-demographic tools, such as Mosaic. Partnerships with the local 
authority required further development and the lack of co-terminosity 
created some barriers. 
The JSNA was city-wide, largely based on previous assessments and there 
had been extensive consultation, including a citizen’s panel, and some 
engagement with LINks and the VCS. However, there had been little 
involvement of PBC and it was argued that more ownership by GPs of the 
JSNA was needed. While the JSNA did not make commissioning 
recommendations it did identify current services in place to address needs 
and appeared to have improved data sharing across agencies. A separate 
DPH report made commissioning recommendations and emphasised the 
importance of partnerships. It provided details on where services were 
being commissioned from, including services commissioned by the PCT; 
services jointly commissioned with other PCTs such as the stop smoking 
helpline; services commissioned through the local authority, such as an 
‘Exercise on Prescription’ service; and areas where the PCT was working in 
partnership with the local authority to commission services to tackle 
priorities. The DPH report also discussed commissioning for localities 
arguing that locality commissioning boards were integral to commissioning 
for health and well being. The subsequent JSNA, in 2009, also included 
locality profiles. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      175 
 Project 08/1716/208 
There were six PBC localities, each developing a three year locality 
commissioning development plan. These were described as working well 
with resources being targeted to health improvement. However there was 
little discussion of PBC in the CSP. 
The CSP discussed incentives including the use of LESs to encourage 
practitioners to engage with providing services. However, interviewees 
noted that the number of LESs was being reduced as it was argued that 
they had often been used for funding mainstream services: developing 
innovative approaches through new contracts and specifications was 
considered a more fruitful route. Individual incentives for behaviour change 
were limited to a health and well being programme for staff, although some 
other initiatives were currently being piloted. 
There were networks of third sector organisations and a third sector 
assembly established around LAA themes, with some involvement in the 
choice of targets. The compact was being revised at the time of first phase 
interviews. Strategic involvement in the commissioning process by the VCS 
was described as in need of development and it was argued by VCS 
interviewees that the PCTs and partnerships needed to become more aware 
of the knowledge held through the VCS, especially in relation to those in 
greatest need. 
Setting up the LINk had been a slow process with representativeness 
difficult to achieve. However at the time of the interviews there was a core 
board and membership which could be either individual or organisation-
based. At this point, there were no links with PBC but plans to engage with 
young people, considered a gap for the organisation. 
Prioritisation was carried out through a gateway process and proposals were 
assessed for return on investment and strategic fit. Decommissioning and 
service redesign were key to the PCT delivering its strategy. 
Second phase interviews demonstrated increased scepticism over the use of 
LESs, as they were often inadequately performance managed. It was 
considered important to develop different kinds of contracts but also not to 
depend entirely on contractual sources of motivation but to develop 
partnerships and greater ownership of the health and well being agenda. 
Influences on PCT commissioning were often derived from views of 
individual clinicians rather than collective views of the consortia. PEC clinical 
leads were appointed by the PCT with delegated authority rather than 
elected by PBC localities and this could lead to tensions. It was also argued 
that PCT functions related to primary care performance could be better 
integrated. 
Site nine 
Site nine was a non-Spearhead area and the result of the merger of two 
former PCTs, but was not co-terminous with the local authority. It served a 
population of just over 300,000. Health was generally better than the 
English average although there were marked health inequalities within the 
PCT area. The Healthcare Commission assessment was fair for both quality 
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of services and use of resources and ‘new national targets’ was rated weak, 
In 2008/9 quality of commissioning services was good, financial 
management was rated fair and ‘providing services’ (core standards) was 
fully met This PCT was located in the second quartile of the 2009 WCC 
league table. The PCT had moved to a more stable financial footing and 
health and well being had been funded primarily through growth money. 
The DPH was a joint appointment. Public health and addressing health 
inequalities were described as being central to the PCT strategy and to 
achieving the aims of WCC. Public health was involved throughout the 
commissioning process including contract monitoring. As in other sites the 
structure of the organisation was shifting to reflect WCC functions and 
different parts of the organisation were being brought together in matrix 
working aligned to pathway development. Although health and well being 
was integral to all eight work streams, with public health represented on 
each, it had been decided also to keep health and well being as a separate 
work stream. Innovative approaches had been developed in areas such as 
Chlamydia screening. 
The JSNA, largely council led, was an overarching document for the various 
PCTs falling within the County Council. It was described as a focal document 
which informed the agenda of both the PCT and the local authority. There 
had been a large consultation exercise through stakeholder events: the 
public was also involved in a strategic commissioning forum and in 
discussions over priority-setting. The steering group for the JSNA included a 
LINk representative. Documentary analysis showed that the DPH report 
made commissioning recommendations but neither the JSNA nor the DPH 
report considered PBC nor how the JSNA would influence commissioning in 
the local authority. There were no pooled budgets and joint work was 
described as needing development. 
GPs were equally divided between PMS and GMS contracts, reflecting 
previous funding for PMS targeted to under-doctored areas. As in other 
sites, it was considered that performance management of primary care 
needed to be improved. Progress in PBC was consistently described as good 
or excellent, partly due to clinical leadership, and there was also a focus on 
health inequalities. There were two PBC groups described as working closely 
with the PCT Board, including joint meetings. They were described as 
involved in WCC and PCT with PBC plans described as fully aligned. There 
were governance arrangements in place which addressed conflicts between 
commissioning and provision. Pooling arrangements were in place across 
the clusters to allow FUR to be used for larger schemes. Unusually, FUR 
were made recurrent to make it easier to run and evaluate pilot schemes 
and this was considered a highly effective incentive. A separate innovation 
fund was also available. Services which had demonstrated a shift from 
acute to community-based services, such as the relocation of clinical 
services, could be mainstreamed. As in some other sites, health and well 
being was described as an ‘earned agenda’, but there were examples of PBC 
commissioning health and well being projects. There was little discussion in 
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the CSP over how PBC would contribute to the health and well being 
agenda. 
There was a proactive approach towards LESs, seen as a successful way of 
securing changes in primary care. These were instigated through the public 
health team and included a focus on ‘hard to reach’ groups and addressing 
health inequalities. There were plans to move away from annual towards 
three year agreements. This PCT had developed the use of individual 
incentives to motivate changes in behaviour for services such as Chlamydia 
screening and dentistry, which had proved successful. Incentives for 
pregnant women to stop smoking had been less successful. 
Public involvement was encouraged through a public consultation event 
before each PCT Board meeting and there were also patient commissioning 
forums. 
The VCS was involved in providing services, such as mental health services, 
and there was a gradual shift in funding from grants to contracts. The LSP 
held an annual stakeholder event for the VCS to discuss what was important 
for the district and also to look at cross-cutting issues. Funding for the VCS 
to provide health and well being schemes was coordinated through the LSP, 
but it was argued that integrated governance around shared commissioning 
needed development. It was argued that the flexibility of the VCS should be 
better recognised along with the importance of supporting small, grassroots 
voluntary organisations with ‘local social capital’ rather than relying solely 
on national organisations. 
The LINk spanned two local authorities and was made up of a coordinating 
group and five locality groups which met monthly, mirroring PCT areas. It 
had held a number of road show launch events. There were also themed 
groups and plans to develop a Youth LINk. However, the LINk was still in 
the process of establishing itself and making links with PCTs. In common 
with other sites it was proving more difficult for the LINk to engage with 
social services. The LINk was still developing at the time of the interviews 
and was not seen as a main route for involving the public. 
The PCT had adopted a weighted approach to prioritisation but assessing 
value for money involved a complex set of skills, there was no single 
measure and prioritisation also needed to be carried out in partnership. 
In the second phase, public health and strategy had been merged into a 
joint directorate, with more of a public health economic perspective, partly 
triggered by the financial climate. There was closer working with the local 
authority in relation to integrated services, prevention of duplication, 
developing joined up pathways and governance issues arising out of new 
developments such as personalised care. The local authority was 
represented on the strategic commissioning group and a joint QIPP event 
had been held to see how the PCT and the LA could work together. 
Accountability for delivering health and well being services was increasingly 
emphasised. 
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Methods for prioritisation were being developed through assessing ‘cost per 
annum’ benefits for patients. Programme budgeting was also being used to 
see where it might be possible to disinvest. It was argued that contractual 
levers in primary care needed to be better understood and used more 
effectively: health and well being services should be included as part of the 
contact and not separately incentivised. 
Site ten 
Site ten was created from a large number of former PCTs with different 
levels of resource and performance and the transition into a single 
organisation had been complex. It related to a two-tier authority. 
Reorganisation had resulted in a PCT with the largest population of the case 
study sites and a greater than average population of older people. It was a 
non-Spearhead area with better health than average for England. Access to 
services and concerns over a postcode lottery in service provision were 
predominant concerns, with problems accentuated by the rationalisation of 
services and associated transport problems. The Healthcare Commission 
assessments showed that use of resources and quality of services was weak 
while new national targets were rated good. In 2008/9, quality of 
commissioning was good, financial management fair and providing services 
partly met. This PCT was located in the last quartile of the 2009 WCC league 
table. 
The DPH was a joint appointment with the County Council and there was 
synergy across both organisations in relation to the public health agenda, 
reflected in a joint public health report (2007/8) which also made 
commissioning recommendations. There was a good working relationship 
with the local authority, a strategic plan developed jointly with the County 
Council with wide consultation, jointly funded posts, joint health and social 
care teams and co-location of many PCT officers with the county council. 
However, joint commissioning and partnerships governance needed 
development and were currently described as parallel governance rather 
than integrated governance. An event had been held across agencies on 
governance between organisations. 
The strategic direction for health and well being was described as driven by 
the public health team. There was concern over disparities in health status 
across the county and attention was being directed to targeting services. 
The DPH report focused on equity of service provision with benchmarking 
and programme budgeting information being used. It also discussed PBC, 
recommending that Public Health Intelligence Teams developed health 
profiles for practices to allow them to address local health needs. Locality-
based commissioning is also considered and again the role of a Public 
Health Intelligence Team is highlighted in exploring issues in more depth 
and profiling local information to inform commissioning teams, the PCT and 
partner organisations. The PCT’s financial commitment to improving health 
is described in the CSP and AOP and included: a shift of resources to 
improving health over the next 5 years; 0.25% of the PCT’s baseline (for 
08/09) being set aside for investment in health inequalities and public 
health (in addition to the 0.25% invested in 07/08). This investment 
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appeared partially reliant on growth however. Due to unexpected additional 
resource demands the PCT had been in financial deficit which had led to a 
lack of alignment between commissioning intentions and financial strategy. 
The JSNA was locality-based, bringing together a wide range of information 
around local communities with a number of area profiles supported by 
smaller locality profiles. It was informed by widespread canvassing of views 
and feedback from local communities, the VCS and PBC and tied into 
locality commissioning arrangements with PBC. It had demonstrated 
variation across a wide range of sectors ranging from education to the 
availability of, and access to health services. This had resulted in some 
priority communities being identified in order better to target resources. 
Traditional health needs assessments were also being carried out in parallel 
with the JSNA. LAA targets were aligned as far as was possible with AOP 
targets. 
The CSP was a joint strategy developed in partnership with the council. The 
CSP acknowledged the importance of partnership working and the future 
directions of joint plans were stated. All eleven areas of care incorporated 
health and well being which also formed a separate area of care. Both the 
CSP and AOP considered PBC and the AOP identified areas where the PBC 
would be specifically involved in working towards PCT priorities in reducing 
deaths from major diseases: heart disease; cancer; and stroke. PCT and 
LAA priorities were aligned, however different timelines had made it difficult 
to align LAA indicators and Vital Signs. AAACM was included in the LAA with 
the PCT and the local NHS Trust signed up as partners. In the AOP for 
09/10 a single metrics set with the local council had been developed to aid 
alignment of performance management systems across the NHS, county 
council and LAA. 
PBC had progressed slowly given a degree of cynicism over the process as 
there had been insufficient PCT funds to allow practices to reinvest savings. 
This meant that practices had lost interest in the scheme. However, all 
practices were involved in one of the ten PBC consortia (subsequently 
reduced to six, almost replicating the previous Primary Care Groups) some 
of which had their own patient panels. Consortia chairs were involved in 
strategic development with the PCT and there was public health 
involvement in the consortia with senior public health staff working at 
locality level. There was a view that the move to PCTs had meant that 
successful multi-disciplinary locality-based commissioning had been lost 
despite a professed aim of keeping a locality focus. Governance issues in 
PBC were considered difficult to resolve and there was some frustration over 
the imposition of central over local priorities. However, GPs had formed a 
social enterprise as providers with separate contracts with the PCT. 
There was a county-wide consortium of VCS organisations with a set of 
protocols which ensured that there was feedback to the VCS after 
representatives attended meetings. The VCS had also been commissioned 
by the PCT to provide support across PBC clusters for complex care cases, 
befriending and supporting patients. The PCT contracted for services from 
the VCS mainly for drugs and alcohol services: the AOP indicated that the 
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role of the VCS in providing services would increase and that the PCT was 
also considering the role of ‘healthy hospitals’ and networked health advice. 
There were well developed methods for public consultation and involvement 
was described as particularly good for children’s services. Board meetings 
were held in public in different parts of the county and prefaced with a 
presentation on the local area. The PCT fed back information to those who 
attended the various listening events. 
The LINk had been slow to get established and the transition from the 
former patient and public involvement forums had not proved 
straightforward. It was anticipated that the LINk Chair would attend the 
board. Representativeness was an issue; however the LINk was working 
with local VCS organisations. 
A percentage of growth money had been ring fenced for public health 
priorities and ethical frameworks for decision-making had been developed. 
However more demanding targets in relation to access to acute care had 
resulted in less resources being available for preventive services. 
As in other sites, in the second phase of interviews there was an emphasis 
on the impact of financial stringency and on demonstrating return on 
investment. Financial stringency made the case for investing in prevention – 
for both the short and the longer term – more pressing. There were also 
plans to develop a joint PCT/local authority strategy for public involvement. 
Pooled budgets were seen as an important way forward and a more 
effective way of pushing money upstream. Service redesign was the main 
focus of PBC with localities grouped around different secondary care 
providers to provide a critical mass for commissioning clinical services. 
However, their engagement with the WCC assurance process was minimal. 
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Appendix 4 Standards, targets and 
performance management 
This appendix provides descriptive background for Chapter 5, summarising 
standards, targets and performance management systems with particular 
reference to health and well being. This is intended to identify the wide 
range of relevant standards and targets, the degree of alignment across 
them and changes over the period of the study. 
4.1 Standards 
Standards for health and well being are included as part of the following: 
National Service Frameworks (NSFs) (which followed the publication in 1997 
of The New NHS, modern, dependable);1 separate national topic–based 
strategies; and specific standards (assessed annually, at the time of writing, 
through the Annual Health Check). NICE public health guidance informs 
implementation of the NSFs and a number of the core standards. It also 
provides the framework for evidence-based interventions through its public 
health guidance which can also inform implementation strategies of local 
partnerships. 
The following main areas are summarised below: NICE guidance; NSFs and 
national topic-based strategies; standards for better health; and world class 
commissioning. While WCC does not incorporate standards, information on 
performance against targets is made available to WCC panels. 
4.1.1 NICE guidance 
The Centre for Public Health Excellence at NICE develops guidance on 
health and well being aimed at helping health professionals, NHS 
organisations and others achieve improvements in areas set out in the 2004 
White Paper ‘Choosing Health: making healthy choices easier’2 namely: 
smoking and tobacco control; obesity; diet and nutrition; exercise and 
physical activity; alcohol; sexual health; and mental health. NICE offers two 
types of guidance on public health: public health intervention guidance and 
public health programme guidance. The former offers recommendations on 
activities promoting a healthy lifestyle or activities to reduce the risk of a 
specific disease or condition. The latter takes a broader approach through, 
for example, targeting specific populations, topics or areas. The guidance 
set by NICE gives clear standards and recommendations, based on the 
evidence and cost-effectiveness of interventions. To help ensure NICE public 
health guidance is implemented and accepted by publicly accountable 
bodies, the guidance is incorporated into national NHS standards. It is also 
related to meeting core standards C22 and C23 of the Annual Health Check 
(see below). 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      182 
 Project 08/1716/208 
4.1.2 NSFs and national strategies 
NSFs were launched in 1998 as part of a rolling programme to support 
improvements in service quality through providing long-term strategies for 
improving care. The NSFs/national strategies set national standards, 
identify key interventions and a time span for implementation. They are 
continuously updated with progress reports at variable intervals. NSFs 
include those for mental health;3 coronary heart disease;4 older people;5 
diabetes;6 renal services;7 children, young people and maternity services;8 
long-term conditions;9 and long-term neurological conditions.10 The NSFs 
emphasise prevention. For example, standard one of the NSF for mental 
health refers to promoting health and combating discrimination. The Health 
care Commission monitored and reviewed the implementation of standards 
set in NSFs, and carried out a series of improvement reviews on specific 
topics. 
The government has also set standards and provided guidance (which 
includes prevention) through a number of national strategies including the 
following: obesity;11 sexual health;12 alcohol misuse;13 substance misuse;14 
tobacco;15 teenage pregnancy;16 stroke;17 and cancer.18 Topic-based 
strategies also inform NSFs. 
4.1.3 Standards for better health 
Guidance on standards for better health19 implemented from April 2005, 
sets standards which the NHS is expected to meet. It originally set core and 
developmental standards for seven domains, the seventh of which is public 
health. The standards form a common set of requirements to ensure health 
services are safe and of acceptable quality and are also seen as a resource 
by which service providers can measure and improve performance year on 
year. Core standards set out the minimum level of service patients and 
users should expect. Developmental standards provided a framework for 
NHS bodies to plan the delivery of services that continued to improve in line 
with patient expectations. Until April 2009, the Healthcare Commission was 
responsible for regulating and monitoring the achievement of standards by 
PCTs through achievement of elements in the Annual Health Check. 
In 2006, The Healthcare Commission resumed all responsibilities and 
functions from The Mental Health Act Commission and, in 2009, the 
Commission for Social Care Inspection (CSCI) merged with the Healthcare 
Commission to become the Care Quality Commission (CQC). Core standards 
relating to public health are: C22, C23 and C24 and the developmental 
standard was D13 (assessed for 2006/7 only). In the domain of 
governance, the Annual Health Check measures governance arrangements 
against those set out in PCTs’ corporate governance framework but does 
not acknowledge the often complex nature of governance arrangements in 
commissioning for health and well being, where there are numerous 
organisations involved. A new assessment procedure was implemented in 
April 2010 by the CQC. 
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The Healthcare Commission and the Audit Commission20 (p.51) describe the 
state of play: in 2007/8: 94 per cent of all health care organisations 
declared themselves compliant with public health core standards that 
applied. However for the 2006/7 assessment of the developmental 
standard, the largest group (55 per cent) showed fair progress. 
Performance against key public health targets was also patchy with 27 per 
cent of PCTs achieving two targets or fewer and a worse performance than 
in the previous year. Table 1 identifies the core and developmental 
standards in the domain of public health. 
Table 1. Core and developmental standards for the public health domain 
Aim: Programmes and services are designed and delivered in 
collaboration with all the relevant organisations and 
communities to promote, protect and improve the health of the 
population served and reduce health inequalities between 
different population groups and areas. 
Core standards: 
• C22 Health care organisations promote, protect and 
demonstrably improve the health of the community served, 
and narrow health inequalities by 
a) co-operating with each other and with Local Authorities and 
other organisations; 
b) ensuring that the local Director of Public Health's Annual 
Report informs their policies and practices; and 
c) making an appropriate and effective contribution to local 
partnership arrangements including Local Strategic 
Partnerships and Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships. 
• C23 Health care organisations have systematic and managed 
disease prevention and health promotion programmes which 
meet the requirements of the National Service Frameworks 
and national plans with particular regard to reducing obesity 
through action on nutrition and exercise, smoking, substance 
misuse and sexually transmitted infections. 
• C24 Health care organisations protect the public by having a 
planned, prepared and, where possible, practised response to 
incidents and emergency situations which could affect the 
provision of normal services. 
Developmental standard: 2006/7 (no longer monitored) 
D13 Health care organisations 
a) identify and act upon significant public health problems and 
health inequality issues, with Primary Care Trusts taking the 
leading role; 
b) implement effective programmes to improve health and 
reduce health inequalities; 
c) protect their populations from identified current and new 
hazards to health; and 
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d) take fully into account current and emerging policies and 
knowledge on public health issues in the development of public 
health programmes, health promotion and prevention services 
for the public, and the commissioning and provision of services. 
The Health Check for 08/09 included PSAs set as part of the 2007 
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) (see below), as well as older targets 
set as part of the 2004 CSR where targets were outstanding until 2010. 
4.1.4 World Class Commissioning 
Following the introduction of WCC in 2007 and implementation of the first 
round of the commissioning assurance process21 PCTs are assessed against 
3 areas: governance; outcomes; and competencies. 
(1) Governance: refers to ‘board grip’ and whether the board has taken 
ownership of, and developed, a meaningful five year strategy, supported by 
a robust financial plan. 
(2) Outcomes: ten outcomes are assessed. Two of the outcomes (life 
expectancy and health inequalities) will be measured for all PCTs with a 
further eight outcomes determined locally from a predetermined list of 63 
outcomes with clear outcome metrics. Data used to quantify the outcomes 
will align with the ‘Vital Signs’ indicator set. Additional local targets can also 
be chosen. 
(3) Competencies: these reflect the eleven WCC competencies. 
Although the overall aim of the commissioning process is to improve health 
outcomes, the following list illustrates how competencies one to six are 
related to health and well being at the highest levels of assessment (level 
4). These are examples and the full list of indicators can be found in the 
Commissioning Assurance Handbook.21 
Competency 1: Reputation as ‘local leader ‘of the NHS: ‘the PCT actively 
participates in and leads the local health agenda’. 
Competency 2: Work with community partners: ‘there is clear clinical and 
PBC leadership in the Local Area Agreement’; ‘multiple partnerships are in 
place across a broad range of settings to support the health and well being 
agenda’. 
Competency 3: Engage with patients and the public: ‘key stakeholders 
strongly agree that the PCT has proactively shaped the health opinions and 
aspirations of the local population’; ‘proactive engagement …is embedded in 
all commissioning processes’. 
Competency 4: Collaborate with clinicians. 
Competency 5: Manage knowledge and assess needs: ‘the PCT has 
proactive population risk stratification to identify populations at risk and to 
intervene at the earliest possible point’; ‘the PCT has a view of unmet needs 
for disadvantaged sub-groups’; ‘the PCT has developed plans to match the 
top performers on each benchmark’. 
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Competency 6: Prioritise investment: ‘predictive modelling to support its 
ability to target required intervention with precision’; ‘understands the 
return on investment of past interventions’; ‘mature programme budgets for 
all key priority care pathways/disease groups’; ‘the PCT invests for longer 
term health gain and can quantify impact’. 
Competency 7: Stimulate the market. 
Competency 8: Promote improvement and innovation. 
Competency 9: Secure procurement skills. 
Competency 10: Manage the local health system and working in 
partnerships with providers. 
Competency 11: Sound financial investments (originally assessed within the 
governance domain). 
However, performance is assessed in relation to competencies and health 
outcomes. This is likely to determine the degree of commissioning 
autonomy accorded. The assurance system is intended to form an ongoing 
regulation of commissioning capabilities and enables good practice to be 
identified through benchmarking across commissioning organisations. 
Connections were being made across WCC and other formal regulatory 
processes, in particular across the Audit Commission and WCC assessments 
of ‘Use of Resources’ and, more generally, across Comprehensive Area 
Assessments (CAAs), the CQC and the WCC assurance process. However 
problems, such as different assessment timetables, remained. 
4.2 Targets 
Over the period of the project changes in targets and performance 
management regimes were implemented with the aim of streamlining a 
profusion of targets, achieving a better alignment of performance 
management regimes and providing an element of local flexibility in the 
choice of targets. This section discusses targets, which derive from Public 
Service Agreements (PSAs), as set out in the 2007 CSR,22 jointly agreed 
targets which are reflected in LAAs and DH targets as reflected in the 
Annual Operating Framework for the NHS. These are discussed in turn. 
4.2.1 Public Service Agreements 
PSAs are the overarching performance management regime for government, 
reflecting key cross-departmental priorities and providing a way of holding 
public services to account. They are produced as part of a rolling 
programme with a review every three years: the Healthcare Commission 
and Audit Commission provide a summary20 of health-related PSA targets 
from 1998-2007. After starting out with 600 targets, PSAs have been 
streamlined over time. A new round of 30 PSAs, supported by outcome 
focused indicators, emerged as part of the 2007 CSR for 2008/9 – 2010/11, 
setting out the government’s priority outcomes. PSA Floor Targets, linked to 
the Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy, were superseded as were Local PSAs 
with their associated stretch targets and reward elements (although there 
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was some overlap adding to the performance management burden locally). 
In their place were local targets drawn from the new National Indicator Set 
(NIS) and monitored through the CAA, which replaced the Comprehensive 
Performance Review from April 2009. 
PSAs are underpinned by a single delivery agreement shared by contributing 
departments and progress is measured through a number of performance 
indicators. PSAs 12, 18 and 19 are of particular relevance to health and well 
being and are reproduced below (Table 2) although all PSAs have some 
impact. 
The national inequalities target has formed part of the PSA for 2002, 2004 
and 2007. From 2003, one single target, which combined elements of 
previous targets, was produced: ‘By 2010 reduce inequalities in health 
outcomes by 10 per cent as measured by infant mortality and life 
expectancy at birth’. For Spearhead areas (that is, the fifth of local authority 
areas with the worst health and deprivation) the target included reducing by 
at least 10 per cent the gap in life expectancy at birth and the population as 
a whole. As part of the 2007 CSR, the existing health inequalities target 
formed part of PSA Delivery Agreement 18: Promote Better Health and 
Well-being for All. All Age All Cause Mortality (AAACM) is used as a proxy 
measure for the life expectancy element of the target, although the 2010 
national inequalities target, with its emphasis on narrowing the gap, also 
remains in force. AAACM is also reflected in the NHS Operating Framework 
(see Vital Signs, below) and as part of the NIS (see below) as indicator 
N120 in the Adult Health and Well Being block. Reducing health inequalities 
and increasing life expectancy are mandatory outcomes for all PCTs as part 
of the WCC commissioning system described above, while the remaining 
eight health outcomes can be chosen by PCTs from a list of options or they 
may choose local public health targets outside this list, according to local 
circumstances. There is clear alignment, therefore, across the different 
systems. 
The Institute for Government 23 notes that only one quarter of the PSA 
indicators have national targets or minimum standards attached, a 
‘significant reduction’ implying that PSAs are no longer synonymous with 
target-driven approaches. The same applies to the latest round of LAAs. 
Encouraging partnerships is built into the structure of LAAs and PSAs and 
reflected in the assessment procedures. 
Table 2 sets out selected PSA targets set out as part of the 2007 CSR. 
Table 2. PSAs, their indicators and associated national targets set as part 
of the 2007 CSR 
PSA 12 ‘Improving the health and well being of children and young 
people’. 
Indicators: 
• Prevalence of breastfeeding at 6 – 8 weeks 
• Percentage of pupils who have school lunches 
• Levels of childhood obesity with the associated national target of 
‘reducing the proportion of overweight and obese children to 2000 
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levels by 2020 in the context of tackling obesity across the 
population’ 
• Emotional health and well being and child and adolescent mental 
health services (CAMHS) 
• Parents’ experience of services for disabled children and the ‘core 
offer’ 
PSA 18 ‘Promote better health and well-being for all’ [23] 
Indicators: 
• All-age all-cause mortality (AAACM) rate with associated national 
target of ‘By 2010, increase the average life expectancy at birth in 
England to 78.6 years for men and to 82.5 years for women 
monitored using mortality rates as a proxy’ 
• Difference in all-age all-cause mortality (AAACM) rate between 
England average and Spearhead areas with associated national 
target of ‘Reducing health inequalities by 10% by 2010 as 
measured by life expectancy at birth’ 
• Smoking prevalence with associated national target of ‘reducing 
adult (16 +) smoking rates to 21% or less by 2010, with a 
reduction in prevalence among routine and manual groups to 26% 
or less’ 
• Proportion of people supported to live independently (all ages); 
Access to psychological therapies. 
PSA 19 ‘To ensure better care for all’ 
Indicators: 
• The self reported experience of patients/users; 
• NHS-reported referral- to-treatment times for admitted patients; 
• NHS-reported referral-to-treatment times for non-admitted 
patients with the associated national target of ‘Ensuring that, by 
December 2008, no one waits more than 18 weeks from GP 
referral to the start of hospital treatment or other clinically 
appropriate outcome’. 
• The percentage of women who have seen a midwife or a maternity 
health care professional, for health and social care assessment of 
needs, risks and choices by 12 completed weeks of pregnancy 
• Long-term conditions 
• GP services 
• Health care Associated Infection Rates - MRSA with associated 
national target of ‘For MRSA the average annual number of MRSA 
bacteraemias for the period 2008-9 to 2010-11 should be less than 
half the 2003-4 figure’ 
• Healthcare Associated Infection Rated- Clostridium Difficile with 
associated national target of ‘for Clostridium difficile to deliver a 30 
per cent reduction in the number of cases reported in 20101-11 
compared to an agreed baseline in 2007-08’ 
4.2.2 Local area agreements and the National Indicator Set 
LAAs and the JSNAs which inform their development, are a key route for 
PCTs and local authorities jointly to address the health and well being of 
their local populations. Developed through LSPs, the priorities and targets 
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within each LAA form the three year delivery plan of the Sustainable 
Community Strategy. Introduced in pilot form they were rolled out on a 
statutory basis in 2008 following the Local Government and Public 
Involvement in Health Act of 2007. 
The 2007 CSR also announced the new NIS for local authorities and local 
authority partnerships. From 2008, the NIS (comprising a set of 198 
indicators) has been used to monitor the performance of local authorities 
and partnerships. The indicator set represents a streamlining of the 
previous indicator set of 1200 separate targets. It measures national 
priority outcomes identified through the CSR which are to be delivered 
through local partnerships. LAAs are the delivery mechanism for these 
targets and are rewarded through an area based grant giving local councils 
more control over how to distribute the funding. There is a degree of 
overlap with existing reward systems. 
Of the 198 indicators, around 40 relate to health, derived from outcomes 
expressed in PSAs applicable to health and well being (shown in Table 2). 
Thirty-one of these indicators fall under the categories of ‘Adult Health and 
Wellbeing’ and ‘Tackling Exclusion and Promoting Equality’ and of the 68 
indicators under ‘Children and Young People’ only 9 indicators fall in the 
domain of ‘being healthy’. Although non-health targets in other areas will 
impact on health, it could be argued that health and well being indicators 
are under-represented. 
While all targets are monitored, 35 locally appropriate targets from the NIS 
(in addition to the 16 statutory targets for education and early years) are 
chosen as improvement targets within each LAA through negotiation with 
Government Office. Some areas may choose to supplement the 35 targets 
with further local targets in line with the findings of local JSNAs and to help 
implement the Sustainable Community Strategy, but these are not reported 
to, or performance managed by central government. The focus on LAAs 
underlines the importance of joint setting and delivery of targets and of 
partnership working to deliver better outcomes in both health and social 
care. 
4.2.3 Department of Health targets 
Targets for 2005-8 were set out as part of National Standards Local Action24 
but were replaced by ‘Vital Signs’25 from April 2008. However, commitments 
prior to Vital Signs were also to be met and were included in the 
assessments of regulators. Vital Signs involves a three tier approach with 
the aim of allowing local services to be delivered in a way to meet local 
needs. The three tiers include five national priorities which apply to all PCTs 
where targets are set and performance managed nationally through SHAs 
and DH (Tier one); 17 national priorities for local delivery (of which 12 are 
reflected in the NIS and can be included within LAAs), where targets are 
locally agreed and signed off by SHAs (Tier two) and where there is a risk- 
based approach to performance management; and optional local priorities 
chosen from a list of 34 Vital Signs (Tier three) where agreements are 
between PCTs and SHAs without involvement of DH. 
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All PCTs are expected to meet national priorities and set delivery plans, 
signed off by their SHA. For 2008/09, five national priorities were set: 
cleanliness and health care-associated infections; improving access; 
keeping adults and children well, improving their health and reducing health 
inequalities; experience, satisfaction and engagement; emergency 
preparedness. Keeping adults and children well, improving their health and 
reducing health inequalities focuses on achievement in four areas; cancer, 
stroke, children and maternity services. Specific targets have not been set 
in the framework but will instead rely on PCTs achieving PSAs and targets 
already set in NSFs and specific strategies such as The Cancer Reform 
Strategy and the National Stroke Strategy. Financial penalties apply to 
failing to meet certain priorities such as 18 week referral to treatment 
target. 
When deciding local priorities (Tier three) PCTs should be able to assure 
their SHAs of the following. 
• Relevant local priorities for health, recognised in JSNA directly inform 
the indicators they choose to recommend from the NIS. 
• They are giving clear priority to those areas where they are most 
challenged. 
• Their operational plan clearly sets out the proposed contribution they 
intend to make to their LAA. 
However, there is still an expectation that even if a plan for improved 
performance is not chosen, performance against that indicator will not 
deteriorate. The operating framework for 2009/1026 keeps the same 
priorities and tackling health inequalities is described as remaining at the 
centre of service delivery. In considering how the 2009/10 framework builds 
on the priority ‘Keeping adults and children well, improving their health and 
reducing health inequalities’, it outlines partnership working and 
commissioning according to local need as key, considers the four key areas 
of cancer, stroke, maternity and children and sets a more ambitious revised 
AAAC mortality rate for Spearhead areas to reduce inequalities. 
Implementation of regional ten year strategies and High Quality Care for 
All27 also influences priorities and development. A framework for improving 
the safety, effectiveness and quality of care is reflected, for example, in the 
new requirement for health care providers to produce annual ‘quality 
accounts’. 
The changes are designed to streamline targets and make them more 
locally responsive. In the operating plan for the 2008/09 it is stated that: 
Throughout this CSR period, I would expect that we will be able to shift even more autonomy 
over local target setting towards PCTs. The work on how we measure all these vital signs and 
how they are regulated is still ongoing, but the underlying principles of greater local autonomy 
and rewarding ambition will remain constant. (p.3) 
However, the relationship between PSAs the NIS, Departmental Strategic 
Objectives (DSOs) and Vital Signs is complex leading to various mapping 
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exercises. For example, the Institute for Government 23 has mapped PSAs, 
the NIS and DSOs 
(Available at: 
http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/content/26/mapping-the-
national-indicators-onto-relevant-psas-and-dsos) 
and the DH has described28 the links across Vital Signs, the three DSOs, the 
NIS and the PSAs for DH, as set out in the 2007 CSR. Thirty-one of the 
Department’s 44 DSO indicators are best delivered through co-operation 
between Local Government and the NHS. Hence these indicators are within 
both the NIS and the Vital Signs. 
Despite intentions to streamline targets a large number remain, some of 
which overlap. For example, while the NIS was introduced with the aim of 
streamlining performance management at a local level, it is argued that the 
new indicators are simply being added to existing measures thus increasing 
the burden on the system.23 While targets interrelate, the existence of 
different layers, separate streams of indicators performance managed 
through local government and the NHS and the numbers of targets involved 
creates a risk that a focus on overarching cross-cutting targets becomes 
displaced by a focus on detailed organisation-specific targets. Moreover, it 
has been argued that managers are more likely to concentrate effort on the 
areas over which they have greatest control29 which works against 
addressing so called ‘wicked issues’ such as inequalities, which are long-
term problems which can only be tackled through cross-sector engagement 
and innovation. 
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Appendix 5 An assessment of prioritisation 
tools 
5.1 Background 
In considering prioritisation tools relevant for commissioners, a number of 
questions need to be considered: 
• Which prioritisation tools are most relevant for meeting 
commissioning competencies and strategic aims? 
• To what extent do prioritisation tools enable commissioners to meet 
the specific demands of WCC competencies six and eleven? 
• To what extent do prioritisation tools facilitate longer term 
strategies for investment and disinvestment or decisions over total 
spend? 
• What resources, skills and capacity are required to utilise the tools? 
This appendix begins by summarising prioritisation tools (Table 1) and then 
lists criteria which arise out of the demands of competency six. A 
preliminary assessment of the extent to which these criteria apply to each 
of the prioritisation tools identified is then summarised (Table 2). It should 
be emphasised that this is a scoping exercise and the list is not intended to 
be exhaustive. However Table 2 demonstrates the range of tools available, 
and begins to assess the relevance of these tools for specific commissioning 
tasks, including longer term investment strategies. A detailed account of 
each of the prioritisation tools is included in a separate economics report 
(JM, AM, HW) carried out as part of the project. 
Table 1. Overview of prioritisation tools 
Programme Budgeting Marginal Analysis (PBMA) 
• Programme Budgeting Marginal Analysis (PBMA) involves 
two component parts, Programme Budgeting (PB) and 
Marginal Analysis (MA) (described separately below). 
PBMA is used as a pragmatic, priority-setting aid to 
identify how resources are being spent prior to exploring 
potential changes in service provision at the margin, to 
maximise benefit and minimise cost. 
• Programme Budgeting involves identifying (i) the total 
resources/funds available and (ii) the services these funds 
are currently being spent on in order to track future 
expenditure in each programme area to meet agreed 
programme objectives. 
• Marginal Analysis focuses on making choices across 
interventions/programmes at the margins. It is used to 
examine the benefit gained from an additional unit of 
resources or benefit lost from having one unit less. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      194 
 Project 08/1716/208 
• Quadrant Analysis can be used to compare PB data, that is 
health outcome and expenditure data on a single cost-
effectiveness type plane (higher/lower spend, 
higher/lower outcome) for all programme budgeting 
categories. YHPHO have recently developed a tool called 
spend and outcome tool (SPOT). It can be used to identify 
outlier programmes, i.e. programmes with health 
outcomes and/or expenditure that are substantially 
different from the average. 
Tools to elicit choices for investment 
• Conjoint analysis and discrete choice experiments are 
survey-based methods used to elicit the trade-offs that 
individuals are willing to make between different 
characteristics of treatments and services, to estimate the 
relative importance of different characteristics, to estimate 
whether a characteristic or attribute is important and to 
predict the demand for a given good or service with given 
characteristics. 
• Paired comparison analysis is a tool for ranking or 
prioritising options based on preference elicitation. A 
series of paired choices are made e.g. programme A vs. 
programme B, programme B vs. programme C etc. 
Preferences for the paired comparisons are elicited from 
stakeholders, and the options are ordered from ‘most 
often preferred’ to ‘least often preferred’. 
• Multi-attribute problem analysis / Multi-criteria decision 
analysis provide a method to value and trade-off the 
characteristics for various programmes under comparison 
to establish the dominant programme. 
• Population cost-impact approach is used to present the 
benefits and costs to a particular population of moving 
from current to best practice. It involves three key steps, 
that is (i) determining the number of events potentially 
preventable over a set time, (ii) for the relevant 
intervention(s), calculating costs to derive cost per event 
prevented and (iii) obtaining decision-makers’ preferences 
for one population impact measure over another based on 
(a) a ranking procedure or (b) a valuation exercise. The 
decision-maker is asked to choose between alternative 
interventions for the highest ranked items. 
• Scoring systems e.g. the modified Portsmouth scorecard is 
used alongside Delphi Consensus methods to understand 
the relative priorities of various, predefined options in the 
group. Using the scorecard, each option is scored (i.e. one 
score for each characteristic) and the total scores for each 
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option calculated. The results are presented back to the 
group and any updates made based on stakeholder 
feedback. Discussions and agreements are made as to the 
priorities ahead. 
• NHS West Midlands tool: NHS West Midlands is in the 
process of introducing mandatory local tariffs for a 
selection of lifestyle risk management services across 
West Midlands. Three services were selected for tariff 
development from a set of eight lifestyle management 
services by assessing readiness for tariff development 
based on seven pre-identified criteria, each of which were 
rated high, intermediate or low. 
Epidemiological modelling tools 
• The Association of Public Health Observatories (APHO) 
Health Inequalities Intervention Tool is an on-line tool. It 
is used to undertake (i) gap analysis to explore the gap in 
life expectancy between the most deprived quintile of each 
local authority and a range of comparator areas (e.g. 
within and between PCTs); and (ii) to model the impact of 
four high impact interventions (i.e. smoking cessation, 
interventions to reduce infant mortality, treatment with 
hypertensives and treatment with statins) on life 
expectancy in the LA and the most deprived quintile of the 
LA selected. 
• Disease prevalence modelling is an approach to estimating 
projected disease prevalence based on regression 
analysis. The website for APHO includes prevalence 
models on cancer, chronic kidney disease, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease, coronary heart disease, 
diabetes, hypertension, mental illness and stroke. Eastern 
Region Public Health Observatory (ERPHO) provides an 
example of disease prevalence modelling for coronary 
obstructive pulmonary disease, stroke, hypertension, and 
coronary heart disease and chronic kidney disease at GP 
practice level and for local authorities for the adult 
population (aged 16+ years). This tool can support 
prioritisation when used alongside other approaches. 
• Predictive modelling is an approach to predicting service use 
based on regression analysis. 
• The National Centre for Health Outcomes Development 
(NCHOD) demonstration model for CHD uses a statistical 
simulation technique to analyse the likely impact on costs 
and benefits over different time horizons, of alternative 
strategies for the prevention, treatment and prevention 
and treatment (linked pathway) of CHD. 
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• Quest for Quality and Improved Performance QQUIP 
includes analysis to analysis to explore the cost-
effectiveness of current resource allocation in three 
selected fields of health care provision (i) improving statin 
prescribing in CHD, (ii) utilising intensive glucose control 
in type I diabetes and (iii) meeting the target of the 
National Suicide Prevention Strategy. 
•  A prioritisation exercise carried out in the USA involved a 
systematic review of the effectiveness, cost-effectiveness 
and burden of disease for 25 interventions (identified by 
the US Preventive Services Task Force and the Advisory 
Committee on Immunisation Practices). 
Web-based tools 
• The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) public health guidance and commissioning guides 
provide guidance, costing templates, business cases and 
make recommendations for populations and individuals on 
activities, policies and strategies that can help prevent 
disease or improve health. 
• Health England Leading Prioritisation tool (H.E.L.P.) is an 
on-line tool that can be used interactively to obtain 
information on the cost-effectiveness and impact on 
health inequalities on for 17 interventions comprising 
programmes related to alcohol use, mental health, 
obesity, smoking cessation, and sexually transmitted 
infections. H.E.L.P.’s prioritisation method used MCDA to 
identify interventions for evaluation and to select criteria 
against which to judge the interventions. Criteria weights 
were derived from a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to 
elicit decision makers’ preferences for the criteria. 
• Public Health Interventions Cost-effectiveness Database 
(PHICED) is an on-line, electronic database of 
bibliographic records which links to abstracts of economic 
evaluation studies (located on the NHS Economic 
Evaluation Database http://www.crd.york.ac.uk) and 
guidance and costing tools (located on the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence website 
http://www.nice.org.uk/) in the field of alcohol, obesity, 
physical activity and tobacco. 
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5.2 Competency six 
Competency six is described as follows: 
‘Prioritise investment of all spend in line with different financial scenarios and according to 
local needs, service requirements and the values of the NHS. By having a clear understanding 
of the needs of different sections of the local population, PCTs, with their partners, will set 
strategic priorities and make investment and disinvestment decisions, focused on the 
achievement of key clinical and other outcomes. This will include investment and 
disinvestment plans to achieve health gains and address areas of greatest health inequality. 
Three financial scenarios are considered and their impact reflected in the investment and 
disinvestment decisions proposed.’ 1 
Table 2 assesses prioritisation tools in relation to criteria relevant to 
meeting competency six.
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Table 2. Competency six: prioritising investment 
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Efficiency/value for money Y P Y Y P P P Y Y P S P S S Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Prioritisation Y P Y Y P Y Y Y Y Y Y P S S Y Y Y Y S Y Y Y 
Predictive modelling N N N N N N N N Y N N Y Y Y N N N N N N N N 
Burden of illness Y N Y Y N N N Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N 
Scenario analysis Y N Y N N N N N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Sensitivity analysis Y N Y N N N N N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Sub-group analysis Y N Y N N N N N Y N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Programme budgeting Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y N N N N N N N Y N N N Y 
Productivity Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Inter-sector impacts Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y 
Care pathway N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N 
Public /patient involvement Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N N Y N Y Y Y Y N 
Clinician involvement Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y N 
Stakeholder involvement Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y N 
Societal values N N N N N N N Y Y Y N Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Level of prioritisation A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A N 
Equity N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y N N N N N Y 
Aids transparency Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Volume of use in UK H H I H I H I I L I L I I I L L N H L N N N 
Ease of application/use I I I I I E E E I E E E I I I I I E E I I C 
Data requirements L L L L I L I L L L L L I I H I I L H H H H 
Analytical complexity L L L L H L I I I L L I H H H I I I I I I H 
Benchmark data available Y Y N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N 
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Y=Yes, N=No; P: tool potentially helps provide information on costs and/or benefits; S: tool provides supportive / 
supplementary data for prioritisation 
Value for money: Y=Yes; Level of prioritisation – A = All, N = National, R = region (SHA), P = PCT or PbC 
Volume of use/Data requirements/analytical complexity, N=Not used, L=Low, I = Intermediate, H= High 
Ease of use: E = Easy, I= Intermediate, C= Complex
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5.3 Assessing tools 
Prioritisation tools are described in more detail in respect of the following: 
(i) readiness for use; (ii) the methods used; (iii) whether they can/do follow 
the care pathway; (iv)whether they can/do include user involvement; (v) 
whether they can/do include stakeholder/clinician involvement; (vi) equity 
issues; (vii) feasibility and user-friendliness; and (viii) uncertainty. 
5.3.1 Readiness for use 
Some tools have not been implemented widely in health care (such as real 
options analysis) or are at early stages of development. Some, such as the 
National Centre for Health Outcomes Development (NCHOD) CHD 
demonstration model, require data input. Others are off the shelf analyses 
which can be re-run for context-specific results. 
Tools classed as demonstration models include the following: 
• NCHOD Coronary Heart Disease (CHD) demonstration model2 
• US prioritisation of prevention exercise for clinical services3-7 
• NHS West Midlands tool8  
• Quest for Quality and Improved Performance (QQUIP)9 
• National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) public 
health guidance and commissioning guides 
• Public Health Interventions Cost-Effectiveness Database (PHICED) 
Available at:http://www.healthengland.org/ 
• Health Inequalities Intervention tool Available at: 
http://www.lho.org.uk/. This has been applied to four interventions 
to date i.e. smoking cessation, interventions to reduce infant 
mortality, treatment with hypertensives and treatment with statins10 
• ERPHO’s disease prevalence models Available at: 
http://www.erpho.org.uk/viewResource.aspx?id=20606&sURI=http:/
/www.erpho.org.uk/ 
• NHS South of Tyne and Wear’s predictive model to estimate future 
acute health care demand 
• The modified Portsmouth Scorecard11 
• Yorkshire and Humber Public Health Observatory (YHPHO) PB work 
including quadrant analysis (the spend and outcome tool (SPOT)). 
Available at: http://www.yhpho.org.uk/. 
Off the shelf analyses include the following: 
• PBMA-based interactive atlases enable users to access the analyses for 
visual comparison across all PCTs and correlation with other variables such 
as the Index of Multiple Deprivation. The Department of Health has 
commissioned YHPHO to provide a PB factsheet for every PCT in England, 
including a quadrant analysis health outcome and expenditure comparison 
tool. 
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• The Health England Leading Prioritisation (H.E.L.P.) on-line tool can be 
used interactively to obtain information on the cost-effectiveness, impact 
on health inequalities and reach of 17 interventions (comprising 
programmes related to alcohol use, mental health, obesity, smoking 
cessation, and sexually transmitted infections). It enables the user to re-
run (i) subgroup analysis of interventions and ranking of interventions 
using different criteria, (ii) analysis at a PCT level rather than the national 
level, (iii) benchmarking new intervention/s against existing 
intervention/s. Available at: http://help.matrixknowledge.com/ 
• The Health Inequalities Intervention tool can be used to undertake (i) gap 
analysis to explore the difference in life expectancy between the most 
deprived quintile in the particular Local Authority (LA) selected and over a 
range of comparators; and (ii) to model the impact of four high impact 
interventions (i.e. smoking cessation, interventions to reduce infant 
mortality, treatment with hypertensives and treatment with statins) on life 
expectancy in the LA and the most deprived quintile of the LA selected. 
• As part of NICE’s public health guidance, costing templates and business 
case templates are available which can be applied within a local context. 
5.3.2 Prioritisation tool methods 
When addressing commissioning competencies each tool might be used to 
help prioritise investment or to evaluate efficiency and effectiveness of 
spend. The prioritisation tools use different methods to rank or prioritise 
options, including: (1) paired comparison analysis to establish choices 
across or within programmes; (2) conjoint analysis and discrete choice 
experiments (DCE) which focus on comparing the characteristics of two or 
more programmes and are typically used to make within programme 
comparisons via survey-based tools to identify the relative importance of 
different characteristics and to predict demand.12 The on-line H.E.L.P. tool 
used DCE to prioritise across programmes.13 DCE was used to weight and 
combine five criteria scores:(a) cost-effectiveness; (b) the proportion of the 
population eligible for the intervention; (c) the distribution of benefits 
across the population; (d) affordability; and (e) certainty to produce a 
ranking of each intervention. 
Similarly, multi-attribute decision-making (MADM), provides a framework to 
elicit stakeholders’ preferences in the decision-making process through 
defining goals, describing a set of alternative scenarios, identifying decision 
criteria and evaluation criteria.14-16 
Cost-effectiveness approaches to prioritisation, such as that of NICE, use a 
threshold incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER). Programmes are 
selected if the ICER is equal to or less than the willingness to pay for a 
Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY), i.e. the threshold value of around 
£20,000 to £30,000 per QALY. However, it is not known whether the 
threshold value reflects society’s true willingness to pay for interventions. In 
its guidance on the assessment of cost-effectiveness of public health 
interventions, NICE suggests the subsidiary use of a cost-consequence 
analysis (CCA) approach. This may provide additional relevant information; 
for example, analysts may report multiple, non-health related outcomes. 
The inclusion of additional outcomes may modify decisions based solely on a 
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cost per QALY evaluation, and may help communicate decisions to 
stakeholders and the public. However, no guidance is offered on how 
decision makers should use CCA. Decision makers may apply their own 
decision-making criteria, and it is not clear that this process will be 
transparent, or applied systematically across interventions.17 
A few of the tools that were identified incorporate predictive modelling, an 
approach of particular relevance to competency six. Predictive models and 
disease prevalence models can link burden of illness to service use18 to 
estimate the impact of changing needs on demand for services over time, 
typically based on regression analysis. The models can be used for planning 
and commissioning purposes to compare outcomes with estimated 
outcomes in the future (ceteris paribus). In addition, scenario analysis can 
be undertaken using predictive modelling, e.g. estimating outcomes in the 
future, under different scenarios, if services are reconfigured. The tools can 
also be used to undertake sub-group analysis, e.g. to compare service 
provision for given population need, or for undertaking health equity audits. 
The Public Health Intelligence North East (PHINE) website (Available at: 
http://www.phine.org.uk/) hosted by the North East Public Health 
Observatory (NEPHO), includes a commissioning support unit for sharing 
information on predictive modelling and prioritisation as well as links to 
predictive modelling resources. The website includes information about a 
predictive model developed by NHS South of Tyne and Wear (SoTW) 19 
which, over a 10-year time horizon, estimated a year-on-year increase in 
primary care consultations, among other things, driven by an increase in 
the elderly population. In addition, the website includes information on 
disease prevalence models undertaken by Eastern Region Public Health 
Observatory (ERPHO),20 in conjunction with Imperial College, University of 
London. ERPHO estimated disease prevalence for coronary obstructive 
pulmonary disease (COPD), stroke, hypertension, and coronary heart 
disease (CHD) and chronic kidney disease at GP practice level and for local 
authorities (LAs) for the adult population (aged 16+ years). 
In the Health Inequalities Intervention tool, planned outcomes were linked 
to estimate the impact on life expectancy figures. This tool uses gap 
analysis, a form of sub-group analysis, to analyse the contribution of causes 
of death to the difference between the most deprived quintile of the LA and 
a variety of comparators (e.g. England as a whole; England’s least deprived 
quintile; the LA as a whole) for four high impact interventions (i.e. smoking 
cessation, interventions to reduce infant mortality, treatment with 
hypertensives and treatment with statins). 
In line with competency six, it would be possible to develop these tools 
further to explore the costs of the services being compared to reflect the 
impact of different financial scenarios. A few of the tools that were identified 
make this step.21, 22 Sensitivity analysis can be used to explore the 
robustness of findings as various parameters within the analysis change, 
including changes in costs. 
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The Quest for Quality and Improved Performance (QQUIP) team22 analysed 
the impact of three policies (i.e. improving prescribing statins to reduce 
cholesterol, using intensive glucose control to better manage Type 1 
diabetes and a policy to reduce the number of suicides). The approach 
taken was to assess current burden of disease (BoD) and the BoD averted 
through use of an intervention. As part of the analysis, the monetary values 
of ‘avoidable’ deaths and gains in Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) were 
estimated, as well as the net costs of an intervention and the gains or 
losses in NHS productivity (assuming a QALY gain is worth £30,000). The 
demonstration model for CHD mentioned above, was constructed to enable 
policy-makers to analyse the likely impact, on costs and benefits over 
different time horizons, of alternative strategies for the prevention, 
treatment and prevention and treatment (linked pathway) of CHD. 
Competency six notes the use of programme budgeting (PB) to prioritise 
investment and competency eleven lists PB as a key skill. PBMA is a 
priority-setting aid to identify how resources are being spent prior to 
exploring potential changes in service provision at the margin, to maximise 
benefit and minimise cost This approach appraises resource allocation 
within certain programmes in relation to programme objectives (programme 
budgeting) and assesses incremental costs and benefits of shifting 
resources (marginal analysis). 
It can be used to inform resource use and (dis)investment decisions within 
and across programmes. In this system, resources are allocated in relation 
to their relative contributions to strategic aims and objectives and tailored 
in light of the law of diminishing returns. Redeployment within programme 
areas forms an integral part of the process. The National Programme 
Budget Project was set up by DH in 2002 and data has been collected for 
DH by PCTs since 2003. Categories are largely based on programmes of 
care linked to specific conditions (in particular the NSFs for which it was 
intended to monitor expenditure) and intended to help monitor how NHS 
resources are being deployed. It is therefore limited in relation to broader 
notions of health and well being. The Spend and Outcome Tool (SPOT) 
developed by the Association of Public Health Observatories is updated with 
expenditure data using the latest programme budgeting returns. The tool 
and PCT factsheets can be accessed at: 
http://www.yhpho.org.uk/resource/view.aspx?RID=49488# 
One of the categories (category 21) refers to ‘healthy individuals’ and 
spending on preventative health care. The latest programme budget 
information23 shows that almost all the £1.8 billion spent on Healthy 
Individuals in 2008/09 went on screening and immunisation programmes. 
It has also been argued that national evaluation needs to be supplemented 
by evaluation at local level, given different historical spending patterns and 
therefore different trade offs. However, a major obstacle has been adequate 
budgetary information. 
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5.3.3 Care pathways 
Care pathways are intended to incorporate public health and preventative 
activities. While a number of the prioritisation tools could potentially assess 
the costs and benefits associated with alternative pathways of care, 
including the contribution of public health interventions, in practice there 
are few examples that follow such a long-term time horizon. In addition, 
analyses tend to be intervention-specific rather than include evaluation of 
the multiple interventions and services that might be accessed and used 
along the individual’s journey and potentially over the lifetime of care. 
The NCHOD demonstration model for CHD is perhaps the most advanced 
prioritisation tool in terms of following the patient pathway of care and in 
linking use of public health and acute interventions. The analyses were 
based on discrete-event simulation models to examine the likely impact on 
costs and benefits over different time horizons, of alternative strategies for 
the prevention, treatment and prevention and treatment (linked pathway) 
of CHD. The latter involves comparison between e.g. primary prevention 
(changing CHD risk in people without CHD) and secondary prevention 
(changing CHD risk in people with CHD). The modelling approach enables 
the user to explore an event sequence for each individual in the simulation, 
a cohort database which lends itself to analysis by sub-group and a cross-
sectional database which enables the analyst to explore the health state of 
each member of the population at a particular point in time. 
Methodologies used in NICE technology assessments could be applied to 
model care pathways, assessing the impact of interventions for primary and 
secondary prevention and curative services over the life course. 
5.3.4 User involvement 
PCTs have a duty to involve patients and the public in decision-making. 
WCC competency three states commissioners need to ‘proactively seek to 
build continuous and meaningful engagement with the public and patients, 
to shape services and improve health’. The majority of prioritisation tools 
have the potential to enable the analyst to incorporate public and/or patient 
preferences. The tools may also be useful as a framework for discussion, to 
shape debate on prioritisation (e.g. by focusing on economic concepts like 
opportunity cost) and potentially to help in exposing and aligning different 
perspectives across potentially diverse groups of people. 
Participatory budgeting can be used as part of the PB/PBMA framework to 
give local people a say in how resources are allocated. It directly involves 
local people in making decisions on spending and priorities for a defined 
public budget. 
The ranking of services or service characteristics as part of conjoint analysis 
and DCE, paired comparison analysis, MADM, population-cost impact 
approach, the modified Portsmouth scoring card, and the NHS West 
Midlands tool can, but do not always, involve public and patient voices. In 
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practice, more could be done to include values and preferences of the 
public. 
As well as incorporating user involvement in the prioritisation of 
programmes, the values of users can be incorporated in the valuation of 
health outcomes. For example, QALYs included in NICE cost-effectiveness 
evaluations incorporate societal values to measure the utility associated 
with different health states.24 The voice of the public will only reflect societal 
views if values are representative of the population. Furthermore, QALYs 
reflect the social valuation of abstract health valuations, but not society’s 
specific valuations of individual diseases and treatments. 
5.3.5 Stakeholder involvement 
Most tools could include stakeholder involvement for example through 
selecting interventions for analysis, criteria on which to judge the 
interventions and to value the criteria and to produce an overall ranking of 
interventions being compared. 
5.3.6 Equity issues 
All the choices made when using prioritisation tools have an equity impact 
on the distribution of health across the population. For example, analyses 
which incorporate QALYs assume a QALY is of equal value no matter to 
whom it accrues, unless the QALY is adjusted to reflect equity-relevant 
characteristics. However, in practice few analysts using prioritisation tools 
explicitly note the equity impact of alternative decisions. WCC competency 
six asks that ’investment and disinvestment plans …. address areas of 
greatest health inequality’. The National Programme Budget project which 
includes the collection of PB data, also includes data on (i) overall spend per 
weighted head of population (ii) all age all cause mortality and (iii) 
deprivation (using the Index of Multiple Deprivation), thus providing 
analysts with the opportunity to explore equity issues. 
In tools that incorporate QALYs (i.e. the NCHOD demonstration model for 
CHD, Bevan et al’s QQUIP work, NICE’s cost-effectiveness analyses and the 
QALY based analyses included on PHICED), these tend to be unweighted 
and therefore each additional QALY has the same weight regardless of the 
health status or other characteristics of the individual who gains the health 
benefit. More could be done to develop prioritisation tools to assess equity 
issues explicitly.25 The Health Inequalities Intervention tool enables 
comparison of interventions in terms of life expectancy in a particular LA 
and the most deprived quintile of the LA selected. 
5.3.7 Feasibility and user-friendliness 
When applying prioritisation tools, a key concern is their feasibility and 
user-friendliness. Indicators of feasibility and user-friendliness include: 
volume of use of each prioritisation tool in the UK; data requirements; 
analytical complexity; and the availability of benchmark data. The most 
developed in these respects include NICE guidance, PBMA analyses and 
paired comparisons. 
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5.3.8 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a feature of any evaluation and this should be explicitly 
addressed when using a prioritisation tool. There will always be a chance 
that the wrong option is prioritised, e.g. the chosen programme may not 
maximise health benefit, given the resources used. Furthermore, models 
that may be validated in their original context may become biased or less 
precise in a new setting. Thus careful analysis should identify and explore 
critical areas of uncertainty (e.g. using sensitivity analysis) as suggested in 
competency six which calls for evaluation of ‘different financial scenarios’. 
5.4 Conclusions 
Competencies are not defined in absolute terms and therefore there is 
significant room for interpretation in relation to the usefulness of 
prioritisation tools: this is reflected in the authors’ categorisations. It is 
important to note that no judgements are being made about the quality of 
the tools per se, rather the tables provide basic appraisal of the tools in 
relation to competency six. While the prioritisation tools might meet most of 
the requirements for competencies six and eleven, the tools need to be 
applied appropriately, and using relevant, unbiased data. Additionally, it is 
important that the correct balance of representation is used when seeking 
stakeholder/user involvement. In general, the tools identify the 
interventions to be compared and the criteria by which the interventions are 
to be judged, then measure and value whether and to what extent the 
interventions meet the criteria. This takes place within a wider context of 
strategic priorities identified through health needs assessment as described 
in Chapter 9. 
References 
1. Department of Health. World class commissioning assurance handbook 
Year 2. London: Department of Health; 2009. 
2. Davies R, Normand C, Raftery J, Roderick P, Sanderson C, Babad H et al. 
Policy analysis for coronary heart disease: a simulation model of 
interventions, costs and outcomes. London: Department of Health; 2004. 
3. Maciosek MV, Coffield AB, McGinnis JM, Harris JR, Caldwell MB, Teutsch 
SM. Methods for priority-setting among clinical preventive services. 
American Journal of Preventive Medicine 2001; 21:10-9. 
4. Maciosek MV, Coffield AB, Edwards NM, Flottemesch TJ, Goodman MJ, 
Solberg LI. Priorities among effective clinical preventive services: results of 
a systematic review and analysis. American Journal of Preventive Medicine 
2006; 31:52-61. 
5. Maciosek MV, Edwards NM, Coffield AB, Flottemesch TJ, Nelson WW, 
Goodman MJ et al. Priorities among effective clinical preventive services: 
methods. American Journal of Preventive Medicine 2006; 31:90-6. 
6. Maciosek MV, Solberg LI, Coffield AB, Edwards NM, Goodman MJ. 
Colorectal cancer screening: health impact and cost effectiveness. American 
Journal of Preventive Medicine 2006; 31:80-9. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      207 
 Project 08/1716/208 
7. Maciosek MV, Solberg LI, Coffield AB, Edwards NM, Goodman MJ. 
Influenza vaccination health impact and cost effectiveness among adults 
aged 50 to 64 and 65 and older. American Journal of Preventive Medicine 
2006; 31:72-9. 
8. Wyatt S. Assessment of lifestyle risk management service: Readiness for 
tariff development. Birmingham: NHS West Midlands; 2008. 
9. Bevan G, Airoldi M, Morton A, Oliveira M, Smith J. Estimating health and 
productivity gains in England from selected interventions. London: The 
Health Foundation; 2007. 
10. Malhotra N, Jacobson B. Save to invest: Developing criteria-based 
commissioning for planned health care in London. London: London Health 
Observatory; 2007. 
11. Heller RF, Gemmell I, Wilson ECF, Fordham R, Smith RD. Using 
economic analyses for local priority-setting: the population cost-impact 
approach. Applied Health Economics and Health Policy 2006; 5:45-54. 
12. Ryan M, Farrar S. Using conjoint analysis to elicit preferences for health 
care. BMJ 2000; 320:1530-3. 
13. Matrix Knowledge Group, Bazian. Prioritising investments in public 
health. Report for the Department of Health. London: Matrix; 2008. 
14.Carrin G. Economic evaluation of health care in developing countries: 
theory and applications. London: Croom Helm; 1984. 
15. Keeney R, Raiffa H. Decisions with multiple objectives: Preferences and 
value trade-offs. New York: John Wiley, 1976. 
16. Mann R. Multi-criteria decision analysis-a new approach to an old 
problem. Pharmacoepidemiology & Drug Safety 2007; 16. 
17. Drummond M, Weatherly H, Claxton K, Cookson R, Ferguson B, Godfrey 
C et al. Assessing the challenges of applying standard methods of economic 
evaluation. York: Public Health Research Consortium; 2007. 
18. Green S, Miles R. The burden of disease and illness in the UK: A 
preliminary assessment to inform the development of UK Health Research 
and Development Priorities. Oxford Health care Associates; 2008. 
19. NHS South of Tyne and Wear. Predictive modelling – the future of acute 
health care demand across NHS South of Tyne and Wear; 2009. 
20. Walford H. Technical briefing: Disease prevalence modelling at practice 
level. Eastern Region Public Health Observatory;2009. 
21. Davies R, Normand C, Raftery J, Roderick P, Sanderson C, Babad H et 
al. Policy analysis for coronary heart disease: a simulation model of 
interventions, costs and outcomes. London: Department of Health; 2004. 
22. Bevan G, Airoldi M, Morton A, Oliveira M, Smith J. Estimating health and 
productivity gains in England from selected interventions. London: The 
Health Foundation; 2007. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      208 
 Project 08/1716/208 
23. Audit Commission. Payment by Results data assurance framework 
2008/09: Key messages from Year 2 of the national clinical coding audit 
programme. London: Audit Commission; 2009. 
24. Rawlins M, Culyer A. National Institute for Clinical Excellence and its 
value judgements. BMJ 2004; 329:224-7. 
25. Cookson R, Drummond M, Weatherly H. Explicit incorporation of equity 
considerations into economic evaluation of public health interventions. 
Health Economics Policy and Law 2009;4: 231-45. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011      209 
 Project 08/1716/208 
Addendum 
This document is an output from a research project that was commissioned 
by the Service Delivery and Organisation (SDO) programme, and managed 
by the National Coordinating Centre for the Service Delivery and 
Organisation (NCCSDO), based at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical 
Medicine. 
The management of the SDO programme has now transferred to the 
National Institute for Health Research Evaluations, Trials and Studies 
Coordinating Centre (NETSCC) based at the University of Southampton. 
Although NETSCC, SDO has conducted the editorial review of this 
document, we had no involvement in the commissioning, and therefore may 
not be able to comment on the background of this document. Should you 
have any queries please contact sdo@southampton.ac.uk. 
 
